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Anxiety and Fear in Personality Structure

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ANXIETY AND FEAR IN PERSONALITY STRUCTURE

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Although fear and anxiety are an important concept in theories of personality development, an understanding of their antecedents, nature, and consequences cannot be said to have been greatly illuminated by the research which has been done (28:2). According to Sarason (28:2) one of the reasons for this state of affairs has been the tendency to study individuals who have been labeled as anxious but who may differ widely in what they fear or the situations which produce their fears. Consequently, in proceeding with the research it was decided to focus the study on the nature, origin, and the effects of fear and anxiety. It is necessary to understand, to some degree, the nature of these before one can hope to see what effects fear and anxiety may have on the development of personality.

Limitations. Although the contents of this paper are related to the effects of fear and anxiety on the personality, the scope of the research to be presented and discussed can, at best, illuminate a very small part of the problem. The fact that fear and anxiety have been considered by personality theorists as a factor in affecting personality does not, unfortunately, mean the job of the researcher is made easy in the sense that he can start with other than a limited attack on the problem. Sarason (28:2)

describes this problem as due to ambiguities in theoretical formulations, the absence of validated methodologies, and the scarcity of systematic research.

There is a vast body of literature that deals with anxiety or fear in children. Although the research does not attempt to fully cover all the literature in this area, an attempt has been made to focus on those aspects which seem most relevant to the study.

I. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the problem. The problem to be studied is the effect of anxiety and fear on the personality. Concern with this problem stems from the fact that on many occasions anxiety and fear blocks a person's free approach to experience and often anxiety and fear prevent one from building sound interpersonal and intergroup relations.

Fear, rage, pain and the pangs of hunger are all primitive experiences which human beings share with the lower animals. These experiences can be powerful determinants of the action of men and beasts. A knowledge of how these experiences affect the personality is of general and fundamental importance in the interpretation of personality development.

Anxiety and fear exist so generally in contemporary life that the present time has been called the age of anxiety.

This does not mean necessarily that the present age is more fear ridden than earlier periods in history but that people recognize the inroads of fear and anxiety more clearly and acknowledge them more openly than they did in the past. No one who is alert to the currents in his own life and to circumstances in the world in which he lives can be wholly without fear or anxiety. Since it is so prevalent, fear and anxiety have had an important place in the development of all personalities (14:342).

II. RELATIONSHIP OF FEAR AND ANXIETY

Fear and anxiety. It is useful to discriminate between anxiety and fear on a conceptual level. The younger the child the more difficult it becomes to maintain a distinction between fear and anxiety (28:37). This is due to the fact that the younger the child the more immature are the intellectual and other personality processes which differentiate between outer and inner, objective and subjective dangers. The child is still in the midst of the painful process of acquiring a stable sense of reality. In the adult fears are states of apprehension which focus on isolated and recognizable dangers. On the other hand, anxieties are diffuse states of tension (4:12, 1:4) caused by a loss of mutual regulation and a consequent upset in libidinal and aggressive controls. These states of tension

magnify and even cause the illusion of an outer danger, without painting to any avenue of defense of mastery (28:37).

Jersild has summarized some of the criteria that have commonly been used in differentiating anxiety and fear. In general, Jersild states, the danger of disaster, which anxiety signals, is considered to be subjective in nature in that the conflicting tendencies and impulses, unfulfilled needs, etc., that underlie and precipitate the anxiety dwell within the personality. These inner tendencies and unresolved conflicts are commonly unconscious. Whereas in fear there is a relatively clear differentiation and perception of the dangerous elements of the situation. In anxiety states the feelings may be diffuse, vague, and varied, and the person's reactions may appear to be indiscriminate and inappropriate (28:35).

In attempting to differentiate between fear and anxiety one runs into the problem that most theorists define the terms fear and anxiety differently. It becomes next to impossible to have consistent definitions of the two terms. Jersild defines fear as pointed toward a particular situation or object. Anxieties, to Jersild, are feelings which may be diffuse, vague, and varied (28:35). Maslow, on the other hand, defines fear as a defense in the sense that it is a protection of one's self-esteem, of one's love and respect for himself (19:57). What Maslow defines as fear

approaches closer to Jersild's definition of anxiety.

Sullivan differentiates between anxiety and fear in terms of their differing roles with respect to the "self-system." The self-system is an organization of experience for avoiding increasing degrees of anxiety which are connected with the educative process. For Sullivan, anxiety is a reflection and a warning of internally originating discrepancies in the self-system, and fear is a dynamism for dealing with the particular in external danger. He sees fear as a legitimate reaction to something that is really dangerous in the situation. In fear there is a concentration of the consciousness onto the real fear-provoking aspects of the situation (28:35-36).

It is agreed by many students of anxiety that anxiety is a diffuse apprehension, and that the central difference between fear and anxiety is that fear is a reaction to a specific danger while anxiety is unspecific, vague, object-less. The terms diffuse and vague do not mean that anxiety is less intense in its painfulness than other affects. Other emotions, like fear, anger, hostility, also permeate the whole organism. Rather, the diffuse and undifferentiated quality of anxiety refers to the level in the personality on which the threat is experienced (20:190).

According to May, the individual experiences various fears on the basis of a security pattern he has developed,

but in anxiety it is the security pattern itself which is threatened (20:191). How uncomfortable a fear may be, it is experienced as a threat which can be located spatially and to which an adjustment can, at least in theory, be made. The relation of the organism to a given object is what is important, and if that object can be removed, either by reassurance or appropriate flight, the apprehension disappears. But since anxiety attacks the foundation of the personality, the individual cannot stand outside the threat, cannot objectify it, and thereby is powerless to take steps to meet it (20:192).

Until recent years the distinction between fears and anxiety has been frequently overlooked in psychological studies, or the two effects have been lumped together on the assumption that they have the same neurophysiological base. But this failure to make a differentiation confuses the understanding of both fears and anxiety. May sees the reactions of an organism in times of fear and/or anxiety may be radically different, due to the fact that these reactions occur on different psychological levels of the personality (20:204). The point to be emphasized is that the reactions in fear and in anxiety may be quite different, but that fear and anxiety represent threats to different levels in the personality (20:203). In some psychological studies purporting to be of fear, the effect involved frequently

turns out on further examination to be anxiety. As pointed out, by John B. Watson, in his theory of the "two fears" of the new-born infant, seems really to be talking of the diffuse, undifferentiated apprehensions one would term anxiety (33:229-230). In studies of childrens fears by Jersild, it seems significant that a large proportion of the fears are irrational. The shifting, unpredictable quality of children's fears in these studies is also a datum of considerable significance. Both of these studies suggest that some affect is present underlying the so-called fears. Indeed, the phrase "irrational fear" is strictly speaking a contradiction in terms; if a fear cannot be understood as a flight from a danger that one has learned in experience is harmful, then something else is involved in the reactions of the person toward the threat (20:204). It may be countered by some, that "irrational fear" is not a contradiction in terms used, since Freud and others speak of "neurotic fears," i.e., fears which are irrational in the respect that they are out of proportion to the reality situation. But Freud cites various phobias as examples of neurotic fears, and phobias are by definition forms of anxiety localized on one object. One cannot help but conclude that it is the anxiety underlying the neurotic fear which lends it its unrealistic, "irrational" quality (20:204).

May speaks of anxiety as basic not only in the sense

that it is the general, original response to threat, but also because it is a response to threat on the basic level of the personality. Fears are the responses to threats before they get to this basic level. By reacting adequately to the various specific dangers which threaten him, the individual avoids being threatened at the inner "citadel" of his security system (20:204). If however, according to May, the person cannot cope with dangers in their specific forms, he will be threatened on the deeper level which May calls the core or the essence of personality. Thus May, figuratively speaking, describes fear as the armor against anxiety (20:204). The phrase "fear of fear," employed by President F. D. Roosevelt, refers to the apprehension that one will not be able to cope with dangers as they arise and will thereby be thrown into a catastrophic situation. "Fear of fear," thus, really means anxiety (20:204).

CHAPTER II

EFFECTS OF FEAR AND ANXIETY IN THE PERSONALITY STRUCTURE

I. NATURE AND ORIGIN OF FEAR AND ANXIETY

In order to understand the consequences of anxiety and fear it is necessary to study the origin and nature of fear and anxiety. Fear and anxiety are two of the more complex impulses of human behavior. They are more subjective, more flexible and tenative, therefore more consequential in the organization of the personality.

Freud found that the capacity for fear or anxiety was innate in the organism, (9:30) that they were part of the self-preservation instinct, and that they were phylogenetically inherited (6:353, 3:96). Freud saw specific fears as being taught and it is due to training that real fear does eventually awake in a person. Freud found that the origin of fear was seen in the birth trauma (25:176) and fear of castration. These two concepts are inter-woven and progressively reinterpreted in his writings (20:120, 31:227-228).

Freud considered the complex of sensory, motor, and psychological experiences which suddenly flood the immature nervous system of the fetus at birth to the prototype of all later fear reactions (25:177). The first fear reaction, according to Freud, is an ungoverned, automatic reaction to

what can be thought of as the most helpless state of affairs in which the organism will ever find himself (25:177). As the organism gradually matures in the context of the new and repeated experiences a most important and mysterious transition takes place. Increasingly, the fear reaction no longer occurs automatically to a dangerous situation which is already present. Therefore Freud regards fear as taking on a signaling function which warns of the impending danger and enables it to exercise preventive measures in order to avoid the experience of intense pain. This transition seems to come about through some sort of learning process (28:31). It seems likely that these early reactions to fear are, to some extent, basic determinants of personality and characterological differences in later life (10:194-197).

It was largely through Freud's genius that scientific attention was focused on the inner psychological patterns and conflicts which render the individual unable to cope with a relatively minor objective threat. Thus the problem of understanding neurotic fear boils down to the question of understanding the inner psychological patterns which underlie the individual's excessive vulnerability to a threat (20:199).

Gesell admits that fear may be an original tendency, but he states, it is subject to the genetic alterations of organic growth as well as to organization by environmental

conditioning. Such conditioning may determine the orientation and reference of fears, but the mode of fearing undergoes change as a result of motivation (7:289). Gesell goes on to explain, that fear is neither more nor less of an abstraction than prehension. It is not a simple entity. It waxes and alters growth. It is shaped by intrinsic maturation as well as by experience, certainly during the period of infancy (7:289).

According to Merry, most of the fear of young children can be traced back to certain concrete stimuli in their environment (22:153), as for example, the face of a false face; of the rattling of a window; of an animal or stranger appearing unexpectedly or of the sudden stopping of an elevator. Merry goes on to show that between two and five years of age there is marked increase in anxieties, especially of an imaginary nature, such as ghosts and the supernatural. Beyond the age of five things which threaten the child's security or status may be sources of anxiety. It is at this age Merry sees the child as beginning to have anxiety of failure, ridicule, and loss of prestige (22:153).

The startle reflex can be elicited very early in infants; Landis and Hunt found it in babies in the first month, but as the infant grew older more and more secondary behavior of the anxiety-fear variety appeared in the child's responses. Similarly, the studies of children by Jersild

and by Gesell show fear emerging after some naturation on the part of the child (14:354).

At birth the infant's perceptive and discriminative capacities are not sufficiently developed to permit him to adequately to identify and localize dangers. Maturing neurologically means not only an increasing capacity to locate possible threats visually, for example, but also it means increasing capacity for cortical interpretation of stimuli. Therefore, some neurological maturation is necessary before the infant can differentiate between various stimuli and respond to it as fear (34:306, 21:217-232).

William James found fear as an inborn reaction to certain noises, strange men, strange animals, solititude, darkness, and high places (13:416). John B. Watson found by experimental tests that the reaction of babies to James' list were acquired not instinctive. Watson found that babies showed definite fearful reactions to loud sounds, pain, and loss of support (32:26-27, 32:47, 33:229). Watson gave the name of fear, love and rage to three emotions he found in infants. He claimed that these three emotions were basic, the building block from which many complex adult emotions were ultimately constructed (33:229). Watson, however, claimed that these emotions were innate but were later affected by learning (29:146).

The present understanding of the course of emotional

development helps one to reinterpret some of the results of Watson's study. In an apparently contradictory series of observations, Mandel Sherman in 1927 stimulated infants by hunger, sudden dropping, restraint of the head and face, and pricking with a pin. Observers who saw only the infants' responses, without seeing the stimulating conditions, were unable to discriminate the supposedly separate "emotions." Sherman concluded that Watson's description of "primary" emotions was biased and inaccurate (29:47).

Gesell also found evidence to support Sherman's findings. He did an investigation on the development of some five-hundred infants and children of preschool age. Gesell had an opportunity to collect interesting data concerning the prevalence and variety of fears in early childhood. His conclusion was that specific fears originate through a psychological process of association (8:164). He found little evidence to show that infants had inborn fear reactions (8:165).

According to Goldstein, anxiety could be observed in the new-born infant in some situations, but that the capacity to respond with specific fears is a later development (20:202, 15:268).

Shaffer and Shoben see fear reactions as being learned. Clinical evidence shows, according to Shaffer and Shoben, that fears can be understood as conditioned responses

(29:67). Many people are afraid of specific situations that are not really dangerous or intrinsically overstimulating. They state that directly conditioned fear reactions account for some of these fears. They also see fears as being learned by the indirect and symbolic processes of social communication. Whole cultures often show an unrealistic fear of some "tabooed" object or action, reinforced by social learning rather than by any overtly injurious stimulation. Sometimes, Shaffer and Shoben continue, a cultural fear may be limited to one segment of a social group. In our culture, girls and women very commonly fear rats and mice, while boys and men rarely do. Both sexes learn the role expected of them by the society (29:216). Normal fear also occurs in situations that may not be really dangerous but that are threatening because of their unfamiliarity and intensity. Fear responses are aroused most readily in adults by intense stimuli that occur very suddenly under circumstances that permit the use of no habitual adjustment for coping with them. The suddenness and the unfamiliarity of the situation are important factors in determining the emotional response of fear (29:215).

At the present time the different approaches to the problem of whether fear is learned not only involves the question of definition, but also the approaches involve divergent emphasis. The tendency is for learning

psychologists, observing that each particular fear is demonstrably closely related to the given individuals experience, to state simply that anxiety or fear is learned (20:208). On the other hand, the neurophsiologists, centering their attention on the given capacities of the organism, have tended to assume that fear is not learned. May believed that there was not necessarily a conflict between the emphases. He suggested that the capacity for fear or anxiety is not learned, but the quantities and forms of anxiety and fear in a given individual are learned. May saw fears and foci of anxiety as the expression of patterns which developed out of the interrelation of the individual's capacities for reacting to threat with his environment and conditioning. He concluded by stating, that the matrix in which these patterns develop is the family in particular, which in turn is part of the larger general culture in which the individual lives (20:208).

II. EFFECTS OF FEAR AND ANXIETY

Psychological fear and anxiety. Miller and Dollard see the special importance in the development of conflicts and the learning of maladaptive ways of coping with conflicts is the drive of fear, the reduction or elimination of which is likely to have a high degree of reinforcement value. The fact that certain responses have reduced or eliminated fear

drives is apt to make them strongly entrenched in the behavior repertory of the child, even though they do not permit the gratification of other powerful drives (17:88).

According to Miller and Dollard, conflict produces emotional dilemmas in the child to which he must learn to respond. Emotional conflicts are at the basis of the development of neurotic manifestations (17:93). Miller and Dollard consider it possible that normal and neurotic persons differ to a large degree in the extent of conflict with which they have to struggle (17:94). Fear seems to be the strongest of the drives capable of producing neurotic behavior. In the neurotic, fear creates a conflict that prevents the occurrence of goal responses that would normally reduce some other drive, such as sex or aggression. The fear motivates conflicting responses, such as stopping and avoiding. When the neurotic stops and retreats from the goal activity stimulated by normal drives, the reduction in fear reinforces these avoidance responses (17:100).

According to Miller and Dollard the avoidance responses, however, prevent the other drive-reducing goal responses from occurring, and unsatisfied drives build up and remain high, producing misery. At the same time, the high drives tend to evoke impulses that elicit the fear. Thus, the neurotic will be stimulated by both frustrated drives and the fear that these drives produce. The state

of conflict itself can produce strong additional stimuli, such as muscular tensions and tremors, which again contribute to misery (17:100).

Miller and Dollard go on to explain that fear can also motivate the repression of verbal responses that label the elements in the conflict situation. Because certain thoughts arouse fear, stopping these thoughts reduces the fear and repression eliminates from consciousness the verbal responses that are the basis for the higher mental processes. Such repression makes the neurotic behave stupidly. He is less able to differentiate the situations in which he has been punished, and this lack of discrimination retards the extension of unrealistic fears and helps perpetuate the vicious circle of fear, repression, stupidity, lack of discrimination, and the persistence and even increase of unrealistic fear (17:100).

Miller and Dollard think of the neurotic as showing stupidity in the areas affected by repression, the person is prevented from finding adequate solutions to his problems and he is driven to maladaptive actions, which further contribute to his state of high drive and misery. The misery, according to Miller and Dollard, tends to interfere with clear thinking and further contributes to his stupidity (17:100).

When persistent anxiety becomes too great to be

tolerated in conscious awareness, the neurotic methods of avoiding anxiety occur. May defines neurosis as an intrapsychic compensatory pattern by which security can be preserved despite conflict (20:224). It involves some form of repression of tendencies which are associated with the conflict situation, or in Sullivan's term, dissociation, a demarcation (20:224). It also involves inhibition of those activities which would place the individual in a situation of danger. May sees the psychological symptoms in neurosis as various forms of compromise which facilitate the avoidance of the danger situation (20:224). Neurotic anxiety results from a cleavage or contradiction between expectations and reality, a contradiction which occurred originally in the person's relations with and attitudes toward his parents. According to May the cleavage between expectations and reality has its normal and healthy form as well as its neurotic (20:356). There is a radical distinction between the neurotic and the healthy manifestations of this capacity. In neurotic anxiety, the cleavage between expectations and reality is in the form of a contradiction; expectation and reality cannot be brought together, and since nobody can bear a constant experience of such cleavage, the individual engages in a neurotic distortion of reality (20:356). Though this distortion is undertaken for the purpose of protecting the individual from neurotic anxiety, in the

long run it makes the contradiction between the individual's expectations and reality more rigid and hence sets the stage for greater neurotic anxiety. May find that in productive activity the expectations are not in contradiction to reality, but are used as means of creatively transforming reality; the cleavage is constantly being resolved by the individual's bringing expectations and reality progressively into greater accord (20:356). May concludes by stating that man's power to resolve the conflict between expectation and reality--his creative power--is at the same time his power to overcome neurotic anxiety (20:356).

Goldstein holds that self-actualization can occur only as the individual confronts and moves through anxiety-creating experiences. The freedom of the healthy individual inheres in his capacity to avail himself of the new possibilities in the meeting and overcoming of potential threats to his existence (20:232). By moving through anxiety-creating experiences one achieves self-realization, i.e., one enlarges the scope of his activity and at the same time increases his freedom (20:232). The capacity to bear anxiety is one measure of selfhood. Goldstein goes on to state that the extent that an individual seeks to avoid anxiety, responsibility, and guilt feeling by refusing to avail himself of his new possibilities, by refusing to move from the familiar to the unfamiliar, he sacrifices his freedom

and constricts his autonomy and his self-awareness (20:234).

Physical effects of fear and anxiety. During traumatic fear, many changes occur in the organs of the body. The pupil of the eye dilate. The eyelid lifts unusually wide, and the eyeball protrudes. The speed and strength of the heartbeat increases. The blood pressure increases (18:79). The hair tends to stand on end, causing "goose flesh." The rate and depth of breathing changes. Lung bronchials dilate, so that a person can consume more oxygen than normal (20:61-62, 27:925).

The secretions of the duct glands are affected. The liver pours out more sugar for the muscles. The sweat glands of the skin secrete excessive amounts of perspiration (20:61-62).

Unlike the sweat glands the salivary glands are inhibited by traumatic fear. The stoppage of saliva produces the so-called "dry mouth" feeling. Secretion of gastric fluids is also inhibited. Also, the adrenal glands secrete adrenalin into the blood (20:61-62).

In recent years, an entirely new branch of medicine has emerged from a recognition of the part that psychological conflicts may play in causing or aggravating illness. Some diseases have been identified in which the psychological component is especially prominent. These have become known

as "psychosomatic" disorders, a term which implies that the mind (psyche) determines the disease of the body (soma). The psychosomatic reactions have two main characteristics: (1) they are brought about by an interaction of psychological and organic factors; and (2) they cause real damage to the structures of the body. The person experiences pervasive fear and anxiety which may result in physiological changes and if a person is kept in this state it may result in a physical disorder. This particular kind of illness can be traced to some psychological experience. In this type of disorder the visceral effects of emotion are so pronounced that actual and irreversible damage may be done to the body's structure. A psychological illness becomes a real illness with identifiable tissue pathology. According to Shaffer and Shoben, psychosomatic reactions may involve all the major functional systems of the body: digestive, circulatory, respiratory, glandular, or reproductive (29:292).

The condition of traumatic fear may be so crucial and devastating for the organism that actual death results. Cannon has discussed the phenomenon of Voodoo deaths in this light. "It may well be true," says Cannon, "that an ominous and persistent state of fear can end the life of man" (20:68-69). Whatever the complex psychological determinants of such experiences may be, it is clear that a threat to an

individual's existence can be so powerful that the individual possesses no way of coping with the threat short of giving up his existence, namely dying (20:70).

Phobic fear. Most people have one or more mild phobias, usually of mice, snakes, insects or other vermin. In some individuals, however, such fears are so intense as to be overwhelming. Closed or open places, heights, animals, the dark, and a multitude of other special situations and objects will reduce this type of person to terror (24:507). Their fear reaction to any one or more of these circumstances becomes so intense as to be termed phobia (30:166, 2:132, 18:78). The phobic person has developed a strong tendency to avoid the fear object or situation because contact with it produces severe disturbance (17:94). When the state of phobia reaches the state of being intense, personality distortion or impairment is so grave as to interfere with a person's normal living (30:166).

The physical symptoms are often dramatic. The patient cannot life an arm. No medical measures avail, nor can the doctor account for the paralysis on anatomical grounds. The patient seems to have clearly irrational fears or anxieties. Almost any part of the body may become afflicted, almost any relationship with external events (25:281, 24:503). Munroe calls such afflictions of the body conversions; she calls the patient's anxieties, phobias (25:281).

Fielding found that criminal or psychopathic fear, as found in psychopathic killers, was never acknowledged by the killer in its reality or its influence upon himself. Very often a man guilty of some crime of dreadful violence would refuse any medical treatment which involved the spilling of his own blood (5:94).

Miller and Dollard see the person who has learned to avoid thinking or talking about the fear as forgetting the origin of the fear and this forgetting has been reinforced by the reduction in anxiety that it produces (17:95). Thus, Miller and Dollard continue, a person cannot say why the unreasonable appearing anxiety exists (17:95). Eventually the sources of anxiety become unlabeled and unconscious (17:96).

Now, according to Overstreet, the anxiety becomes a personality trait. The fear becomes detached from its original cause. It becomes internalized, and from this point on the individual will approach every situation as though it held threat. Anxiety now becomes a very real part of his personality. These anxieties more than objective circumstances will tend to determine his behaviors (26:24-25).

Overstreet considers the person who is possessed by anxiety to expect to be hurt. Expecting to be hurt, he works out a way of life that is primarily a way of playing

safe; and all of his attitudes and actions become progressively expressive of that way. He retreats, for example, into undemanding meekness and conformity. Or he stands wistfully on the sidelines of life, waiting for others to notice him. He often blames them as people do not make the approach that he himself feels unable to hazard. Or he takes the initiative in hurting. He turns his hostility outward as a will to belittle, to dominate, to destroy; or turns it inward and punishes himself by becoming ill, accident-prone, or subject to compulsive blunders that make him fail and fail again (26:24).

CHAPTER III

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In attempting to differentiate between fear and anxiety one runs into the problem that most theorists define fear and anxiety differently. But if an attempt were to be made to differentiate between fear and anxiety, fear would seem to be states of apprehension which focus on isolated and recognizable dangers; whereas anxieties are diffuse states of tension cued off by a threat to some value which the individual holds essential to his existence as a personality (20:192). In various languages the usual expressions, accurately enough are "One has a fear" but "One is anxious" (20:192).

The effects of anxiety tend to impoverish and constrict the personality, and where impoverishment is accepted and structuralized in the personality, subjective conflicts and neurotic anxiety are obviated. With regards to the converse proposition, presented by Goldstein, that the more creative and productive the personality, the more anxiety-creating situations are confronted (and hence the more potential anxiety is present) (20:355). May sees the result of neurotic anxiety as a cleavage or contradiction between expectation and reality (20:355).

Of all the emotional experiences, fears are probably of the least value to the individual. According to Merry,

fear leads to the blocking of behavior; hence the individual does nothing to relieve his tension, or else meets the situation by running away from it or by surrender. If a person is often anxious, he may eventually become chronically anxious and unable to make normal adjustments (22:153).

Enough is known about fear and anxiety to reject the extreme position that many philosophers and psychological theorists have held for centuries, that all adjustment needs are instigated by anxiety and the adjustment process is only one of reducing anxiety. For many years, this may have seemed plausible, but now animal and child experiments contradict this theory in its pure form, for they show that, generally, anxiety kills curiosity and exploration, and they are mutually incompatible, especially when anxiety is extreme.

Living with unresolved anxiety involves primarily a devastating waste of human energies, occasioned not only by the conflicts themselves but by all the devious attempts to remove them. According to Horney, when a person is basically divided he can never put his energies wholeheartedly into anything but wants always to pursue two or more incompatible goals. This means that he will either scatter his energies or actively frustrate his efforts (11:17).

The bibliography that follows is made up of books to which I am indebted. To these I owe insights that have in some measure modified my attitudes and commitments.

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