12-31-1976

Initial Report of Crash

San Dewayne Francisco

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UNCLASSIFIED

11. WITNESSES AND/OR PERSONNEL OR AIRCRAFT ATTACH PERTINENT STATEMENTS FROM EACH.

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<tr>
<th>LAST NAME</th>
<th>FIRST NAME</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>GRADE</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hall, John R.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Major</td>
<td></td>
<td>WV2225979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantine, Gary R.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>F172610</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldman, James D.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1st Lt</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dallin, Ralph C.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitzsimmons, Robert J. (See Continuation Sheet)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Capt.</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
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12. DETAILS CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING DISAPPEARANCE (Duration, extent and results of search; life-saving equipment, available and/or used; if applicable, peculiarities of tides, terrain, etc., and any other details pertinent to a determination of status not included elsewhere in this report.)

Major Morrison and Lt Francisco (Grommet 02) F4D escorted an RF-4C into NV1 at approximately 1241L, Coordinates 171640/1061140. Grommet 02 reported at approximately 1242L, in vicinity of 1720/10612 heading 13° altitude 14^0 AGL minimum and ground speed approximately 540KTS, "We've taken a hit." Recce crew broke off run, climbed to altitude and remained in the vicinity. Grommet 01 heard a steady beeper. Grommet 01 notified Croom 06 that his wingman was down and gave approximate location by coordinates and proximity to a delta reference point. Jolly 41 relayed the information to Insert control and proceeded to the area where he sighted the aircraft wreckage and established voice and visual contact with Grommet 02 Alpha at 1254L. At Jolly 41, Grommet 02 Bravo established possible contact with Jolly 41 that it was Grommet 02 Bravo. The reply was extremely garbled, but review of the taped conversation has convinced both crew members of Jolly 41 that it was Grommet 02 Bravo. They were however unable to pinpoint his exact location. The aircraft wreckage, Grommet 02 Alpha and Grommet 02 Alpha's parachute were observed to be within 700 meters of an enemy encampment on one side and a highway segment on the other with numerous personnel and trucks in the vicinity. During the SAR effort which continued throughout the daylight hours a Jolly 31 (FLOOF) received battle damage one of at least four 37MM double gun positions located 2-4 miles south of the survivors position. Jolly Green 20, a rescue helicopter, also received numerous automatic weapons impact from one of approximately 10 areas of small arms/automatic weapons firing on all sides and within 2000 meters of the survivors. It is believed that Grommet 02 Bravo landed in very close proximity to enemy personnel and was detained shortly after the initial and inconclusive attempt to contact him at 1315L. Grommet 02 Alpha successfully evaded during the hours of darkness and voice contact was re-established at 0555L, 26 Nov 68, by Jolly 11. (See Continuation Sheet)

13. OPINION OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER

A. CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT CONTINUATION IN A MISSING STATUS

B. CHANGE FROM MISSING TO DEAD

C. REASONS

The nature of the disappearance indicates that the possibility for survival does exist and there is no conclusive evidence of death.

Definite voice contact was made with Major Morrison on 25 November and 26 November. Probable voice contact was made with Lt Francisco on 25 November.

One chute was observed on the ground.
Major Morrison and Lt Francisco (Grommet 02) F4D escorted an RF-4C into NV 01 at approximately 1240L, Coordinates 171640/106140. Grommet 02 reported at approximately 1242L, in vicinity of 1720/10612 heading 15° altitude 100' AGL minimum and ground speed approximately 540KTS, "I've taken a hit". Recce crew broke off run, climbed to altitude and remained in the vicinity. Grommet 01 heard a steady beeper. Grommet 01 notified Grom 06 that his wingman was down and gave approximate location by coordinates and proximity to a delta reference point. Misty 41 relayed the information to Invert control and proceeded to the area where he sighted the aircraft wreckage and established voice and visual contact with Grommet 02 Alpha at 1254L. At 1341 Misty 41 established probable contact with Grommet 02 Bravo. The reply was extremely garbled, but review of the taped conversation has convinced both crew members of Misty 41 that it was Grommet 02 Bravo. They were however unable to pinpoint his exact location. The aircraft wreckage, Grommet 02 Alpha and Grommet 02 Alpha's parachute were observed to be within 700 meters of an enemy encampment on one side and a highway segment on the other with numerous personnel and trucks in the vicinity. During the SAR effort which continued throughout the daylight hours a Misty 31 (FLOOR) received battle damage one of at least four 37MM double gun positions located 2-4 miles south of the survivors position. Jolly Green 20, a rescue helicopter, also received numerous automatic weapons impact from one of approximately 10 areas of small arms/automatic weapons firing on all sides and within 2000 meters of the survivors. It is believed that Grommet 02 Bravo landed in very close proximity to enemy personnel and was detained shortly after the initial and inconclusive attempt to contact him at 1351L. Grommet 02 Alpha successfully evaded during the hours of darkness and voice contact was re-established at 0555L, 26 Nov 68, by Misty 11. (See Continuation Sheet)
Item 11 (Continued):
Rice, Roger F
Soller, Clyde
Lynch, Robert E.
Holden, Charles H.
Konopka, Robert C.

Item 12 (Continued):
The SAR was delayed primarily for weather and the last known contact with Grommet 02 Alpha occurred at 0723L with Misty 21. At that time Grommet 02 Alpha was still "OK". SAR effort terminated on 26 Nov 68 at 1727L due to unsuccessful voice or beeper contact with either crew member. The parachute which had been visible on the 25th was not observed on the 26th of November. Life saving equipment available, personal life raft, Caliber 38 Revolver, SN K597312 (Major Morrison) and K743474 (Lt Francisco), tropic survival kit and signaling equipment. The area where the survivors ejected from the aircraft consisted of hilly, karst jungle.
UNCLASSIFIED

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I, John V. Wall, Major, FV2225979 was Aircraft Commander in an RF-4C, call sign, Grommet I, which lead the flight in which Major Morrison and Lt Francisco were crewmembers in an F-4D flying wingman call sign Grommet 2. Grommet 2 reported at approximately 1245L in vicinity of 1720 degrees N 10612 degrees E, heading 013 degrees, altitude 1,000 feet AGL, Ground Speed approximately 540 KMS, that "we've taken a hit". I broke off my reconnaissance run and climbed to altitude. Grommet 2 never climbed to altitude and joined up with lead. A SAR effort was initiated by me, through Harbor Master. No parachutes were observed but a rescue beeper was heard. No voice contact was made by my aircraft with the downed crewmembers. Hasty 41 arrived on scene and became the On Scene Commander for the SAR effort. I returned to base as requested by Crown 6 when radio control was made with him.

John V. Wall

JOHN V. WALL

Major USAF

FV2225979

Aircraft Commander Grommet 01

Classification canceled (changed to UNCLASSIFIED) by authority of 5200.1-R-1-40 by

Kane English 11 Dec 1976

Classified by: Headcliff, Barrow, Col USAF

SUBJECT: 10 GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE
OF EXECUTIVE ORDER MUST
AUTOMATICALLY DEGRADED
AT TWO-YEAR INTERVALS.
DECLASSIFIED ON 31 DECEMBER 1976
UNCLASSIFIED

Grommet "flight" proceeded to the target area, RTE 137. At 1245L the "flight" started its run at the southern point of RTE 137 at 1000' AGL, heading 01L at approximately 1245L Grommet 02 broadcasted, "We've taken a hit." Immediately Grommet 01 broke off the run, climbing to altitude and established that Grommet 02 had been shot down. Grommet 01 stayed in the area until 1425L. Voice contact had been made with Grommet 02-3 and probably with Grommet 02-7, by Nasty 41.

Cpt. R.T. "Randy" Hatley
Wt. Cpt.

Classification canceled (changed to UNCLASSIFIED by authority of 5300.1-8, 1-401 by [signature])

UNCLASSIFIED

Classified by: [signature]
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11852 AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO YEAR INTERVALS. DECLASSIFIED ON 31/DECEMBER 1976

UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJ: (U) US Pilots Captured in North Vietnam.

(U) Items 1-2: Two issues of "Quân Đội Nhân Dân" ((People's Army)) Newspaper, No 2696 and 2698, published in Hanoi on 24 and 26 Nov 68, provides news coverage on the war in SVN, AA activities in NVN, editorials, and international news. Following are noteworthy articles:

- Letter of Commendation, dtd 23 Nov 68, issued by the NVA High Command, awarded to the Nguyễn Viên An Artillery Unit, which, at 1317 hours, on 23 Nov 68, shot down a US recon aircraft, type RF-4C, in Quảng Bình Prov and captured the pilot.

- A news item which discloses that two other aircraft were shot down on 25 Nov 68, and the pilots captured. The first was an "A-37" shot down in Nghi An Prov, at 1030 hrs, and the second was a "F-4C" shot down in Quảng Bình Prov at 1230 hrs.

- A editorial which calls for the strengthening of the relationship between province units ((in NVN)) and local associations because this is...
**Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report**

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<td><strong>Subject</strong></td>
<td>CDEC BULLETIN No. 20,602(U)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Date of Report</strong></td>
<td>14 February 1969</td>
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<td><strong>Evaluation</strong></td>
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**Summary:**

Attachment to this report, CDEC "Bulletin No. 20,602(U), Enemy Documents" summarizes information contained in captured enemy documents considered to be of intelligence value. Attachment also lists the CDEC Document Log Number, capture data pertaining to the documents concerned, and date these documents were received by CDEC.

The items contained in the attached bulletin which have been selected for full translation or extract translation and are to be published as "Translation Reports" (TR) at a later date are marked with an asterisk.

Full translation of other documents summarized in attachment will be provided upon request. Such requests should include the CDEC Document Log Number.

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**REQUEST ENC FROM DIA/10A**

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**UNCLASSIFIED**
GRUMMAN FLIGHT PROCEEDED TO THE TARGET AREA. RTB 137. AT 1245L THE FLIGHT STARTED ITS RUN AT THE SOUTHERN POINT OF RTB 137 AT 1000' AGL, HEADING 013°. AT APPROXIMATELY 1245L GRUMMAN 02 INFORMED, "WE'VE TAKEN A HIT." IMMEDIATELY GRUMMAN 01 BROKE OFF THE RUN, CLIMBING TO ALTITUDE AND ESTABLISHED THAT GRUMMAN 02 HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN. GRUMMAN 01 STAYED IN THE AREA UNTIL 1323L. FOICE CONTACT HAD BEEN MADE WITH GRUMMAN 02-1 AND PROBABLY WITH GRUMMAN 02-3, BY NITY 41.

[Signature]

GRUMMAN, CONWAY, Capt., USAF

M172310

Navigator, Grummam 01

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED by authority of MSG 200774, 17th REARM, Randolph
AFB, TX on 10 DEC 1974
At approximately 1330 hours on 25 November, Misty 51, (Weidman/Kellum), was en-route to the tanker on Peach track to refuel when the Grommet 02 SAR effort was started. Being busy with the tanker, we were unable to monitor the proceedings until dropping off the tanker. We then proceeded back to the fox trot area to meet Lunar flight at 1420. As we proceeded to the area we called Invert for the particulars of the SAR effort and got the general location of the effort. We informed them we were full of fuel and were available for the SAR effort. Receiving no reply other than acknowledgment we proceeded to south of Tchefone to await Lunar flight.

We monitored the SAR effort until about 1410 when Roy called on frequency and asked us to relieve a sailor on the tanker. We proceeded back to the fox trot area to meet Lunar flight.

As we proceeded to the area they called Invert for the particular SAR effort and got the general location of the effort. We informed them we were full of fuel and available for the SAR effort. We called Invert and asked about Lunar flight. They said they had not heard from them. About a minute later, Crown called us and asked us to relieve Misty 41 who had to cycle to the tanker. We proceeded at once toward the delta 58 area.

As soon as we were on frequency we heard M-41 go to the tanker. To wait so long to bring the next Misty into play in my opinion is a mistake. We had to proceed to the area with nothing but a tacan/DME and no real description from M-41 of the ground situation or status of the downed pilots.

The only information we got was by simply monitoring the radio. Arriving in the general area, Crown contacted us and designated M-51 on scene commander. We picked up Nail 62, brought him over on frequency, and found he was orbiting above the clouds over the crash site. At this time, there was a solid overcast layer at about 6000 feet thick. Due to our not knowing the exact location of the downed airman, we told Nail 62 to orbit over the clouds and act as a relay to all agencies and top cover for us. We elected to go about 6 miles south, drop under the clouds and try to establish contact with Grommet 02A and B. Finding the bases of the clouds just above the mountain peaks, we entered at Ban Labby just south of delta 58 and proceeded up Rt 137 to the coordinates that we had copied down. We spotted the general area and made a sweeping pass over it and heard one of the Grommets come up on radio and say he heard us and we were close. Having very little room to turn we slid behind the mountains and elected to make another pass to narrow down Grommet's exact position. On the second pass we told Grommet we would light the burner and to inform us how we passed over him. Doing this, he informed us to come down into the slope at him and that we were very near. We again swung around to make a pass to pinpoint his position. This time we passed exactly over him and he told us we were receiving 37mm and heavy ZPU fire. Because of the very low clouds and our ability to talk to him only when very close, we elected to make one more pass to fix the gun positions relative to the pilots, and then pop up through the clouds.
Running just east of the road, we established voice contact with Grommet and immediately were hit by a 37mm shell in the left aileron. We punched off the stones and departed for NKP eventually landing at Ubon. To make a few observations, Misty 51 should have been brought into the effort in time to have been thoroughly briefed by Misty 41 and allowed to set up a fuel-cycle overlap so as to always having a Misty in the area. This would allow a constant update of the situation as well as the ability to put fast movers in at any break in the weather.

JAMES H. WEIDMAN, L Lt, USAF
Commando Sabre Pilot

RALPH C. DELLUM, Capt, USAF
Commando Sabre Pilot
1. On November 25, I participated in the SAR effort for C-130 02. Misty 51 was in voice contact with 02A when I arrived. He briefed me on the location of the downed pilot and known 37mm positions in the immediate area. I then left the area to refuel.

2. When I returned, Crown had several flights of fighters available for close suppression. The first flight to expend received very heavy AA fire. I estimated 100 air bursts on each pass. Two additional flights were used and the guns appeared to be completely silenced. Shortly thereafter Sandy arrived on the scene. He made numerous low passes attempting to draw ground fire. When he didn’t receive any, the Jolly attempted a pick-up. As he approached a hover, he received automatic weapon fire from several locations, forcing him to withdraw with battle damage.

3. The second pair of Jollys were too far away to reach the scene prior to darkness. The SAR effort was terminated for the night. The remaining fighters were expended on suspected gun positions.

4. Comments. The back-up Jollys should have been holding much closer to the locations of the survivor. A second rescue attempt could have been made prior to the onset of darkness. As I recall the Jollys were being held 35mm west of the scene.

Robert J. Tigges
ROBERT J. FITZSIMMONS, Capt, USAF
Commando Sabre Pilot

Roger P. Rice
ROGER P. RICE, 1 Lt, USAF
Commando Sabre Pilot
STATEMENT
UNCLASSIFIED

1. At 1700 Misty 71 was launched as an extra sortie to help with the Grommet SAR effort. We arrived in the area at 1740 just about the time the SAR effort was called off because the Jolly had been hit. We directed, or helped Misty 41 direct, Zebra, Flamingo and gun fighter flight upon gun positions south of the survivor. We RTB'ed with Misty 41 at 1900.

2. On the morning of the 26th we flew Misty 11, arrived in the area and established contact with Grommet 02A at 0655. He stated he was all right. It was still almost clouds in the valleys and we could see fog in the valleys, otherwise the visibility in the immediate area was clear. Misty 21 arrived and we proceeded to refuel. Enroute back to the area M-21 briefed us and we put Bass flights in on suspected gun sites south of the survivor. At this time, 0800, I asked Crown if the Sandys and Jollys were enroute and was told they were being held on the ground at NKP. We requested an immediate launch. I had previously thought the Sandys and Jollys would launch to arrive on scene at daylight because it was to be a first light effort. About 10 minutes later I asked Crown the position of the Sandys and was told they were being held and that they wanted another weather report. Since all my previous weather reports were favorable I said to pass the weather that you have and to launch the Sandys and Jollys. Only our flights of fighters received ground fire and that was Bass who received 40/50 rounds of 23/37mm. At 0820, M-21 made a low pass over the survivor and he came up voice and said he was OK. Since it was going to be an hour for Sandy and Jolly to arrive we expended, or helped, Barracuda and Gunfighter flights. The Sandys arrived at 0945 and started calling Grommet 02A and no contact was ever made. I made a low A/B pass at 0955 with no response. We remained in the area until 1130 and RTB'ed due to weather and no contact with Grommet 02A.

Olyser Eiler
C. L. DE SELIER, Maj, USAF
Commando Sabre Operations Officer

ROBERT E. LYNCH, Capt, USAF
Commando Sabre Pilot

Replaced UNCLASSIFIED by authority of Maj. H. D. F. SCOTT, 1974
I, John W. Wall, Major, F72225979 was Aircraft Commander in an EF-4G, call sign, Gromet 1, which lead the flight in which Major Morrison and Lt Francisco were crew members in an F-4D flying wingman call sign Gromet 2. Gromet 2 reported at approximately 12,500ft in vicinity of 1720 degrees N 10312 degrees E, heading 013 degrees, altitude 10,000 feet AGL, Ground Speed approximately 540 KIAS, that "we've taken a hit". I broke off my reconnaissance run and climbed to altitude. Gromet 2 never climbed to altitude and joined up with lead. A SAR effort was initiated by me, through Harbor Master. No parachutes were observed but a rescue hooper was heard. No voice contact was made by my aircraft with the downed crew members. Hasty 41 arrived on scene and became the on-scene Commander for the SAR effort. I returned to base as requested by Gromet 4 when radio control was made with him.

JOHN W. WALL
Major USAF

Aircraft Commander Gromet 01
Cronment flight enroute to the target area, X2: 157. At 12:49 the flight
entered its run at the southern point of X2: 157 at 1,000' FL, heading 015°
of approximately 11:17. Cronment 02 broadcast, "We've taken a hit." Immedi-
ately from 01, voices off the run, climbed to altitude and established
that Cronment 01 had been hit. Cronment 01 stayed in the area until
12:31. Voices enroute had been made with Cronment 02-1 and verbally with
Cronment 02-1, 03:00 FL.

Cronment 01

Ft. Drum, N.Y.

F17-10

Ft. Drum, Cronment 01

UNCLASSIFIED

BEST COPY AVAILABLE
At approximately 1330 hours on 25 November, Misty 51, (Heichan/Kellum), was en-route to the tanker on Peach track to refuel when the Grommet 02 SAR effort was started. Being busy with the tanker, we were unable to monitor the proceedings until dropping off the tanker. We then proceeded back to the foxtrot area to meet Lunar Flight at 1420. As we proceeded to the area we called Invert for the particulars of the SAR effort and got the general location of the effort. We informed them we were full of fuel and were available for the SAR effort. Receiving no reply other than acknowledgment we proceeded to south of Tachepone to await Lunar flight. We monitored the SAR effort until about 1440 when we called Crown on guard and told him of our fuel state and availability to participate in the effort. They said they would contact us if we were needed. At approximately 1425 we called Invert and asked about Lunar flight. They said they had not heard from them. About a minute later, Crown called us and asked us to relieve Misty 41 who had to cycle to the tanker. We proceeded at once toward the delta 53 area. As soon as we were on frequency we heard K-41 go to the tanker. To wait so long to bring the next misty into play in my option is a mistake. We had to proceed to the area with nothing but a tacan/DEK and no real description from K-41 of the ground situation or status of the doomed pilots. The only information we got was by simply monitoring the radio. Arriving in the general area, Crown contacted us and designated K-51 on scene commander. We picked up Nail 62, brought him over on frequency, and found he was orbiting above the clouds over the crash sight. At this time, there was a solid overcast layer at about 6000' that looked fairly thick. Due to our not knowing the exact location of the doomed airmen, we told Nail 62 to orbit over the clouds and act as relay to all agencies and top cover for us. We elected to go about 8 miles south, drop under the clouds and try to establish contact with Grommet O2A and B. Finding the bases of the clouds just above the mountain peaks, we entered at Ban Lady just south of delta 53 and proceeded up Rt 137 to the coordinates that we had copied down. We spotted the general area and made a sweeping pass over it and hear one of the Grommets come up on radio and say he heard us and we were close. Having very little room to turn we slid behind the mountains and elected to make another pass to narrow down Grommet's exact position. On this second pass we told Grommet we would light the burner and to inform us how we passed over him. Doing this, he informed us to come down the slope at him and that we were very near. We again swung around to make a pass to pinpoint his position. This time we passed exactly over him and he told us we were receiving 37mm and heavy ZTV fire. Because of the very low clouds and our ability to talk to him only when very close, we elected to make one more pass to fix the guns positions relative to the pilots, and then pop up through the clouds.
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James D. Windham
Commando Sabre Pilot

Ralph C. Keller
Commando Sabre Pilot
1. On November 25, I participated in the SAR effort for Gromet 02. Misty 51 was in voice contact with O2A when I arrived. He briefed me on the location of the downed pilot and known 37mm positions in the immediate area, I then left the area to refuel.

2. When I returned, Crown had several flights of fighters available for flak suppression. The first flight to expend received very heavy AAA fire. I estimated 100 air bursts on each pass. Two additional flights were used and the guns appeared to be completely silenced. Shortly thereafter, Sandy arrived on the scene. He made numerous low passes attempting to draw ground fire. When he didn't receive any, the Jolly attempted a pick-up. As he approached a hover he received automatic weapons fire from several locations, forcing him to withdraw with battle damage.

3. The second pair of Jollys were too far away to reach the scene prior to darkness. The SAR effort was terminated for the night. The remaining fighters were expended on suspected gun positions.

4. Comments. The back up Jollys should have been holding much closer to the locations of the survivor. A second rescue attempt could have been made prior to the onset of darkness. As I recall the Jollys were being held 35mm west of the scene.

ROBERT J. FITZSIMMONS, Capt, USAF
Commando Sabre Pilot

ROGER P. RICE, 1 Lt, USAF
Commando Sabre Pilot
1. At 1700 Misty 71 was launched as an extra sortie to help with the Grommet SAR effort. He arrived in the area at 1740 at just about the time the SAR effort was called off because the Jolly had been hit. We directed, or helped Misty 41 direct, Zebra, Flamingo and gun fighter flight upon gun positions south of the survivor. We RTB'ed with Misty 41 at 1900.

2. On the morning of the 26th we flew Misty 11, arrived in the area and established contact with Grommet 02A at 0655. He stated he was all right. It was still almost clouds in the valleys and we could see fog in the valleys, otherwise the visibility in the immediate area was clear. Misty 21 arrived and we proceeded to refuel. Enroute back to the area K-21 briefed us and we put Cass flights in on suspected gun sites south of the survivor. At this time, 0800, I asked Crown if the Sandys and Jollys were enroute and was told they were being held on the ground at XFP. We requested an immediate launch. I had previously thought the Sandys and Jollys would launch to arrive on scene at daylight because it was to be a first light effort. About 10 minutes later I asked Crown the position of the Sandys and was told they were being held and that they wanted another weather report. Since all my previous weather reports were favorable I said to pass the weather that you have and to launch the Sandys and Jollys. Only our flights of fighters received ground fire and that was Cass who received 40/50 rounds of 23/37mm. At 0820, K-21 made a low pass over the survivor and he came up voise and said he was OK. Since it was going to be an hour for Sandy and Jolly to arrive we expended, or helped, Barracuda and Gunfighter flights. The Sandys arrived at 0945 and started calling Grommet 02A and no contact was ever made. I made a low A-3 pass at 0955 with no response. We remained in the area until 1130 and RTB'ed due to weather and no contact with Grommet 02A.

Clyde Diller

ROBERT E. LYNCH, Capt, USAF
Commando Sabre Pilot

CLYDE SILLER, Maj, USAF
Commando Sabre Operations Officer
1. At approximately 1330 on 25 November, Misty 41, Holden/Konopka, heard Grommet 01 calling for his wing man - 02 - on guard. We had just returned from the tanker and were south west of delta 18. We immediately switched to guard and called Grommet 01. Crown 6 also came up on guard at this time. 01 stated that he thought he had lost his wing man. Crown 6 asked his position and 01 passed it in Lat/Long. He asked if he was close to delta 29; Grommet 01 said negative; that they had just started up route 137 north of Ban Ladoy when his wing man transmitted he was taking a hit. He was unable to raise him on frequency after that. We immediately turned north to head towards his position. At this time we began receiving a strong beeper. Enroute to the area we contacted Invert on guard for clearance into the PCA and notified them that the downed aircraft was probably in North Vietnam. Invert got radar contact with us and passed pidgeons to the area. Enroute to the area we heard a call for 02 to come up voice. Grommet 02A immediately relayed on guard with his call sign. He passed a tentative position of "3km north of delta 56" to Invert as we approached Ban Ladoy and began looking for the crash site. The weather was 7/8 to 8/8 coverage of strato-cu, bases at 3500' with tops at 7000'. This coverage was interspersed with large holes which would form, last for 20 - 30 minutes, and then close in again. We attempted to get down through some of these clear areas to locate the crash site. On our first pass we established voice contact with 02A. He said he was "O.K. I guess", we were called once by Invert at this time and requested to fly south as they were showing us "too close to Waterloo". We were across the SVN border at this time. We requested Invert to contact Blue Chip and inform them of the survivors' position in SVN. A large hole formed over the area, and at approximately 1345, we located the still burning aircraft wreckage. The crash site - 270185 - is on the side of a ridge line, about half way up the slope. It is approximately 700 meters west of route 137 and 200 meters north of the Ban Corona river. I also observed several people on 137 along with 6 trucks, all in the immediate vicinity. On the next pass we went over the crash site; 02A came up voice and said we passed right over him. We asked Invert to mark the position on radar, and Invert, again, tried to direct us to fly south. For the third time, we asked Invert to contact Blue Chip and inform them of the situation. We also requested clearance to expend on the trucks moving toward the crash site and for additional ordnance to be directed to the area. Misty 41 expended 20mm and several 1P rockets on the road and succeeded in driving the trucks and people under cover. On one pass we received approximately 30 to 40 rounds of 23/37mm fire from a gun position along route 137 in the vicinity of delta 58. On another pass we received an undetermined number of rounds of ZPU. This position was about 1 4/5 north of delta 53. We again contacted 02A and asked him if he had contact with 02B. He said he hadn't heard from him but that "he should have gotten out". We told 02A to go down on his radio and come up again in 30 minutes. He then called for 02B and got a