The Evacuation of Japanese-Americans from Washington State During World War II: A Study in Race Discrimination

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THE EVACUATION OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS FROM WASHINGTON STATE DURING WORLD WAR II: A STUDY IN RACE DISCRIMINATION

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THE EVACUATION OF JAPANESE-AMERICANS FROM WASHINGTON STATE
DURING WORLD WAR II: A STUDY IN RACE DISCRIMINATION

In 1964 Congress passed a major civil rights bill designed to give equal rights to all Americans regardless of race, but there was a time when that same government under pressures of war, denied civil rights to citizens as well as non-citizens strictly because of race. Going back twenty-three years, one can study the racial discrimination practiced by the United States government towards another minority group—the Japanese-Americans. This paper will cover: (1) Why the Japanese-Americans were evacuated during World War II; (2) How they were evacuated; (3) The consequences of their evacuation. Because of the vast program of relocation of all the Japanese-Americans on the Pacific Coast, this study will be limited to the 14,565 Japanese-Americans of Washington State.
CHAPTER I
WHY THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS WERE EVACUATED

Background

When Commodore Matthew C. Perry entered the Bay of Yedo in 1854 "he thought that he was merely opening Japan to American commerce, but he actually opened America to Japanese labor." (10:3) Chinese laborers were prohibited from entering the United States in 1882 when the Chinese Exclusion Act was passed, yet American businesses needed cheap labor so they encouraged Japanese laborers to immigrate. The number of Japanese in the United States jumped from 184 in 1880 to 24,000 in 1900. But in 1907 the United States and Japan signed a treaty restricting Japanese immigration to only 185 per year, and finally in 1924, Congress barred all Japanese immigrants. "Originally, they came to this country to acquire wealth and return to their native country." (10:3) But after living here, raising their children here, "they chose not to return to their 'Fatherland of birth,' but elected to cherish the privilege of living permanently in their 'Motherland of dreams.'" (10:3)

According to the 1940 census, there were about 127,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the continental United States which represented less than one per cent of the total United States population. Over 47,000 of the resident Japanese had been born in Japan and about 98 per cent of them had entered
the country prior to the Oriental Exclusion Act of 1924 and almost one half of the total arrived before 1910. "With numerically unimportant exceptions, they were ineligible to American citizenship." (40:1) However, Congress passed an act in June 1935 making aliens eligible for citizenship if (1) they had served in the United States armed forces during World War I and had been honorably discharged: and (2) if they were permanent residents of the United States. Only a small number of Japanese obtained citizenship under this act before it expired on January 1, 1937. (40:1)

Of the 127,000 Japanese in the United States, over 90 per cent or about 113,000 lived in the four Western states of Arizona, California, Oregon and Washington. In Washington there were 14,565 persons of Japanese ancestry in 1941. Most of these people, 11,913, lived in King and Pierce counties. Nearly two-thirds of the Japanese in the state had been born in this country and were automatically American citizens. Thus, only 5,683 were aliens or foreign born Japanese. (For future reference, the following terms will be used to distinguish between the different groups of Japanese aliens and the Japanese-Americans: The word "Issei" will refer to the first generation immigrants from Japan. The Japanese children born in the United States will be called "Nisei.") In the United States in 1940 most of the Issei were old, over 50 per cent of them being over 50 years of age, with 17 per cent
being over 60 and only eight per cent under 35. By contrast, the Nisei were characterized by their youth with over 66 per cent being under the age of 20 and less than three per cent being over 35. In Washington State, out of the 14,565 Japanese, 8,882 were Nisei and 5,683 were Issei.

**Causes for Action**

With the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan on December 7, 1941, the American people as a whole were confused and uneasy. The apparent success of the Japanese enemy in the Pacific exposed the entire Pacific Coast to possible attack. Wild rumors spread about a Japanese fifth column in Hawaii that had helped the Pearl Harbor attack. Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox clouded the truth when he said at a press conference in Washington, D. C., on December 15 that the "most effective fifth-column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii, with the possible exception of Norway." (42:10) Apparently "what Secretary Knox actually had in mind, it now seems clear from all the available evidence, was that espionage activity was carried out by agents in the Japanese consulate in Honolulu and perhaps, to some extent, by special emissaries who had quite recently come into the territory from the Japanese home islands." (42:10) Unfortunately, the Secretary of the Navy did not say this at that time and left the public to its own interpretation of his remarks. Almost immediately
a government official took exception to Secretary Knox's choice of words. Curtis B. Munson had made a government survey of the loyalty of resident Japanese both in Hawaii and on the West coast in November 1941. According to his findings the resident Japanese were loyal to the United States and the Nisei were completely Americanized. About Knox's term "fifth-column" he said, "Fifth-column activities, such as in Norway, impugns the loyalty of a certain large percentage of a population." (42:11) Honolulu officials also seemed to discredit Knox's insinuations. The chief of police, the chief of military intelligence, and the special agent in charge of the FBI office in Honolulu all denied that there was any sabotage by Japanese or Japanese-American residents of the territory. (42:10) However, several other simultaneous and unrelated developments seemed to strengthen Knox's statement: (1) continuing reports of enemy submarine activity off the West coast; (2) the unfounded rumors of resident Japanese sabotage at Pearl Harbor which were spread on the mainland by women and children evacuees from Honolulu. (42:11) (3) reports circulating of signal lights being visible along the West coast and the interception of unidentified radio transmissions; (4) government reports of spot raids which revealed hidden quantities of contraband such as guns, rifles, ammunition, and maps. (The government failed to point out that much of this contraband was legal to possess in peace
time and that a large number of guns and rifles and ammunition collected was taken from Nisei-owned sporting goods stores, while the maps were nothing more than what any citizen or alien might have in the glove compartment of his car. (24:262)

In Hawaii, where the population was predominantly of Japanese ancestry, the Issei and Nisei became part of the war effort without any hesitation and they had the support of officials who quickly denied that there was any disloyalty by these people. (24:266) However, in Washington State as elsewhere on the West Coast, a minority of outspoken, white American citizens began to wonder, question, and finally to demand the evacuation of all the Japanese residents. They and the government used the term "Japanese" to include both Issei and Nisei. (43:9) The Bremerton American Legion Post No. 149 stated that it was impossible to segregate loyal from disloyal Japanese and that the security of the United States was in jeopardy as long as any Japanese were within the coastal area. Their resolution said in part that the "recent attack upon Pearl Harbor was a glaring example of Japanese trickery and indicative of the disastrous results that may be obtained by fifth-column activities operating in conjunction with the enemy from without." (17:7) An editorial in a daily Seattle paper implied that the Japanese should prove their loyalty. Part of the editorial
stated:

Apparently the department of justice is not entirely satisfied with the present situation upon the Pacific Coast. Whether the measures already taken affecting Japanese will meet all requirements for national safety is still to be determined. There is still opportunity for the residents of the Japanese community to demonstrate their loyalty. And if sterner measures are to be taken later they should be carried out without rancor and with full recognition that some hardships necessarily will be inflicted upon those who do not deserve them. (18:8)

Some letters to the editor of a daily Seattle newspaper also show the high degree of anti-Japanese feeling. One man wrote:

No citizen can hold a dual allegiance and be a loyal American. I mean Japs and Japs only, for the Italians and Germans are few and far between who are not here in good faith and the few exceptions can easily be brought to book.

I personally know a Jap who is to all indications a big shot among his kind who, when his son completed high school, whisked him off to Japland [sic] to enter college. Anyone suggesting that Papa Jap is a trustworthy American resident and entitled to be free, at large and conducting a business under the same protection as other people is just putting up an argument that won't add up for me.

Herd them up, ship them to labor camps and when we have finished slaughtering their progenitors in the old country then herd them up again and send them all back. (17:10)

Even after a period of three years the idea of disloyal resident Japanese was present as evidenced by this letter to a Seattle paper:

I would like to ask one question. Do you remember December 7? If so, you'll agree that appearances deceive. Especially Japanese appearances.
I think this also applies to our so called Japanese-Americans. Pearl Harbor could not have been successful without a tremendous amount of help from here. Who gave it to them? The Japs are a menace to our standard of living and to our safety. (23:12)

Many questions were raised in the minds of suspicious Washingtonians: Why did the Japanese live mostly in the area west of the Cascades? Why were the largest concentrations in Seattle, Tacoma, and Olympia areas? Why were the heaviest concentration of these Japanese people between Seattle and Tacoma in the Green River and Puyallup River valleys? After all, Boeing Airplane Company was located in the Green River Valley. Why did these people operate vegetable markets along the Seattle and Tacoma waterfronts and farm near the Bremerton Navy Yard? Why were they engaged in fishing along the Pacific Coast and near the Columbia River? Why were these Japanese located near the forests of our state? It looked on the surface to a small but loud and vicious minority that these Japanese people had settled in these regions only to plan and carry out sabotage so that Japan could conquer the area.

However, on closer examination, it should have been clear that the Japanese settled along the river valleys and near the large cities only to carry out their work of truck farming. They set up their markets in areas, not because they wanted to be near the waterfronts or near the navy yards but to be located in the middle of the cities and close to
markets. Other Japanese were fishermen and their logical place was on or near the ocean and major rivers. Moreover, some had settled in these areas before industry had moved to the suburbs. For example, Boeing Airplane Company in Renton was built on farmland at the start of World War II, and naturally there would be Japanese in the vicinity.

Prejudice or discrimination against the Japanese was not new. Prior to World War II, and even today, aliens were forbidden to own land in some of the Western states, including the state of Washington. The parents of Nisei were denied by the law the right of citizenship. In many Washington cities residential choice was limited by covenants in real estate contracts. Intermarriage with Caucasians was forbidden in most Western states.

With the arrival of the war, discrimination increased. All Japanese were prohibited from travel on any public carrier. "As early as December 8, the status of Nisei as American citizens was disregarded in favor of their status as descendants of the Japanese enemy." (40:6) Some Japanese, aliens and citizens, were stopped and questioned by authorities. Heads of Japanese associations, societies, and schools as well as owners of import-export businesses were picked up, detained without charge by the FBI, and taken to Immigration Headquarters in Seattle. The treasurer of the Tacoma Japanese Association, Shuichi Fukui, a World War I veteran
and citizen of the United States, was one of those picked up and taken to Seattle. He was held for a period of two weeks and then released as were the other Japanese who were citizens of the United States. The alien Japanese who had held important positions were held and finally sent to a special enemy alien camp at Missoula, Montana, for the duration of the war. (4:-) Meanwhile, others at home were losing their jobs and being evicted from their homes. Some grocers refused to sell them food, and milk deliveries also stopped "because of a mistaken notion that this would constitute trading with the enemy." (24:261) At a small flower, fruit, and produce market operated in downtown Tacoma by Jack and Sarah Sugimoto, former customers would stop by and speak but only about half would make any purchases. Towards the end of January when it looked like all Japanese would be evacuated the owner of the market told the Sugimotos that someone else wanted their prime market location and they must be out of business in four days. (27:-) When all alien funds were frozen in December, many families had only what money they happened to have in their pockets. Without cash, the utilities were shut off and credit cancelled.

To further complicate the situation, on February 5, 1942, Congressman Martin Dies of Texas, chairman of a special committee on Un-American Activities, claimed to have evidence that the Japanese would attempt to land on both coasts at the
same time and that the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii had aided the enemy on December 7. (24:262) Another committee in the House of Representatives known as the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration (commonly called the Tolan Committee after its chairman, John H. Tolan of California) held hearings which began on February 21. Its purpose was to investigate possible solutions to the "Japanese problem" on the West Coast. Hearings began in San Francisco and continued in Seattle, Portland, Los Angeles, and lasted about one month. These hearings provided a stage for all anti-Oriental groups such as the Native Sons of the Golden West, the Associated Farmers, and the Joint Immigration Committee, all of which testified before this committee and urged the complete evacuation of all Japanese from the West Coast for the duration of the war.

At the Tolan hearings in Seattle on February 28, Governor Arthur B. Langlie, who had been pursuing a moderate course, said:

Every precaution should be made to be humane and American in this task, but the people feel this is no time to worry about hurting feelings. Safety is the prime factor—safety of production and safety of the people. (29:1)

Two strong advocates of evacuation were the state attorney-general and the mayor of Seattle. The Attorney General, Smith Troy, told the committee the danger of vigilantism "had caused him most concern. The prosecuting
attorneys of the thirty-nine counties in the state had re­ported that the danger of mob violence was growing. A disas­ter at the battle fronts might result in outbreaks of vio­lence."

(5:109) Mayor Earl Millikin of Seattle said, "Among the American-born are some of the most disloyal. We can't afford to take chances by leaving one whose loyalty is questionable." (29:1) The only elected local official to oppose mass evacuation was Mayor Harry P. Cain of Tacoma. He told the Tolan Committee that he favored selective instead of mass evacuation because the Japanese operated farm produce businesses worth $1,000,000 per year in the Puyallup Valley and accounted for about 39 per cent of the farm land in Pierce County. (29:1) The manager of the Washington Produce Shippers' Association, Floyd Oles, said he felt the Japanese could be "settled on the soil and guarded by the army and the FBI, with an armed guard, if necessary, at every third fence post." (29:1) When Fred Fueker, department adjutant of the state organization of the American Legion, testified, he took a more liberal stand than had a large majority of the individual Legion posts. Fueker said that among the Nisei "any number of them are real Americans and that, therefore, an attempt should be made to evacuate citizens on a selec­tive basis. If segregation were impossible, citizens and aliens alike should be evacuated." (5:43) The Seattle Downtown Kiwanis Club formally asked that all "enemy aliens
and all Japanese . . . forthwith be removed from the Pacific Slope." (5:55) Two other organizations, the Lake Washington Business Men's Association and the Eastern Washington Beet Growers association, also testified and urged evacuation. When the Tolan Report was issued in May, it stated that no sabotage had taken place. However, it was too late to be of importance, for two months earlier, General DeWitt, head of the Western Defense Command, had announced that all Japanese would be evacuated from coastal areas.

During the early months of 1942, Congressmen were advocating action by the federal government. In February the West Coast Congressional delegations (except Senator Johnson and Congressman Lea of California) formed two committees: (1) the Committee of Alien Nationality and Sabotage headed by Senator Conrad C. Wallgren of Washington State, whose purpose was to see that adequate internal protection against sabotage was taken; and (2) the Committee on Defense headed by Senator Holman of Oregon, whose purpose was to see to the adequate defense of the Pacific Coast. Their joint final action came on February 13th when, in a letter to President Roosevelt, they urged evacuation of all Japanese. (5:71) During this time Senator Wallgren received letters from his constituents in Washington State demanding evacuation. Organizations such as the American Legion, the Grange, seven Chamber of Commerce groups, the Kiwanis, the Lions, the Shriners, and nine trade
unions demanded evacuation. (5:218) Congressman John Coffee of Washington was an adherent of moderate action even though he later went along with his colleagues. He said:

It is my fervent hope and prayer that residents of the United States of Japanese extraction will not be made victims of programs directed by self-proclaimed patriots and by hysterical self-anointed heroes . . . . As one who has lived as a neighbor to Japanese-Americans, I have found these people, on the whole, to be law-abiding, industrial and unobstrusive. Let us not make a mockery of our Bill of Rights by mistreating these folks. Let us rather regard them with understanding, remembering they are victims of a Japanese war machine, with the making of international policies of which they had nothing to do. (5:62)

Even though three months had passed since Pearl Harbor and no case of sabotage was discovered on the West Coast, the public, or at least a portion of it, continued to demand evacuation of all coastal areas. (5:262-5) The Sixth District of the American Legion urged the Federal Government to lock up all Japanese for the duration of the war and to deport them after the war. The Native Sons of the Golden West in California raised funds to try to cancel the citizenship rights of Americans of Japanese ancestry.¹

The field of communications, both radio and newspapers,

¹"This last-mentioned report is worth pausing over. An organized group of our fellow-citizens is asking that another group of our fellow-citizens, distinguished solely by their descent from persons of a certain race be deprived of their citizenship rights. This time this is being advocated not in Nazi Germany but in California, U. S. A." (15:153)
was also a source of prejudice against the Japanese-Americans in the early part of 1942. On February 12, 1942, Walter Lippman implied in a column written from the West Coast that sabotage had occurred in Hawaii and was likely to happen on the West Coast when the right moment came.

The Pacific Coast is in imminent danger of a combined attack from within and from without. *** This is a sober statement of the situation, in fact, a report based not on speculation but on what is known to have taken place and to be taking place in this area of the war. It is the fact that the Japanese navy has been reconnoitering the Pacific Coast more or less continually and for a considerable period of time, testing and feeling out the American defenses. It is the fact that communication takes place between the enemy at sea and enemy agents on land. These are the facts which we shall ignore or minimize at our own peril. It is also the fact that since the outbreak of the Japanese war there has been no important sabotage on the Pacific coast. From what we know about Hawaii and about the fifth-column in Europe, this is not, as some have liked to think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is well organized and that it is held back until it can be struck with maximum effect. *** I am sure I understand fully and appreciate thoroughly the unwillingness of Washington to adopt a policy of mass evacuation and internment of all those who are technically enemy aliens. But I submit that Washington is not defining the problem on the Pacific coast correctly. *** The Pacific coast is officially a combat zone; some part of it may at any moment be a battlefield. Nobody's constitutional rights include the right to reside and do business on a battlefield. And nobody ought to be on a battlefield who has no good reason for being there. (42:12)

Henry McLemore in the San Francisco Examiner and Westbrook Pegler in the Seattle Post Intelligencer, both nationally known writers, in their respective columns made bitter attacks against the Japanese and urged their removal. John B. Hughes
on the Mutual Broadcasting Company conducted a bitter anti-Japanese campaign on the radio. (40:17)

However, not all Americans approved of this racial discrimination and many spoke out against any mass evacuation as an infringement of civil rights. John Dewey and Harry Emerson Fosdick were among hundreds that wrote the President and urged non-evacuation of all Japanese. Congressman Tolan, after all his hearings were held and with the facts known, opposed the evacuation, as did Louis Goldblatt of the California State Industrial Union Council (CIO). Norman Thomas, after action had been taken, wrote: "No possible danger of sabotage could so menace our cause as has the Japanese propaganda in Asia describing our treatment of Asiatics, apparently less guilty of actual sabotage than German agents." (41:95)

Among the groups that opposed mass evacuation of all Japanese were the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the American Association of University Women, the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, the Civil Liberties Union, the National Council of Jewish Women, Family Welfare Association of America, the Socialist Party, the YMCA, and the YWCA. The Tacoma News Tribune in an editorial on March 6, 1942, urged great care and caution to safeguard justice for the alien Japanese if they were evacuated.
While most of those who have been urging the evacuation of aliens from this district have been motivated solely by patriotic ideals, it is known that there have been a few who are using patriotism as a cloak and who have their eyes on fertile fields or business property which they hope to acquire for below real value.

Such a procedure would savor too much of the practices and policies to those with whom we are at war. We want no forced sales of valuable alien property to favored individuals at prices far below real values, such as occurred during the First World War.

Here is a situation which the public should watch.

War is no excuse to permit avaricious individuals to steal the property of ousted aliens. Such procedure would be a blot on the good name of this state. We must see that justice is done in this important matter and that the greedy and unscrupulous do not seize the opportunity to make big personal profit. (30:16)

Later when mass evacuation of all Japanese was announced by the government, the News Tribune in an editorial on March 27, 1942, compared this to two other mass evacuations in North American history: the Acadians of Nova Scotia and the Loyalists or Tories of the new United States. (33:18)

Federal Action

Action by the federal government began on December 8, 1941, when President Roosevelt asked Congress for a declaration of war. At first, the domestic war restrictions applied only to enemy aliens, which followed the precedent of World War I. However,
almost all immigrants of Japanese origin were, because of their ineligibility to citizenship, automatically classified as enemy aliens, a situation in sharp contrast with that facing immigrants from the two other enemy nations, Italy and Germany, a large proportion of whom had become naturalized American citizens and were thus exempt from the enemy-alien classification. (40:5)

These restrictions included travel, possession of contraband items, possible exclusion from military zones, and internment of any alien that might be dangerous to the national security. Attorney General of the United States was in charge of carrying out the terms of the proclamation. However, he was relieved of his duties when on February 19 the President issued an Executive Order authorizing the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas from which he and military commanders may exclude any or all persons. Two categories of restricted areas were set up: (1) Category A. Areas through or within which no alien enemies may be permitted under any circumstances; (2) Category B. Areas through or within which alien enemies may be permitted on pass or permit. (43:20)

The Western part of the United States was under the protection of the Western Defense Command headed by General John L. DeWitt who, in 1943, told a Congressional Committee that "A Jap's a Jap. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not." (24:276) This was the man who would be responsible for the complete evacuation of all "Japanese" from the West Coast because of "military necessity."
The alien enemy control coordinator and chief of General DeWitt's civilian staff was Tom C. Clark.

On March 2 General DeWitt issued Proclamation No. 1, which set up Military Area No. 1 from which any or all persons could be excluded. For the first time the official press releases made it clear that all Japanese were liable to be evacuated. (2:146) The following headline appeared in the Tacoma News Tribune on March 3, 1942: "City, Coast Barred to Japanese." The Wartime Civilian Control Administration was then created by General DeWitt to help encourage voluntary evacuation of Military Area No. 1, which in Washington included the area from the eastern base of the Cascade Mountains westward to the ocean. It also included Western Oregon and California. Proclamation No. 2 was issued by DeWitt on March 16, which extended the alien control program to include Idaho, Montana, Nevada and Utah. When voluntary evacuation did not work well enough, General DeWitt asked that a new agency be set up to try to correct this problem. On March 18 President Roosevelt created the War Relocation
Authority by Executive Order. Its duty was to relocate the Japanese in new areas, provide for their needs, and to supervise their activities. Milton S. Eisenhower, assistant secretary of agriculture, was appointed as director, but served only until June 17 when Dillon S. Myer was appointed to replace him. The first compulsory evacuation of an area in the United States took place on March 24 when General DeWitt issued Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1. This affected all persons of Japanese ancestry living on Bainbridge Island, Washington, which lay in a north-south direction on western Puget Sound and could provide easy access to ships that must pass by going to the Bremerton Naval Ship Yards. On March 29, General DeWitt ordered all voluntary evacuation by Japanese in Military Area No. 1 to stop. (The process of voluntary evacuation will be further explained in Chapter II.) By June 1, 1942, the compulsory evacuation of Japanese from Military Area No. 1 to assembly or relocation centers was practically complete.

The reasons given for this compulsory evacuation were summed up in the phrase, "military necessity." (15:149) The western portion of Washington State fell under this "military necessity" because it was dominated by waterways, forests, vital installation of industry, military and naval bases, an airplane factory, and shipyards. The fact that so many persons of Japanese ancestry were concentrated in the Puget Sound was
was reviewed as a threat to military security. Seattle, the principal port in the Northwest; Deception Pass Bridge, the only means by land to the naval base on Whidby Island; and the forests which help to produce a large bulk of the sawed lumber in the United States, must be protected. The distance between inhabited areas on the coast of Washington was too great to constantly check; thus, it seemed like the only course open to the military was total evacuation. (43:15) By June 7, 1942, some 98 exclusion orders later, the Japanese from Military Area No. 1 were concentrated in specific centers. "The ideology of racism had finally prevailed over the doctrine that Americanism was not a racial matter and that all citizens were equal before the law." (24:277)
CHAPTER II
HOW THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS WERE EVACUATED

Voluntary Evacuation

Even before Public Proclamation No. 1 was issued in March, some voluntary evacuation had begun when about 9,000 Issei and Nisei moved to the eastern parts of the coastal states, including 499 men and women who voluntarily moved in Washington State. Some Nisei bought land and planted crops, but they eventually were forced to move to assembly centers before they could harvest. General DeWitt urged this voluntary evacuation program as did the Fourth Army which was in charge of the Western Defense Command. When the Wartime Civil Control Administration was created, 48 regional offices were set up in each important center of Japanese population in the West Coast area, the first civil control station being opened at Winslow, Washington, on March 24. Their primary job was to encourage voluntary evacuation. The offices were staffed by representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank, to handle business and personal property; the Farm Security Administration, to handle all agricultural property; and the Federal Security Agency, to provide all necessary social services needed. "After these were started, specific plans for (compulsory) evacuation of Japanese from Military Area No. 1 were immediately initiated." (43:41) (These plans were not evident to all Japanese, however.) Since some major
economic and social problems developed from this voluntary evacuation, the President, by Executive Order, established the War Relocation Authority on March 18 with Milton S. Eisenhower as the director. Its functions were to supervise, to provide employment, and to resettle displaced evacuees. WRA had broad discretionary powers with only two limitations: It could not start further evacuation and it had no power to return evacuees to their original areas. (40:24) Prospective voluntary evacuees were urged to prepare for evacuation and were promised aid in moving with the government paying the cost of transportation to the interior and helping to find specific employment. However, the attitude of the interior states was hostile and showed that the evacuees were not welcomed. The fears that the Japanese voiced were clearly shown in a statement given to the Tolan Committee by Emergency Defense Council, Seattle Chapter of the Japanese-American League in Seattle:

A large number of people have remarked that they will go where the government orders them to go willingly, if it will help the national defense effort. But the biggest problem in their minds is where to go. The first unofficial evacuation announcement pointed out that the government did not concern itself with where evacuees went, just so they left prohibited areas. Obviously, this was no solution to the question, for immediately, from Yakima, Idaho, Montana, Colorado and elsewhere authoritative voices shouted: "No Japs wanted here!"

The Japanese feared with reason that, forced to evacuate their homes, unable to find a place to stay, they would be kicked from town to town
in the interior like the "Oakies" of John Steinbeck's novel. Others went further and envisioned the day when the inhabitants of inland states, aroused by the steady influx of Japanese, would refuse to sell gasoline and food to them. They saw, too, the possibility of mob action against them as exhausted, impoverished and unable to travel further, they stopped in some town or village where they were not wanted. (43:101)

Over 270 Japanese people, 187 of whom were American citizens, who lived on Bainbridge Island, wanted and tried to move voluntarily but were unable to do so. Their leader, I. Nagatani, wanted to set up a cooperative colony of evacuated Japanese in Eastern Washington and Idaho. They planned to take over abandoned farms in these areas and would even pay most of the costs in their moving. However, the residents of Eastern Washington and Idaho opposed such a plan and the idea was dropped. These Japanese people were helpless for they could go nowhere voluntarily. Most of them were strawberry growers with their crop valued at $250,000. Their plants were just beginning to bud, but they cared for their crop until that time when they must move. It was announced by the major daily newspapers in this state on March 23 that Bainbridge Island Japanese could leave voluntarily from March 23-30, providing their destination was approved by the Army. After March 30, they would be sent to the Manzanar Center in California. These newspapers also announced that the evacuees would be paid $50 per month, to be collected after the war, and charged $15 per person per month for
food. (31:1) (The actual pay for those working in the centers would range from $12 to $19 per month with no charge for food.) James Y. Sakamoto, general chairman of the emergency defense council of the Seattle Chapter of the Japanese-American Citizens League, wrote to President Roosevelt on March 25, 1942, asking him to "point out to our fellow citizens that we are not traitors," (32:16) and asked that some refuge in the heart of the country be designated for the evacuees. He suggested the southern end of Moses Lake in the Columbia Basin reclamation area be opened for 10,000 Japanese, but the letter hardly had time to reach the President when General DeWitt ordered compulsory evacuation two days later. The entire voluntary evacuation program was terminated by General DeWitt, with Proclamation No. 4 on March 27, 1942, for two reasons: (1) to alleviate tension and to prevent incidents between Japanese evacuees and others; (2) to insure an orderly, supervised, and controlled evacuation with adequate provision for the protection of evacuees and their property. (43:105) The final results of voluntary evacuation of men, women, and children in Washington State by counties appears in Table I, page 25.

Compulsory Evacuation

The controversy by this time was not should the evacuation take place, but whether time and practical considerations should be allowed for a study of individual cases
TABLE I
BREAKDOWN OF VOLUNTARY EVACUEES
IN WASHINGTON STATE (43:110)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chelan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitsap</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okanogan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierce</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thurston</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yakima</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>499</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

before evacuation, so that only dangerous individuals would be evacuated. Some Americans, such as the American Civil Liberties Union, asked if it would be constitutional to remove citizens indiscriminately without due process of law but Senator Non C. Wallgren, chairman of the Pacific Coast Congressional Committee on enemy aliens and sabotage, said the "War department would have the authority to bar any or all persons from restricted areas during wartime and it could be done without raising any constitutional or legal questions." (19:2) The decision had been made and was to be carried out.

The general plan for the compulsory evacuation and relocation provided three main steps: (1) registering and servicing of evacuees at Civil Control Stations; (2) provisions of temporary residences and a minimum of normal community services at assembly centers; (3) ultimate transfer of
evacuees to relocation centers under the control of the War Relocation Authority. While the initial recommendations for evacuation on February 14, 1942, contemplated the internment of only alien Japanese, this was now abandoned by General DeWitt. (43:43) The method of compulsory evacuation was as follows: First, the coastal strip of the United States was divided into 108 exclusion areas, 18 of which were in Washington State. As each area was ready for evacuation, the people were notified, with the heads of families and/or each individual living alone being required to report to Civil Control Stations for instructions and registration. Over $5,000,000 was made available for making loans against evacuee crops and farm equipment and also to find substitute farm operators who would take over these farms and equipment. The Federal Reserve Bank took the responsibility for personal property including business property and cars, but the Army offered to buy any car or truck for the Blue Book value. Each evacuee was given a health check for contagious diseases by the United States Public Health Service prior to their entry in the assembly centers.

The evacuation procedure within the exclusion area covered a period of seven days. The Exclusion Order would be posted throughout the area from noon the first day to 5 a.m. on the second day. Registration of all persons of Japanese ancestry would take place on the second and third days. The
processing or preparing of evacuees for evacuation would take place on the fourth and fifth days. On the sixth and seventh days the evacuees were moved. (43:92) The first compulsory evacuation on the Pacific Coast was from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound directly to Manzanar Relocation Center in eastern California. The areas were to be evacuated as fast as possible in the order of their relative military importance. The Exclusion Order also stated: (1) the evacuation would not split family units or communities where this could be avoided; (2) the program should minimize financial loss to the evacuees; (3) the use of military was to be at a minimum, instead the use of civilian personnel was recommended; (4) evacuation was to be as quick as possible and was to make the relocation centers self-supporting; (5) evacuation was to include an initial move to assembly centers and then a more permanent move to relocation centers. (43:77)

The provisions of the Exclusion Order were soon ignored. The first provision stated that family units would not be split, yet Ebaristo Arota, a Filipino, and his wife, Kiki, a Japanese, were separated when the Bainbridge Island residents were evacuated. The Army authorities said "they were compelled to deny requests that Arota be permitted to accompany the evacuees or that his wife be allowed to stay with him." (34:1) The second provision said that financial
loss to the evacuees should be minimized, yet at the begin­ning of the program some evacuees had as little as 48 hours to sell, rent, loan, store or even give away their real property and possessions. (1:124) The evacuees on Bainbridge Island had only four days to move voluntarily (March 23-27) and only two days' notice that the government would evacuate them to California (March 27-29). Financial loss was inevi­table. The third provision said that the use of the military should be at a minimum, but when the Bainbridge Island Japanese were moved the soldiers were in charge of the evacuation. One soldier who helped with the moving said it had been both a hard and an easy job, "Easy because the Japanese cooperated. Difficult because it was hard to see the Japanese having to leave their homes." (34:2) The fifth provision said that the Japanese would first be sent to assembly centers and then to a more permanent relocation center, yet the Bainbridge Island Japanese were sent directly to the Manzanar Relocation Center in California. In all, the entire evacuation job was completed by the Army in some 68 days after the first actual removal, and done without any serious breakdown of operations.

Assembly Centers

The assembly centers were initially called "induction centers." They were being planned at the same time the sites for the relocation centers were being sought. The plans
called for the use of existing facilities: thus fairgrounds and race tracks were the primary source of such locations. Only one site was picked in Washington and that was in Puyallup near the Western Washington Fairgrounds. The United States Engineer Corps were to construct suitable facilities for housing and feeding families. Only four weeks were allowed for completion of the projects with work beginning on the Puyallup Assembly Center on March 28 and being finished 17 days later. It cost $500,000 and would hold 8,000 persons. Stories that were carried in the local papers described the buildings that would house the evacuees as being 40 feet by 15 feet and arranged in blocks with each family having a room (called an apartment) which was 20 feet by 15 feet. Families with over five members were allowed two rooms. Each room or apartment had a wood stove and steel cots with mattresses, (36:1) but the residents were to make or supply their own furniture. They would eat in mess halls. (35:1) The Seattle Japanese were the first to be sent to Puyallup Center starting on April 28, and they nick-named it Camp Harmony.

The Western Defense Command hoped to move evacuees to an assembly center near their homes for the purpose of keeping the evacuees close by until property matters were settled but four of the five assembly centers were outside the state. They also hoped to group the evacuees in a center in a
similar climatic region, but the Japanese of Washington State were sent to five different assembly centers, as shown in Table II.

### TABLE II

**BREAKDOWN OF EVACUEES TO ASSEMBLY CENTERS (43:290)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Assembly Center</th>
<th>Relocation Center</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>Manzanar,</td>
<td>Manzanar,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>California</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>7,314</td>
<td>Puyallup</td>
<td>Minidoka,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Idaho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>3,497</td>
<td>Pinedale,</td>
<td>Tule Lake,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>1,165</td>
<td>Portland,</td>
<td>Heart Mountain,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oregon</td>
<td>Wyoming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>Tule Lake,</td>
<td>Tule Lake,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Northeastern</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>California</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Relocation Centers

In total, ten relocation center sites were chosen with a majority of them on public lands, such as reclamation projects which the federal government owned. Each center had to be able to hold at least 5,000 persons, had to be distant from any strategic spot, and had to be capable of providing some of the necessary food. In the centers the evacuees were to live in Army-type barracks which were arranged in the rectangular form found in all Army camps. The centers resembled both an Indian reservation, in that all the people were of one racial group, and an internment camp, being completely surrounded with a wire fence and armed guards. (15:152) Each center was to try to provide work for every able person above 16 years of age with most of the jobs being farming but with limited positions available in the areas such as teaching, engineering, and other professional-type jobs. The evacuees' wage scale was $12 per month for unskilled labor, $16 per month for skilled work, and $19 per month for professional and supervisory work. This wage scale was used even though the Tolan Committee had recommended that evacuees be paid the current wages for comparable work outside of the centers. (24:294) The adult evacuees also received a clothing allowance of $3.75 per month while children were given $1.25.

The Japanese in these centers were encouraged to take and carry out responsibility, and some served as assistants.
to the chief of each center. Policies were also discussed with the evacuees. Each center had a hospital with doctors and nurses, many of whom were Japanese as was the chief police officer. A board of Judicial Review with a majority of its members being Japanese was set up to try petty cases in criminal court. In the centers only the Nisei could hold elective office, but the Issei could vote in the elections.

The evacuees could leave the centers only for specific and properly guarded work projects and all centers were surrounded by barbed wire and were under guard, not only to keep evacuees in but to keep outsiders out. (15:155) Resentment grew between the Caucasian staff and the Japanese inhabitants, especially at the Tule Lake Center. The Japanese were confined there, fed and clothed by the government, housed in barracks with one family to one room, and their children were schooled in the center. The Caucasian staff had liberty to come and go, better food in their dining room, attractive apartments, a higher standard of living, and could send their children to outside schools.

The transfer from the temporary assembly centers to the relocation centers was supposed to follow certain prime objectives: (1) evacuate entire communities as units; (2) combine communities to get a balance between urban and rural population; (3) minimize change in climatic conditions; (4) keep the movement of each group to a minimum of
distance. (43:94) These principles were not always followed in the case of the Japanese from Washington. The climatic conditions between Puget Sound and eastern California are vastly different as are the conditions between eastern Washington and Portland, Oregon, where the eastern Washington evacuees were sent. The principle of keeping travel to a minimum was also violated when evacuees were sent from Washington to California, Oregon, Idaho, and Wyoming. As was previously mentioned, the Bainbridge Island Japanese were sent directly to Manzanar Relocation Center in northeastern California and kept there. Seattle Japanese and Japanese from most of the eastern part of Pierce County were sent to the assembly center in Puyallup and were later sent to Minidoka Center in Idaho. The evacuees from Kitsap and the rest of King county (excluding Seattle) and western Pierce County (including Tacoma) were sent to the assembly center in Pinedale, California, and later to a relocation center at Tule Lake, California. (43:290) The residents of the counties west of the Columbia River and east of the Cascades were sent from Portland to Heart Mountain, Wyoming. The Japanese from the remainder of the Western Washington counties were to remain at Tule Lake in California.

Thus the Japanese from Washington State were sent to four different relocation centers, but the greatest number were sent to the Minidoka Relocation Center, which was
located in Jerome County, Idaho, 25 miles northwest of Twin Falls. The center consisted of 33,500 acres of land obtained from the Bureau of Reclamation and could handle 10,000 evacuees. The terrain was rolling but the soil was good for growing potatoes, sugar beets, beans, and peas. The Manzanar Assembly and Relocation Center was located in Inyo County, California. Located some 225 miles north of Los Angeles, it consisted of 60,000 acres leased from the city of Los Angeles, and since it hadn't been used for over 30 years the arid climate had turned it back into unproductive desert lands. The capacity of the center was 10,000 inhabitants. The Heart Mountain Relocation Center was located in Park County in northwestern Wyoming and consisted of 46,000 acres with a capacity of 11,000 evacuees. The land had been public domain and was received from the Department of the Interior on a temporary transfer. The suitable crops for the soil were alfalfa, beans, sugar beets, seed peas, potatoes, soy beans, and small grains, but since it had only 5½ inches of rain per year, irrigation was necessary to raise these crops. The Tule Lake Assembly and Relocation Center was located in Modoc County, California, about 35 miles southeast of Klamath Falls, Oregon. The site was formerly the bed of a lake and consisted of 7,400 acres of extremely fertile soil. The capacity of the center was 16,000 evacuees, but its peak population was 18,789. (43:250-263)
Since the greatest number of Washington evacuees were sent to the Minidoka Relocation Center, it deserves further discussion. Its peak population at any one time was 9,387 residents, but during the entire duration about 13,000 evacuees went through the center. To try to more fully Americanize the Issei, the center offered adult education classes in the evening which began November 1942 and lasted until September 1945. The curriculum included English, American history, American geography, and a current events study. About 1,800 evacuees took part in these courses with over 1,000 taking English. The Minidoka adult school system consisted of a supervisor, a regular Civil Service employee and 15 evacuee teachers who were paid $16 per month. At first only college graduates were used, but soon they chose to move further east on their own and resettle in normal communities. This created a problem. The Nisei were reluctant to teach their elders and the Issei were embarrassed to be taught by these youngsters. To solve the problem, four Caucasian high school teachers and the librarian taught some adult education classes. In addition to the adult education program, two elementary schools were established in the center to take care of the 948 students in grades one through eight while a high school was set up to educate the 630 students in grades nine through twelve. In both elementary and secondary education the teaching staff
consisted of Caucasian and Nisei personnel. (10:98)

The farm land at Minidoka consisted of about 270 acres of cleared and irrigated soil on which over 2,200,000 pounds of crops were harvested per season. "Open ditch irrigation was something new to most of the ex-northwest people and even to experienced irrigation experts, the raw sage brush and a rolling irregular terrain presented problems." (10:108) However, the problems were solved and the farm land was able to provide a few root crops, like potatoes, for the other centers. The 1943 crop, for example, produced 979,770 pounds of potatoes and also yielded many pounds of radishes, squash, cabbage, onions, tomatoes, and watermelons.

The center maintained a fire department manned by 43 evacuee-firemen and officers with two fire engines plus other equipment to fight range fires. Minidoka also had its own maintenance crew made up of 312 evacuee carpenters, electricians, plumbers, boilermen, sanitary engineers, and janitors. The Internal Security Section served as the Center's police force with a Caucasian as its chief and an evacuee as its captain. Over fifty evacuees served on the police force. The center was served by three religious groups: the Roman Catholic Church, the Federated Christians, and the United Buddhists. Evacuee professional personnel including physicians, graduate and student nurses, dentists, pharmacists, X-ray and laboratory workers served in the center's hospital
under the supervision of a Caucasian medical officer and chief nurse. (10:90-114)

The most offensive thing to the Japanese at all the centers was the fence. "It was three months before the fence was built (at Minidoka). During that time the residents felt they were on their honor to follow the rules, and followed them." (24:302) In time, the fence was built, as has been previously mentioned, not only to keep the evacuees in, but also to keep racists out. The evacuees at this center resented several other things such as the evacuation and the prejudice which produced it; the loss of their property and jobs; the mockery of American ideals; the Japanese-American Citizens League, because it didn't resist evacuation; the broken promises of the federal government which included promises of no general evacuation, better housing, higher wages, and protection of property. (24:302)

In January of 1943, the government decided that all Japanese must declare themselves loyal or disloyal. All persons 17 or over were asked, 'Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the United States of America . . . and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese Emperor . . . ?' (6:572) Almost 31,000 Japanese-Americans said yes, while more than 6,000 said no, and another 3,000 refused to answer the question altogether. Why did these 6,000 Japanese-Americans refuse to swear allegiance to the
United States? Four possible reasons are suggested:

(1) as a protest against their wartime treatment; (2) family loyalty; (3) as security—they felt safe there until the war was over; (4) as a consequence of administrative confusion.

At Minidoka the negative responses were very few because of better conditions such as better constructed barracks, a friendly adjacent community, good rapport between evacuees and administrators, and the fact that the registration of the oath had been explained five days before.

When the federal government lifted the restrictions on Japanese enlisting in the armed forces, about 11,000 Nisei volunteered. In Hawaii where there was no evacuation, one out of every three Nisei, or 9,507, ages 18 to 38 volunteered, but on the mainland only one out of fourteen or 1,208 who were eligible volunteered. A possible reason for the relatively low number of mainland Nisei volunteers may have been that they had to volunteer from behind barbed wires and armed guard. (6:580) In the Minidoka Center, because of good administrative explanation and cooperation with the Issei advisers, about 300 men volunteered. This represented 25 per cent of the total who volunteered from the entire West Coast, while Minidoka housed only seven per cent of the total West Coast Nisei. (24:308) These volunteers served in the 442nd Regimental Combat Team which was called the most decorated in the war. General Joseph Stillwell said, "The
Nisei have bought an awful big chunk of America with their blood." (16:328)
CHAPTER III
CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVACUATION

By the evacuation of the Japanese the United States risked a blow to its world prestige, but because of the scope of World War II few persons noticed or protested the mass evacuation and relocation program that was being carried out. In Europe Nazi Germany was fighting for the doctrine of racial superiority; while Japan was fighting for the so-called cause of the colored races struggling against their white oppressors. The United States might have built even greater strength and prestige at home and abroad out of the diversity of her minority groups, but the opportunity was completely thwarted. The mass evacuation policy seemed to affirm the enemy principles. (5:373) President Roosevelt had said, "The principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is a matter of mind and heart; Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry." (10:6) Yet, it was he who signed the order to incarcerate all West Coast Japanese. On the other hand, Roosevelt was the object of great pressure by citizens, Congressmen, and the military as a result of great national fear of the Japanese warlords who attacked the United States without warning. Military leaders, whose responsibility it was to defend the continental United States, demanded full powers to adequately protect the country from
possible internal and external attacks. Apparently there was little else for the President to do but sign the order giving the military leaders the power they needed to protect the country. However, the 15,400 German aliens and 8,600 Italian aliens in the Puget Sound region were never moved in a mass evacuation movement, yet the United States was also at war with Germany and Italy. The evacuation was called a military necessity by the military officials, yet not one resident, Issei or Nisei, had been found guilty of sabotage either in Hawaii or on the mainland. Because of ties of race, tradition, culture and customs, the Japanese presented a strong, tightly-knit racial group to the military authorities. The racial features of the Japanese marks them off from the Caucasian majority in the United States. Even though they were born and reared in the United States and became Americans on the inside, they were still Orientals on the outside and thus identified with the enemies of the United States. (15:146) Thus not only the 41,000 Japanese aliens were evacuated from the entire West Coast, but also the 71,000 Nisei who were citizens. (9:69) The overzealousness of the military to move all Japanese went so far as to affect all Japanese aliens, Nisei, all persons who were even a quarter Japanese, Caucasians married to Japanese, and Eskimos from Alaska who had a Japanese grandparent. (24:276) Not only did the Japanese suffer greatly, but the nation lost
the productivity that reduced its war potential. (1:132) It was estimated that in 1942 the Japanese worked about 56 per cent of all agricultural land in King County and about 39 per cent in Pierce County. (29:1) In addition, for almost the entire year of 1942 at least 50,000 Japanese on the West Coast who had been employed were now idle and many man hours of labor were lost. Finally, the cost to the federal government of the mass evacuation program for only the first nine months was a staggering figure listed by the Army as $88,676,716.69. This amount included the construction of the assembly and relocation centers and the operation of the federal agencies such as the Farm Security Administration, the Federal Security Agency, and the Federal Works Agency, which were used to help the evacuees. (43:401)

Even after the evacuees had been relocated, some Americans accused the War Relocation Authority of "pampering and coddling" the evacuees, but the WRA would point out some of the following things.

1. The maximum for food cost per day for evacuees was 45 cents per person.

2. The evacuees lived in only one room barracks with families of six or more having two rooms.

3. The rooms were furnished with steel cots and bedding and nothing else.

4. Evacuees received low wages--$12-$19 per month--for work performed at the centers. (10:5)

In addition, during the four years of internment, some
Americans had real apprehensions and misgivings about the evacuees after their evacuation. As one motion picture executive told a WRA staff member, "There must be something seriously wrong with those people or the Army wouldn't have "em all under wraps. That's all I need to know." (42:14) On the other hand some Americans did take the time to question and voice their complaints on the indiscriminate evacuation of the Japanese. Professor J. F. Steiner, chairman of the sociology department at the University of Washington, agreed that enemy aliens who lived near defense plants and military establishments should be moved.

But when this plan of evacuation is enlarged to include citizens as well as aliens on the ground that American-born Japanese are inherently disloyal to this country, we are starting in motion a dangerous mass movement growing out of war hysteria and differing little from the treatment of minorities by the totalitarian governments in Europe and Asia. (5:192)

For the evacuees, their removal and return brought about various consequences: the damage suffered to their status in the community, to their security and self-esteem, to their ability to earn, to their economic resources, (1:124) and to their family organization. Officials estimate that the Japanese evacuees were forced to leave behind some 200 million dollars worth of real, personal, and commercial property. The average yearly loss for farmers and nursery men was $13,960 per family, business families suffered an average loss of $12,810, while families who worked for wages
lost an average of $7,350. (26:117) While evacuees were incarcerated, they received a wage for their work which ranged from $12 to $19 per month which did not compare with the wages military personnel received, which were notoriously low at that time. In addition the military personnel had pensions, benefits, and opportunities unavailable to the evacuees. In fact the compensations paid could only be compared to that paid in prisons. The family organization of the Japanese had also suffered by life in the relocation camps. No longer did families cook and eat as a typical family group, but now ate in cafeterias on diets that consisted mainly of western food. In addition the Japanese experienced great damage to their status in the community when local papers appeared with the following page one headlines: "More Japs Must Leave," "Start Jap Camp in Valley," and "Japs Must Evacuate County." These headlines concerning resident Issei and Nisei appeared on the same front pages that told of the Japs capturing Singapore or the Japs sinking an American ship—the word "Japs" in these stories described the war making machine of Japan. (28:-)

At the relocation centers the evacuees heard rumors based on stories that appeared in newspapers that many of their former communities didn't want them back. News stories and headlines in local Washington papers such as "Race Mongers Oppose Nisei," only supported these rumors. Dillon
S. Myer, national director of WRA, said at a Seattle luncheon that "professional race Mongers and special economic groups were stirring up hatred in the interests of their own pocket-books to keep Japanese-Americans from returning to the West Coast." (21:3) At the same luncheon C. W. Doyle, executive director of the Central Labor Council, took exception to Myer's statement and said he felt that the armed forces should be returned before the "Japs" are allowed to come back. He said:

I have my Grandfather's discharge papers from the Civil War. I guess I'm an American. But I am unalterably opposed to the return of the Japs at this particular time and the majority of the 200,000 people in our council feel the same way. I've talked to soldiers, sailors, and they want to know how we can let the Japs come back here at this time. We better make some provision for our boys' return from the armed forces instead of debating the issue. (21:3)

Myer quickly answered this by telling Doyle:

I repeat, the decision to allow the return of people of Japanese ancestry was the military's, not ours . . . I hope you told them (soldiers and sailors) that you were talking about Americans, not Japs as you call them. I hope you told them, if they have not been overseas, that there are 17,600 boys of Japanese ancestry fighting in the armed forces. I'm not worried about the boys at Iwo Jima and in Italy. They've seen boys of Japanese ancestry spill their blood and they think they are fighting for the American way. (21:3)

Senator Warren G. Magnuson of Washington State in April 1945 felt that all evacuees should be given loyalty tests before being released from the centers. He said: "It is time every
Japanese-American stand up and be counted. This country has no place either in war or peace for anyone of questioned or questionable loyalty." (22:13) He also said certain Japanese aliens and Nisei should be subject to quick deportation if they didn't swear allegiance to the United States:

Japanese aliens not deported promptly should be held subject to deportation on the first evidence of sympathy toward Japan, or unfriendliness to this country, deportation to be consummated without involved and prolonged bureau procedures.

Persons of Japanese ancestry born in America should also be subject to deportation unless they attest to their loyalty to the United States . . . .

Events have proved many Japanese although born in the United States have considered their real allegiance is to Japan. (22:13)

This declaration of Senator Magnuson's raises an interesting point. Is it legal to deport an American-born citizen of the United States to the ancestral homeland of his father? In the past history of our country aliens and naturalized citizens of the United States have been deported after due process of law to their former homeland, but the only course for native born citizens after due process of law would be confinement in prison for a period of years.

When the return of the evacuees appeared imminent in April 1945, 700 persons met at Overlake Grade School in Bellevue to plan a welcome for the loyal Nisei. Of course, the anti-Japanese groups were there with George Westbea of Auburn and C. Nifty Garrett of Sumner representing the
"Remember Pearl Harbor League," but the majority of the people at the meeting were for the return of the loyal evacuees. The three leaders of this meeting were Linden Mander, University of Washington political science professor and member of Mayor Devin's Civic Unity Committee; John L. Fournier, Kent newspaper publisher; and the Rev. Frank Blish of Kirkland. Professor Mander told the group that "strong evidence that agitation against minority groups in some Seattle defense plants has been inspired by professional saboteurs." (20:1) However, after the war when all evacuees were released, only about one half of the Japanese moved back to their homes on the west coast, the rest remained near the relocation camps or moved to new areas of the country. In March 1946, 52,000 had settled elsewhere and about 57,000 evacuees were back on the Pacific Coast. In Washington State, according to the 1950 census, there were only 9,694 Japanese as compared with the 14,560 in 1940. Most of the Japanese (7,573) continued to live on the west side of the Cascades and only 1,764 in eastern Washington with Spokane county having 1,171 of the latter total.

The readjustment of these Japanese to their former communities after the war was helped by the lack of segregation in the public schools. However, much of their social activity was carried on entirely within Nisei and Issei groups. The prejudice that was evident in the early part of
the war again was present in 1945. The Native Sons of the Golden West, an anti-Oriental group in California, the Remember Pearl Harbor League, the Los Angeles Examiner, and the San Francisco Examiner all spoke against the return of the Japanese to the coastal areas. The Remember Pearl Harbor League distributed signs to businesses in Washington State—signs that read, "No Japs," and "We Want No Japs Back Here, Ever." In some Pacific Coast cities the burial of Nisei soldiers was refused in their city cemeteries. In other areas, including Seattle and Tacoma, restrictive housing agreements to prohibit persons of Japanese ancestry from moving into specified districts were still in effect, even though the Supreme Court ruled that the law couldn't be used to enforce such agreements. It should be noted that not all evacuees experienced prejudice after the war. Yanosuke Takao, a gas truck driver before the evacuation, left the Tule Lake Center in 1945 for Idaho and worked in an orchard. There he felt no intolerance; however, he didn't tell his employer that he came from the Tule Lake Center because he was afraid of the reputation that the center had for being where a majority of the so-called disloyal evacuees were kept. (38:-) Another evacuee, Shuichi Fukui, returned to Tacoma and started buying and then selling rice to returned evacuees and later opened a grocery store. Because he dealt mostly with Orientals he felt little or no discrimination upon
his return. Fukui not only went through the evacuation as a citizen of the United States and a veteran of World War I, but also lost one of his sons in action with the U. S. Army at Okinawa and another son while in the U. S. Army during the war. (4:-) The only case of discrimination that Jack and Sarah Sugimoto noted after their return to Tacoma was in 1946 when Mrs. Sugimoto sought the services of a doctor. Seventeen days after the birth of a child, Mrs. Sugimoto developed an ulcerated tooth and made an appointment by phone with a receptionist for a local doctor. Upon arriving at the doctor's office, she was told that the "doctor didn't feel like working on a Japanese because he had fought in the South Pacific." (27:-) Had the doctor questioned Mrs. Sugimoto he would have found out that she was a native born citizen of the United States.

Several cases involving Japanese were taken to court. Such a case involved the Miyoshi family of Vashon Island, Washington. They owned a well-insured home and stored all their personal belongings in it until after the war. When they were evacuated, the insurance company cancelled their policy and no other company would insure them even though two of the brothers had served in the army. On February 1, 1945, when the family was allowed to return, the home was burned to the ground with the loss of all their personal belongings. The arsonists were caught, tried, sentenced, and were
compelled to make partial restitution. (24:287) In 1943 the Supreme Court heard a case involving Gordon Hirabayashi, a senior at the University of Washington. Hirabayashi was convicted in district court for failing to report for evacuation and for violating the curfew, and was sentenced to three months in jail on each count with all sentences running concurrently. Hirabayashi said that if he registered he would be "giving helpless consent to the denial of all things which give me the incentive to live. I must maintain my Christian principles and I consider it my duty to maintain the democratic ideals for which this nation stands." (37:1) The American Civil Liberties Union supported Hirabayashi's stand because "grave questions of constitutional rights are involved in the application of this order to American citizens without any inquiry into their loyalty." (37:1) The Supreme Court upheld the violation of the curfew and its legality, but "Chief Justice Stone emphasized that nothing was decided regarding the constitutionality of the evacuation." (11:3) In another appeal case involving Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu, who had refused to obey the exclusion orders and had been found guilty in District Court, the United States Supreme Court upheld the wartime exclusion orders in a six to three decision with Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson dissenting. The majority represented by Justice Black said:
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes except under circumstances of direct emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger...

... We cannot by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions were unjustified. (14:2)

On the other hand, Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion is frequently quoted by constitutional lawyers. He said in part:

But here is an attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime merely because this prisoner is the son of parents as to whom he had no choice and belongs to a race from which there is no way to resign. If Congress in peacetime should enact such a criminal law, I should suppose this Court would refuse to enforce it...

... Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting and detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial construction of due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency. Even during that period a succeeding commander may revoke it all.

But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens.

I should hold that a civil court cannot be made to enforce an order which violates constitutional limitations even if it is a reasonable exercise of military authority. The courts can exercise only the judicial power, can apply only the law, and
must abide by the Constitution, or they cease to be courts and become instruments of military power . . . ."  (14:4)

Justice Murphy also noted that the curfew order "bears a melancholy resemblance to the treatment accorded to members of the Jewish race in Germany and in other parts of Europe."  (3:252)

While the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases involved only individual appeals to the Supreme Court, it may be asked why didn't the Nisei, through such an organization as the Japanese-American Citizens League bring legal action against the mass evacuation and relocation program? First of all the leadership of such organizations as the JACL and similar groups had been detained at the out-break of the war by the FBI, thus providing a period of time for these groups with no leadership available. Secondly, the Nisei felt that to bring such a case to court would reflect on their loyalty at a crucial time for the country and for their future as was pointed out in a book published by the evacuees at Minidoka:

We did not wish to test the legality of restraints on our freedom. We believed that the obedient, quiet cooperation with the government's plan would indicate the genuineness of our loyalty and should be accepted as our contribution and sacrifice to the war effort. Of more importance is the realization of the government and its people that the evacuation was a mistake from a standpoint of humanity if not from a standpoint of constitutionality.  (10:5)

However, the Nisei, who were by birth citizens of the United States were denied due process of law in that no formal
charges were ever brought against them, no trial was held, no jury sat in judgment, and no witnesses were called to prove any charges against them. The Japanese-Americans were the immediate victims of the evacuation, but "larger consequences are carried by the American people as a whole. Their legacy is the lasting one of precedent and constitutional sanctity for a policy of mass incarceration under military auspices. This is the most important result of the process by which the evacuation decision was made. That process betrayed all Americans." (5:374) Eugene V. Rostow, professor of law at Yale, judged the evacuation on legal grounds and said it was "our worst wartime mistake. Its motivation and its impact on our system of law deny every value of democracy." (24:290)

"The immediate goal of the evacuation was presumably clear cut: Protection of the West Coast as a war measure. But the national government, in addition to winning the war abroad, had an equal responsibility for maintaining democracy at home." (5:372) The evacuation violated the fundamental liberties of Americans and has continued a dangerous precedent from the American Civil War that military necessity may override the civil rights of all Americans.
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