Central Washington University

## ScholarWorks@CWU

1969

# Towards a Theory of Metaphor

Lee A. Farr
*Central Washington University*

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/etd

Part of the Education Commons, and the English Language and Literature Commons

## Recommended Citation

# TOWARDS A THEORY OF METAPHOR

A Thesis

presented to

the Graduate Faculty

Central Washington State College

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

by

Lee A. Farr

July,  1969

APPROVED FOR THE GRADUATE FACULTY


_____

Donald W. Cummings, COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN


_____

John Herum


_____

Tom Blanton

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

# CHAPTER I

## The Language of Metaphor

Metaphorical theories may be divided into <u>literal</u> and <u>non-literal</u> theories. The division between literal and non-literal theories is based on three main points of disagreement in establishing a theory of metaphor. These points are (1) <u>similarity</u> vs. <u>difference</u> within the metaphor, (2) <u>non-absurdity</u> vs. <u>absurdity</u> of the metaphor, and (3) its translatability vs. its <u>non-translatability</u>. These points stem from Aristotle's discussion of metaphor, for he raised two main questions about metaphor that continue to occupy modern metaphorical theorists. These two ideas are first that a metaphor has two terms related through "similarity in dissimilars" and second, that this relationship is analogical or proportional. He states that "Metaphors must be drawn ... from things that are related to the original thing, and yet not obviously so related—just as in philosophy also an acute mind will perceive resemblances even in things far apart." (3:191) and that "... a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars." (3:255) Thus a metaphor, according to Aristotle, has two terms that are in some ways similar to each other and this similarity presents us with an analogical or proportional relationship through which we may logically understand the completed metaphor.

Aristotle's "similarity in dissimilars" remains with us as the opposition of similarity vs. difference, and his belief that the relationship is analogical or proportional remains with us as the opposition

of non-absurdity vs. absurdity. These differences taken together consti-
tute the third opposition in modern metaphorical theories: translat-
ability vs. non-translatability.

The literalists generally emphasize the similarity between the two
terms of a metaphor and because they believe this similarity is based
on logic they also believe the combination of the terms that creates
the completed metaphor is not absurd. That is, there is a relation-
ship between the terms on the semantic level. As such, we can reduce
the similarity to a logical analogy or proposition and this analogy or
proposition may in turn be translated into a series of prose statements
that will be equivalent to the original metaphor.

The non-literalists, on the other hand, emphasize the difference
between the two terms of a metaphor, and because of this difference
they maintain that there is an inherent absurdity in the combination of
these terms. That is, they believe that there is no relationship be-
tween the terms on the semantic level. Therefore they also believe
that we cannot reduce the completed metaphor to a logical analogy or
proposition. The completed metaphor is then not the kind of statement
that can be translated into a series of prose statements that will be
equivalent to the original metaphor. The non-literal theory estab-
lishes metaphor as a means of creating and attaining insight through an
imaginative use of language. It is consistent with the manner in which
new language forms and insights develop and are gradually absorbed into
a standard language. The questions that we will be dealing with through-
out this paper concern the various components of metaphor and the rela-
tionships between these components in respect to the three main points

of difference just mentioned. I will cover these points in more detail
in the following chapter. The non-literal theory of metaphor will be
correlated with a general theory of language and both of these theories
will correspond with the manner in which man encounters the universe
and acquires knowledge.

The proliferation of terms by the different theorists has reached
a point that a unified understanding of the various positions is diffi-
cult to achieve. But even though the terms they use are different, dif-
ferent theorists are usually talking about the same kinds of things, so
for the sake of clarity I will state most of their ideas in a standard
terminology. This may result in a slight blurring of the exactness of
each writer's ideas, but it will enable us to achieve a more unified
view of how each writer's ideas are related to other writers' ideas.

In 1936 I. A. Richards introduced the terms tenor and vehicle to
distinguish the two terms of a metaphor. (110:96-97) According to
Richard's explanation, the tenor of a metaphor is the idea being ex-
pressed or the subject of the comparison, while the vehicle of the
metaphor is the image by which this idea is conveyed or the subject
communicated. The tenor and the vehicle interact with each other to
constitute the completed metaphor. The relationship between the tenor
and vehicle can vary from the vehicle's being a decoration of the tenor,
to the tenor being an excuse for introducing the vehicle. Shipley states
that, "Richards suggests a division of metaphors according as tenor and
vehicle (A) have a direct resemblance ('the winter of my discontent')
or (B) are bound by the maker's attitude (one's enemies are rats or

gargoyle grotesques)." (119:268)  Richards also feels that the differ-
ences in the relationship are as important as the similarities.  We can
see that Richards has partially adopted Aristotle's idea of "similarity
in dissimilars" and has added some precision to the two subjects of a
metaphor by the use of the terms tenor and vehicle.  These terms have
been very valuable, but they only help us a little in understanding a
metaphor and they do not explain the relationship between the terms.
Tenor and vehicle are well enough known that they carry their own mean-
ings and in using them it would be difficult to introduce new ideas or
erase old ideas concerning the nature of the two subjects of a metaphor.
Therefore, instead of using tenor and vehicle, I will use Max Black's
less familiar but more descriptive terms, principal subject and sub-
sidiary subject.  (16:44)  Also, instead of using Aristotle's "similar-
ity" I will use the term resemblance.  This will remove any possible
confusion with the word "simile."

The various theorists also use the terms denotation, designation,
connotation, and association in a wide variety of ways.  For this paper,
denotation will be used to refer to the relationship between the term
and its referent as a thing.  This is a direct and public relation in
which the term refers to a thing or object.  Designation will refer to
the critical attributes of the category named by the term.  Connotation
will refer to the term's non-critical attributes.  Association will re-
fer to the private attributes of the term generated out of the relation-
ship between the user of the term and the term's referents.  This is a
private and personal relationship which does not necessarily have any

meaning for anyone but the user or listener of the term.  All of these terms—denotation, designation, connotation, and association—taken together constitute the signification of each term being discussed, whether it be a single word or a phrase.  Signification is the total sense of a term at any particular moment for a particular user or listener.  See figure 1, page 6.

There is a progression from associations, which are private and individual, through connotations to designations, which are public and general.  In the creation of a metaphor the designative, connotative and/or associative values of the two terms are switched.  It is rare that all of these values would be switched in one metaphor.  When the more private and individual values are switched, the metaphor is more subtle than if the public and general values are switched.  As an example we can use Shakespeare's "All the world is a stage," in which there is a crossing of denotations and disignations, from stage to world.  This metaphor is a seeing the world as a stage on a public and general level but undoubtedly for Shakespeare and his audience there is also a mixing on the connotative and associative levels.

Shakespeare's metaphor is quite simple when taken on the designative level, but if we move to the opposite end of the scale, to a predominately associative metaphor, like Blake's "O Rose thou art sick," we are presented with different problems.  Exactly what Blake means by Rose and sick are part of his personal reactions and all we can hope for in being able to understand this metaphor, is that we will be able to find statements about the rose and what he means by sick in

```
                                    Term
                   ┌──────────────────────────────────┐
                                              Attributes
                                        ┌──────────┼──────────────────┐
Signification─┤  Denotation      Designation    Connotation      Association

                 Referent         Critical      Non-critical       Private
                 (thing)


                              General ──────────────────── Individual
                              (public)                       (private)
```

Figure No. 1

his other writings. These words, <u>rose</u> and <u>sick</u>, have general and public designative and connotative meanings that enable us to understand the metaphor on these levels, but the metaphorical qualities of Blake's statement reside primarily in an associative context, and until this is made explicit, the important aspects of the metaphor escape us. Most metaphors will cover the range from denotation to association but will place emphasis on the designative and connotative aspects of their subjects. If the poet places too much emphasis on the transferring of associative values, the metaphor will be so private that few people will understand it and if too much emphasis is placed on transferring designative values the metaphor will tend to be trite.

# CHAPTER II

## Literalists and Non-literalists Theories of Metaphor

The literalists view metaphor as essentially a disguised or tele-scoped simile, an elliptical simile, because they feel there is a basic similarity or resemblance between the two terms of a metaphor.  They hold that a metaphor consists in the presentation of an underlying analogy expressed in the similarity between the terms.  Metaphor of analogy or similarity is basically logical (non-absurd) and can be translated into another set of terms.  The main difference between a metaphor and a simile in this view is that a simile uses the words like or as and a metaphor does not.  Aristotle, Scott Buchanan, Andrew Ushenko, and Richards essentially hold this view.  (3:160)  They feel that metaphors offer no particular problems for explication.  The meta-phors can be reduced to a simile and then through a series of prose statements we can derive the same information that is conveyed in the metaphor.  This view is also held be Hershberger, who believes "that metaphor, the distinctive feature of poetry, is fundamentally an ex-pository, and--in its own way--economic prose usage; that in principle, through scientific study of the aesthetic experience, a metaphor is re-ducible to a multiplicity of integrated prose arguments;..." (51:433) In effect she believes that there is a resemblance between the terms of metaphor and that this resemblance is logical.

According to Black, the literal theory may actually be divided into two subgroups:  the substitution and comparison views.  The substitution theorists believe that metaphor can be replaced by, or substituted with,

a prose statement.  The comparison view maintains that a metaphor con-
sists in the presentation of the underlying analogy or similarity be-
tween the two terms and "holds that the metaphorical statement might be
replaced by an equivalent literal comparison." (16:35)  This means that
the substitution and comparison views imply each other and both may be
considered literal theories because they hold that a metaphor may be
translated into prose statements.  For the metaphor to be replaced or
substituted by another statement is essentially a translating of the
metaphor into another statement.  One of the basic reasons for the
literalists' acceptance of the translatability of metaphor is their be-
lief that a metaphor points out resemblances that we are already aware
of prior to the act of relating them in the metaphor.  Because we are
aware of these resemblances, we can express those relationships in other
terms besides those of the completed metaphor.

However, a weakness in this idea is that it does not take into con-
sideration the fact that the metaphor may create relationships that we
were not previously aware of.  Also, the belief in translatability ig-
nores the fact that all we can translate with any accuracy are the
designative and possibly some connotative meanings, and even then we
have a different whole because new and different relationships are
created when any one element is changed.  The majority of the connotat-
ive and almost all of the associative meanings cannot be translated be-
cause they depend upon the individuality of each reader.

Another major weakness of the literal theorists is that they have
not brought their views into a general language theory and have not

tried to fit their theories into the manner in which man perceives his universe and creates language. The only system that they have tried to fit metaphor into is that of logic as it is presently understood. The literal view makes metaphorical statement just another way of saying something and does not account for its uniqueness as a means of acquiring insight and expanding knowledge.

The literalists, then, assert that metaphor expresses a similarity in the terms that are being related, that the relationship is a logical one—that is, is not absurd—and because of the logical similarity between the terms, the relationship can be translated into a series of prose statements.

There is a connection formed between the literalists and the non-literalists by Max Rieser. Rieser is like the literalists when he says that metaphor is a, "...transformation" of the simile. (8:160) This would make metaphor basically a simile, and since simile is based on a prescribed set of logical correspondences, a simile would express a non-absurd relationship and would be transcribable into a series of prose statements. However, Rieser is like the non-literalists in his belief that although metaphor is misused language—that is, is not literally true—this misuse is valuable. He says that metaphor is an expression that has emotive impact but no meaning. A statement or phrase that can be tested is one that has meaning; a statement or phrase that cannot be tested cannot be said to have meaning. There is no way of testing metaphors, and Rieser denies meaning to metaphor. He denies

meaning because, "...the link (between the two subjects of the metaphor) is not factual but emotional," (8:160) and "poetic comparison is not a proposition at all." (8:160)

Rieser's idea that the resemblance between the terms of a metaphor is an emotional one, means that the crucial aspects of metaphor do not reside in any rational or logical system.  Since it creates relation-ships that do not reside in a logical system, metaphor is literally ab-surd.  Understanding a metaphor is therefore a matter of emotional con-formity, not of rationality, and of putting one's self in tune with the emotions of the poet.  Rieser feels that, whenever an object has acquired an emotional value for the poet, his mind will seek an object of similar emotional value as 'explanation'." (111:216)  This feeling does not explain why a particular poet's mind creates metaphors of the type that it does, but just says that for any particular poet, the meta-phors that he creates have an emotional similarity in their objects for that poet.  However, this analysis of metaphor "places the phenomena of poetic thought and creation in their proper position in revealing their character as resulting from a natural trend of thought impregnated with emotion." (111:216)  Rieser is making an attempt to relate the operation and process of forming a metaphor with the manner in which the human mind operates.  In his ideas on the relationship between simile and metaphor Rieser agrees with the literalists, but his characterization of the resemblance between the subjects of the metaphor as emotional and not logical places him with the non-literalists.

The second group of theorists, the non-literalists, have a greater variety of views of metaphor, but the one factor that holds them together is their belief that metaphorical structure is not based on a literal similarity, but on the difference between the terms of a metaphor, and therefore the relationship between the terms is not one of logical correspondence. According to the non-literalists, because this relationship is not logical and is absurd, a metaphor cannot be translated into a series of prose statements that will approach any kind of equivalence with the original metaphor. The metaphorical statement, "Achilles is a lion," is literally false: it does not fit with what we experience in our encounter with our environment. It is not logical in any sense that we understand logic. Logic has to do with a correspondence between words on the designative level of notation, which is concerned with a general and public understanding, and not with words on the connotative or associative level, which are concerned with an individual and private understanding and are usually related to emotional responses.

Concerning similarity, the non-literalists say that, "It would be more illuminating in some of these cases to say that the metaphor creates the similarity than to say that it formulates some similarity antecedently existing." (16:37) A resemblance may antecedently exist, but it may also be created by the metaphor. In many cases, "Metaphors can be supported by specially constructed systems of implications, as well as by accepted commonplaces; they can be made to measure and need not be reach-me-downs." (17:43) To admit a literal equivalent for

metaphor is to deny its uniqueness as a literary statement and its value
as a means of achieving insight into problems and relationships.

The non-literalists Max Black, Monroe C. Beardsley, William Empson,
and Bedell Stanford, are all in general agreement. Basically, they feel
that a metaphor is a significant attribution that is either indirectly
self-contradictory or obviously false in its context, and in which the
subsidiary subject connotes characteristics that can be attributed,
truly or falsely, to the principal subject. A metaphorical statement is
discourse that says more than it states, by cancelling out the primary
meaning to make room for secondary meanings. In poetry the chief tactic
for obtaining this result is through the creation of logical absurdity.
This absurdity is in the relationship between the two terms of the meta-
phor. Absurdity is the result of misapplied or transposed denotations,
designations and possibly some connotations. The logical absurdity of
statements in poems forces them to meaning on the second level.
Logically empty attributions are either self-implicative or self-
contradictory. Whenever an attribution is indirectly self-contradictory,
but the subsidiary subject has designations or connotations that could
be attributed to the principal subject, the attribution is a metaphor-
ical attribution, or a metaphor.

This means that the emphasis for the non-literalists is not on any
similarity or resemblance between the terms of a metaphor, if there is
any at all, but on the differences between the terms. Through his
choice the writer creates the metaphor in such a manner that he selects,

emphasizes, suppresses, and organizes attributes of the principal subject by implying statements about it that normally apply to the subsidiary subject.

Black feels that a metaphor's principal and subsidiary subjects may best be thought of as "systems of things" rather than "things." That is, each subject must be considered in its total signification, which includes denotation, designation, connotation and associations. The juxtaposition of the principal subject with the subsidiary subject, as systems of things whether they be individual words or longer phrases, creates the metaphor by applying to the principal subject a system of "associated implications" characteristic of the subsidiary subject. These associated implications usually consist of what Black calls "commonplaces" about the subsidiary subject, but may in suitable cases, consist of deviant implications established ad hoc by the writer. This means that the writer may make use of the commonly held denotations, designations and connotations or he may make use of his private associations to impose meaning. This process involves shifts of meaning of words belonging to the same family or system as the principal subject. Some of these shifts, though not all, may be metaphorical transfers. When, in "The Eye of Hurricane Renee," James Tate asks, "Today the clouds are / become vats of soda," he is using certain characteristics of vats and soda and applying these characteristics to the formation of clouds prior to the coming of a hurricane. We are to see the clouds as though they are vats of soda. But not all of the characteristics of vats of soda will be transferred to the clouds, only the ones that are

pertinent to the poem, only the characteristics that will imaginatively clarify and emphasize the characteristics of the clouds that he wants us to notice about the clouds on that day.

Black's position is put forth concisely when he states, "The new context ... imposes extension of meaning upon the focal word." (16:39) This is close to the view of I. A. Richards in that the reader must remain aware of the extension of meaning and must attend to both the old and the new meanings together.

The idea of "extension of meaning" is used by Philip Wheelwright in his etymological approach to metaphor, in which he provides us with two new terms. Basically meta means "change" and phor means "movement." From this analysis we can see that a metaphor is a change in movement or direction. It is "a word transference from one universe of discourse to another," (133:433) or the intentional transfer of a name from one referent to another. The type of metaphor that creates new meaning through a basic similarity or relatedness is called epiphor by Wheelwright. Epi can be translated as "over on to" and epiphor is then an outreach or extension of meaning through comparison. It is an effort to make each word mean more than it actually says. This type of metaphor would fit with the literalist theories. It is basically a simile without the words like or as. An example of this type of metaphor is taken from Richard Wilbur's "Exeunt."

> All cries are thin and terse;
> The field has droned the summer's final mass;
> A cricket like a dwindling hearse
> Crawls from the dry grass.

There are many words that are related or similar here and I won't try a complete explication but similarities may be seen between cries and cricket, thin and blades of grass, droned and hearse, and summer and dry.

For his other term Wheelwright adopts the root dia, which means "through," and creates the term diaphor; a creation of meaning by juxtaposition or synthesis. The "movement is 'through' certain particulars of experience." (143:78) This is a creation of meaning through the juxtaposition of dissimilarities or unrelatedness. It emphasizes the differences between the terms. Here Wheelwright uses as an example two lines from Ezra Pound's "In a Station of the Metro."

> The apparition of these faces in the crowd;
> Petals on a wet, black bough.

There is no relationship between the two lines or any of the words in these lines. We derive meaning from these lines because of, not in spite of, the unrelatedness of the lines. Because of the absurdity of the juxtaposition a new awareness of each situation is created. The term "diaphor" seems to be in agreement with the non-literalists' view of metaphor. According to Wheelwright both epiphor and diaphor may be present in one poem. Each stanza may be epiphoric while the relationship between the stanzas may be diaphoric, or it may be the other way around, or the character of the metaphor may change as we move through the poem.

Douglas Berggren uses Wheelwright's idea of plurisignation, which is similar to Black's idea that meanings in metaphor may be accomplished on more than one level at a time, and he states that, "Vital metaphor should be defined as a plurisignificative sign focus where referents

can be univocally conjoined or fused only at the expense of absurdity,
but which implicitly involves a process of assimilative construing
whose cognitive import cannot be entirely resolved into literal or non-
tensional assertions." (9:244) He claims that given this theory we can
say that the metaphor both creates and reveals. Berggren constructs a
diagram which helps explain his view of the functioning of metaphor.

$$
\begin{array}{c}
F \\
| \\
S ---+--- P \\
| \\
T
\end{array}
$$

F = Sign Focus
S = Subsidiary Subject
P = Principal Subject
T = Transformed assimulation of S & F

In this diagram, T, the transformed assimulation of S and P, is the
completed metaphor. In connection with this diagram he states that
"the legitimate and vital use of metaphor, while transforming S and P
in the direction of T, by means of some principle of assimilative con-
struing, simultaneously retains their initial separation." (9:247)
Berggren goes on to explain that given such a process of metaphorical
construing, poetic textures appear. However, to apprehend those tex-
tures we must construe the world with feeling and "nothing short of
ultimately irreducible metaphor can open up or sustain this specific
dimension of textural reality, or the poetic truth it affords."
(9:256-257) Berggren would obviously disagree with the literalist
position, for to him the very basis of metaphor and poetic textures
lies in the absurdity of the metaphorical statement and in its inabil-
ity to be resolved into a series of literal equivalents.

Another non-literalist, Marcus Hester, presents us with the most detailed analysis of metaphor now available. He begins his analysis of metaphor by accepting the ideas of explicit and implicit metaphor. An explicit metaphor, or simile, is one that uses the terms like or as. An implicit metaphor does not use like or as, and is recognized by its being literally false. We must go outside the metaphor to be able to recognize an implicit metaphor. It is a tension between what is being said and our body of knowledge. Accordingly, the terms of the metaphor do not establish a relationship through their similarity, as the literalists maintain, but remain unrelated because of their difference. The relationship is absurd in that we are not initially aware of any meaningful correspondence between the terms and therefore the completed metaphor is non-translatable.

Thus Hester begins his analysis at the point where the other theorists finished theirs; that is, with the acceptance of metaphor as presenting two terms that are not similar or related in the structural relationship of a completed metaphor. In other words, the metaphor places two terms together that are not otherwise related. In being unrelated, the combination of the terms in the form of the completed metaphor is not a logical relationship, but an absurd one and as such is non-translatable.

The problem now is that if we accept these three conditions, i.e. the essential difference in the terms, the absurdity of the relationship and the non-translatability of the completed metaphor, how are we able to derive meaning from a metaphor?

In his effort to understand metaphor, Hester feels that we must approach it with an open mind and in a methodical manner. He uses as a base for his approach Husserl's "epoch," a method of bracketing out all limiting objects, attitudes and/or systems while concentrating one's attention on a single phenomenon. This means that we do not approach the phenomenon we are examining with any presuppositions concerning its nature. In this way, "The epoch allows 'the original right of all data...'" (53:119) The use of the epoch is especially fitting, for "The reading which is appropriate to metaphor is that reading which allows the 'original right of all data' presented by metaphor during the act of reading." (53:119) This reading allows us to approach the metaphor openly. In relating the two terms of a metaphor, the non-literalists agree that we are transferring the terms of one category to the idioms of another; we are seeing one thing as if it were something else. For Hester this seeing as is perhaps the most important aspect of our understanding metaphor. Seeing as, to function properly, re-quires the principal and subsidiary subjects to be essentially differ-ent, for if the principal and subsidiary subjects are similar, there is no new information imposed on either term by seeing them as they appear through the other term. If they are similar, the terms are inter-changeable and we might as well only have one term. So it is through the juxtaposition of different terms that we can see one term in the light of the other. With this in mind Hester now says that, "Reading appropriate to poetic metaphor is reading which allows metaphor's

primary qualities, the words, and its secondary qualities, the imagery
and seeing as, on an equal footing." (53:119)

We can now see that the act of reading is neutral just as the
aesthetic stance is neutral. Both the act of reading and the aesthetic
stance lack positionality or belief content. The act of reading
brackets out presuppositions concerning the physical world and systems
of reality. In reading we do not divide the poem into real and ideal
or primary and secondary qualities. Reading then, "is a radical open-
ness which seeks as a methodological ideal to let the poem reveal its
intention or meaning. Reading is an active openness to the text."
(53:131) This then allows the poem to develop a sensuous fullness
approaching that of a perceived object. However, the metaphors within
a poem function through image control. That is, the images of a poem
or metaphor are not free to be interpreted any way a person wants to
interpret them. One way a poet controls his imagery is by exploiting
"the aura of imagery which words get by association in our memory of
that word with images of its referent." (53:143) Another way is through
the use of etymological rejuvenation. Also, our history, that is of the
world, associates certain words and types of language and selected
imagery.

The poet's intention or style selects certain imagery in the act of
imposing his will on the medium and in this way rules against the acci-
dental. Thus, "imagery is part of the intentional structure or style
of the metaphor. The metaphor as a stylized object is definitive of
intention." (53:149) The concept of intention will be covered in the

next chapter. For now, just keep in mind that metaphors are deliberately—that is, intentionally—constructed. Lastly, the process of seeing as selects out the relevant aspects of metaphorical images. Hester (53:160) continues then by saying that,

> By metaphorical imagery then I understand those quasi-sensuous experiences, occurring while reading metaphor, experiences which are qualitatively different from impressions because their object is neither posited as existing nor not existing and because such imagery lacks the perspectival fullness of impressions. Further this quasi-sensuous experience is precisely a <u>quasi-sensuous</u> experience. We can and do speak of such imagery in qualitative terms.

Thus far, then, we can say that in reading metaphor, images occur, these images are not free, the images are quasi-sensuous experiences and these images are contemplated as ends in themselves which do not necessarily correspond with either the physical world or "reality."

Imagery and seeing as are related to each other because metaphor "involves the intuitive relation of seeing as between parts of the description." (53:169) That is, there is a positive relation of seeing as between the principal and subsidiary subjects. The seeing as identifies the subsidiary subject as different from the principal subject. Essentially then, "<u>metaphorical seeing as is a seeing as between elements of an imagistic description</u>." (53:176) Thus, "<u>Seeing as is an intuitive experience-act by which one selects from the quasi-sensory mass of imagery one has on reading metaphor the relevant aspects of such imagery</u>." (53:180) Seeing as is an intuitive experience-act and as such is irreducible. It is not possible to reduce it to a set of rules or to a series of prose equivalents as the literalists would like

to do.  Hester concludes by saying that, "<u>seeing as is the fundamental</u> <u>distinguishing characteristic of metaphor in poetry.</u>" (53:175-176)  And, "<u>metaphor is a fusion of sense and sensa because the seeing as in the</u> <u>metaphorical structure is half thought, half experienced</u>," therefore, "<u>in reading metaphor one experiences imagery and sound-sensa-related in a</u> <u>relevant way - sense.</u>" (53:187-188)

Hester has attempted to show that the differences between the terms of a metaphor are more important than the similarities, the juxtaposi- tion of two terms that are essentially different create an illogical or absurd relationship, at least on the denotative and designative levels, and because it is an illogical or absurd relationship the metaphor is non-translatable.

Basically the images we have or derive from words are private and are thus not justifiable reference criteria.  That is, our images probably will not provide meanings for other people.  This is to imply that meaning is not an inner image nor an inner verbal translation.

> The only generalization about meaning that we can make is
> the very limited one:  'For a <u>large</u> class of cases - though
> not for all - in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can
> be defined thus:  the meaning of a word is its use in the
> language. (53:51)

There are several senses of the word <u>use</u>.  It may be thought of in an individual sense, an instrumental sense, and a social sense.  The social sense of the word <u>use</u> can be thought of as involving public actions; meaning as an act, both verbal and behavioral, and involving public objects—that is, it presupposes public acts and public objects, a common physical environment, and involving a body of accepted conventions.

These conventions form the standard use of the language. The instrumental sense of use would be primarily concerned with the denotative, designative and connotative values of words but not with the associative value of words. The individual sense of use would be concerned with total signification encompassing denotation, designation, connotation and association. Poetry means on all these levels for it may be interpreted as being used on all these levels.

The way use is described means that denotative language is general, and public and associative language is individual and private. This is why the images we derive from words, which are primarily associative, probably do not provide adequate meanings for other people. These images are private and are not necessarily understood by other people. Therefore, the way the language is used determines its meaning in a large number of cases and it is the way language is arranged into a metaphor that establishes metaphor as a means of creating insight and language growth. The most important method of creating insight through the use of metaphor is to establish the metaphor as a presentational symbol, an icon and a concrete universal, all of these terms being more or less interchangeable. Hester accepts Langer's argument for the poem as a presentational symbol in as much as it is a direct presentation of an individual object. Ogden and Richards also agree with Langer that the poem is a presentation of an experience; that is, in reading a poem one has an experience.

If we accept that standard language is referential and poetic language is presentational, then poetic language is also iconic. An

icon shares certain qualities with its object, just as a picture shares
certain qualities with the pictured object. Iconicity and signification
are also inversely related. Thus there is a similarity in the terms
presentational symbol and icon.

Wimsatt argues "that what distinguishes poetry from scientific or
logical discourse is a degree of irrelevant concreteness in descriptive
details." (53:72) Now, particulars in themselves do not mean; they must
be related to something beyond themselves. And this something else is
the universal. This is accomplished by expressing the reality of the
inter-action between the I who is aware and the that of which I am
aware. And accordingly, "the coalescence of the self and the not self
involves a second coalescence between the particular and universal."
(53:75) Thus we can say that the poem is also a concrete universal.
Combining these elements, Hester (53:79) says that,

> The logical and counterlogical elements in the poem function
> to make the poem an icon. Iconic language is 'thick' and pre-
> sents its object in a manner similar to a painting's presenta-
> tion of its object. This means that iconic language, the
> thick language of the poem, is not transparent. Like a paint-
> ing it is looked at and not through. The poem has become
> 'thingy.' As such, it forces us to recognize that it is re-
> lated to reality in the same way in which a sculptured object
> is related to reality, that is, metaphorically. (53:79)

This is to say that, "the poem is a picture (noun), but it does not
picture (verb) literally or correspond. The poem is a concrete object
not a transparent image." (53:80) The poem as an icon and a concrete
object is using language in a way that it is not normally used. In stan-
dard language the denotative and designative values are emphasized and
we look through the words to their referents and critical attributes.

In poetic language the total signification is emphasized and we look at the words and their interrelationships.

The qualities of the language that the poet works with are the sense of the language, the sound of the language, and imagery. These are the qualities of language as a medium. The sense is the total signification of each word or phrase including the denotation, designation, connotation and associations of each word or phrase, while the sensa is described by Hester as the sound and imagery taken together. Therefore in combination with what has been said earlier, Hester now says, "Poetic language is that language in which both sense and sound function iconically, thus yielding a fusion of sense and sensa." (53:96) In this manner, "poetic language attains the concreteness of an icon." (53:96) This is not the case with standard language. Standard language and poetic language are not unrelated to each other; they are at opposite ends of a continuous scale.

The juxtaposition of principal and subsidiary subjects essentially different and unrelated creates the absurdity of metaphor and makes it non-translatable. These conditions also establish metaphor as iconic use of language. Iconic use of language creates a situation in which we look at language and not through it. It draws attention to itself as being used differently from the way in which language is normally used. Iconic use is therefore a method of foregrounding language. Foregrounding is always in relation to standard use of language and it is at this point that metaphorical theory and general language theory merge. I will develop the concept of foregrounding and a general theory in the next chapter.

Hester's explanation of non-literal metaphor is the most explicit single explanation we now have. He has established that metaphor is composed of principal and subsidiary subjects that are essentially different; this difference is expressive of an absurd relationship between the terms and because of this the metaphor is non-translatable. His emphasis on the iconic nature of metaphor leads us up to the point of relating metaphor to a theory of language. However Hester has just led us up to that point. He has formed the basic ground work and now we will attempt to formulate a theory of language and integrate that with a theory of non-literal metaphors consistent with what we have said so far. Both of these theories must also fit with the manner in which man encounters his universe and acquires knowledge.

# CHAPTER III

## A Philosophy of Metaphor

Accepting that metaphor is composed of two parts that are related
to one another, we will agree with Black and call these parts the
'principal' subject and the 'subsidiary' subject. These subjects can
be of the simplest nature possible like the specific concrete term,
rock, or they may be a complex system of things like a philosophical
attitude. In order to create a metaphor we must apply the system of
'associated implications' that normally apply to the subsisiary subject
and are characteristic of it to the principal subject. The associated
implications will include the designative, connotative and associative
values of words which, taken together with the denotation, constitute
the signification of each term. If there is a physical resemblance be-
tween the two subjects, it is purely coincidental because the resemb-
lance necessary, if any, is one of a complex of emotions. The transfer
of 'associated implications' from the subsidiary subject to the prin-
cipal subject is similar to Turbayne's "the presentation of the facts
of one category in the idioms appropriate to another." (132:12) He
calls this transfer "sort-crossing" because there seems to be a certain
inappropriateness of terms being placed together in a metaphor. This
inappropriateness results from the use of a sign in a sense different
from what we normally expect. In a metaphor we have two different
levels of sense or understanding and we must simultaneously be aware
of this duality of sense and pretend that the two different senses are

one. There is a constant shift or change of our focus from one term and sense level to the other term and sense level, such as we have in Op art, except Op art is only on the visual level. Turbayne quotes Gilbert Ryle as saying of metaphor that, "It represents the facts ... as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types of categories), when they actually belong to another." (132:17) I will go into the term "as if" later for it is an important consideration in understanding metaphor.

Aldrich claims that in viewing a metaphor "you see an image in the medium of the picture, or the picture animated by the image." (1:57) He calls this mode of perception "prehension" and distinguishes it from "observation." In other words, "One 'observes' that X is P, but one 'prehends' X as Y, where X is not Y, and Y is an aspect of X animating it." (1:57) The artist's manipulation "is for the sake of the beholders seeing the composition as something that it is not. The image of this something 'animates' the work, which thus expressively portrays the artist's impression—brings it to the prehensive view of the beholder." (96:65)

Thus far, then, we have established that there are two terms related in some way in a metaphor. The relationship between these terms emphasizes their difference; that is, the relationship is basically absurd, and the completed metaphor is a non-translatable presentation. All of these points are part of a non-literal theory of metaphor.

Accepting the portions of the theories that I have indicated, we now have established the component parts of a metaphor, and what a

metaphor does, but the various theorists have not been able to explain how we are able to combine the terms of a metaphor. This is the one place where all of the theories are lacking. Max Black describes the process as involving "shifts of meaning"; Turbayne uses the term "sort-crossing" as seeing one thing as if it were something else; Aldrich accomplishes the transference through "prehension"; Berggren uses some "principal of assimilative construing" and Hester describes "seeing as" as in "intuitive experience-act." All of these terms are referring to the same basic process. The need at this point is to describe what it is that enables us to accomplish what the terms mentioned above allow us to do. How are we able to relate the two terms of the metaphor?

All of these descriptions require that the reader participate in the metaphor to the extent of combining the terms of the metaphor in some way. This combining of the terms is an act of subjective synthesis on the part of the reader. The question now is how do we accomplish this act of subjective synthesis? The basis for performing the act of subjective synthesis lies in Husserl's concept of the transcendental ego.

The transcendental ego is the ultimate source or basis for the nature of subjectivity. The transcendental ego is not the psychological or empirical ego. The empirical ego is merely one item of empirical presentations before me. The totality of experience that I have will be called the transcendental realm. The transcendental realm or consciousness is usually what is referred to when one speaks of his body or his "person." Behind this lies the transcendental ego. The transcendental ego is the source of all intentionality. The transcendental ego is pure

consciousness, one of whose objects is the person that I am. The epistemological problem, that is the problem of an external world, is really a language problem because there is no external aspect to the ego. Interpersonal or intersubjective relationships are characterized by intentionality.

The relationship between the metaphor and the reader is one of intersubjectivity. That is, the metaphor was written by a specific person with a specific meaning to attain that was constructed from a subjective standpoint. This relationship, as all intersubjective relationships, may be characterized by intentionality. By intentionality Husserl means that in order to perform an act we must intend to do so. However, intentionality is rarely conscious, it is automatic, passive, unconscious and anonymous.

It is from our basic intentionality that we perform the act of subject synthesis through application of the phenomenological epoch which brackets out all limiting attitudes and systems in order to be open to that which we want to investigate. This method consists in focusing on any part or all of a particular experience by removing ourselves from the immediate and lived engagement in it. In the aesthetic experience all but the subject itself is bracketed; the subject is extracted from the stream of practical, involved, committed, and engaged concerns in order that it may be contemplated, described and analyzed in isolation without the limitations of philosophical or any other presuppositions. This method can be applied to metaphor. Through the use of the epoch we bracket out the presuppositions so that all we

are confronted with is the metaphor itself and the relationship between the two parts of the metaphor.

After being open to accept each term of the metaphor in its fullest sense and on its own ground without any presuppositions, we must be able to meet the synthesized metaphor on its own ground and without any presuppositions carried over from the limits of previously held systems. When this is done, the metaphor seems new, a fresh insight because we have not previously been in the position that we find ourselves after reading and assimilating the synthesized metaphor.

The data for examination through the use of the phenomenological epoch need not be only sensory, it can also be eidetic or effective; that is, it can be a concept to the extent that it is apprehended as a subject for examination. In the same way an emotion, my own first person apprehension of an emotion, may be thought of as a subject to which I can apply the epoch and its bracketing. A perception of a metaphor, even if it is continuous and unchanging, is a composite in that it is made up of time intervals; two appearances may be similar in all respects as the two elements of a metaphor, but the fact that they are apprehended at different times means their unity is also a matter of subjective decision, constitution and intention, not of pure giveness. To describe both of the appearances that occur at different intervals in time, like the two terms of a metaphor, to one and the same object is an act of subjective synthesis. The two terms of a metaphor are each considered as subjects and in considering these subjects, we must include the total signification of each subject. The total signification

would include its denotative, designative, connotative and associative values. That is, we must not only consider the objective referents of that term but also our subjective referents to that term.

The combination of past, present and future is synthesized into one intended construct which comprises each term of the metaphor as a subject. The completed metaphor, the two subjects taken together, is also viewed in relationship to its past, present and future. That is, its past meanings and associations that we have about it, what it means at the present, and what our expectations are of it in the future.

Thus it is through our intentionality that we can perform the act of subjective synthesis that the non-literal theorists were alluding to and unable to describe. The subjective synthesis applies not only to the two subjects (terms) of the metaphor in relationship to each other, but also to the past, present and future of the completed metaphor. The completed metaphor may be thought of as a complex subject structure that is a result of synthesization. However, on a more sophisticated level Husserl recognizes that subjective synthesis and access to other minds is achieved through empathy which is a part of our intentionality. The reduction of psychological space through intentionality and empathy is a central feature of the manner in which other minds appear to me. Interpersonal or intersubjective relationships are characterized by intentionality and empathy. (96:65)

Empathy has been described by Professor Groos in this manner: "When the body feelings, etc., are not perceived as localized in the body, they seem to fill the object (perceived*); when these sensations

are still too weak to induce our attentions to wander from the object, but are sufficiently strong to have a decided effect on consciousness, there is a projection of ourselves in the object; if they are still stronger, they will be definitely realized ..." (8:321)

Lipps also feels that in empathizing with an object there is a projection of our ego into that object. The "projection" spoken of by Groos and Lipps, I interpret as being empathy itself and as such is an integral part of intentionality. Beardsley has said that in empathizing with an object we identify with the "forces through which its form has originated." (8:321) Therefore in empathizing with an object there is an intentional projection of ourselves, our subjectivity, into that object. This object has now become a subject and the relationship between it and myself is one of intersubjectivity.

Max Rieser was approaching the idea of empathy when he said that the similarity in a metaphor was not between the signification of the terms of the metaphor but between the emotions created between the two terms of the metaphor. Douglass Berggren has said that in order to transform the subsidiary and principal subjects in the light of each other we must construe the world with feeling. Both of these people seem to be getting at empathy. Through empathy we come to know what is beyond our immediate sense experience. To empathize, in a literary sense, is to participate in an interaction (the interaction between the two terms of the metaphor) between categories or universes of discourse and as a result of this participation to become aware of existences that are organically related to our present body of knowledge. Our

basic grounding as intentional beings, with empathy as a part of that
intentionality, enables us to transcend our mental limits at any one
specific time; to realize "... the alternations of that current which
runs from subject to object and from object to subject," (8:318) and
the subjectivity of objects and the objectivity of subjects. It is the
means by which we orient ourselves to the world, create meaning and
derive a sense of identity. The ability to perform the needed synthesis
of the terms of the metaphor, and then accept that synthesis and relate
it to our present body of knowledge is, as explained earlier, rooted in
the basic intentionality of our psychological make-up but is also, in
its fullest sense, environmentally influenced. Thus the creation and
understanding of metaphor has both a linguistic and a psychological basis.

Since metaphor is part of the total structure of language, a
theory of metaphor must fit into and be a derivative of an overall
theory of language. So far there has been no attempt to relate meta-
phorical theory and language theory. We will now attempt to formulate
a theory of language and a non-literal theory of metaphor that will
generally accommodate each other. In order to understand the unusual
and unique expression, of which metaphor is one type, we need to know
the usual or standard, or at least how the usual or standard is formed.
We cannot go back to the beginning of language and see how it was
originally formed, so we need to develop an hypothesis on how a common
or standard use of language develops. Language develops only through
a use of unique words, ideas or expressions gradually becoming common
enough that they can be used by many people and these people can then
relate these words, ideas or expressions to other people that will

understand what they mean. This means that the movement of language is
from associative, individual and private expressions to designative,
general and public expressions. That is, initially the word or expres-
sion is unique to one person and only later through more and more people
using that word or expression does it become common or standardized.
The result of this process has been called "automatization" by Bohuslav
Havranek. (48:9-10) He says that,

> By automatization we thus mean such a use of the devices of
> the language, in isolation or in combination with each other,
> as is usual for a certain expressive purpose, that is, such a
> use that the expression itself does not attract any attention;
> the communication occurs, and is received, as conventional in
> linguistic form and is to be 'understood' by virtue of the
> linguistic system without first being supplemented, in the
> concrete utterance, by additional understanding derived from
> the situation and the context.

Thus we achieve a language that is basically denotative and desig-
native. The words and the syntactical structure of the language are
understood by the users of that language without any additional explan-
ation required. The language at this point does not introduce any new
words or syntactical structures. Its main purpose is to convey ideas
already held in common by the users of that language as simply and as
clearly as possible.

Now an "automatized" language is language that is stabilized, but
we need to allow for new forms, words or syntactical structures to enter
the language which will in turn allow us to express and communicate new
ideas. Without some process of deviating from the standard, language
would be unable to cope with new and individualized expressions.

Havranek (48:10) has called one process of deviating from the standard automatized language "foregrounding." In contrast to automatization he says that,

> By foregrounding ... we mean the use of the devices of the language in such a way that this use itself attracts attention and is perceived as uncommon, as deprived of automatization, as de-automatized, such as a live poetic metaphor (as opposed to a lexicalized one, which is automatized).

As a result of the automatization of language we have a body of words, grammatical and syntactical structures which Mukarovsky says "furthers the generality of modes of expression, that is, their independence of the person of the speaker, as well as their formality, that is, their independence of the passing linguistic and extralinguistic situation, and of the concrete meaning." (96:62) This automatized language, supports the communicative and intellectual function of language. In contrast with this, foregrounding serves,

> to counteract the automatization of the act of speech, to individualize it over and over again, with regard to both the personality of the speaker and the uniqueness of the linguistic and extralinguistic situation from which the act of speech stems. (96:61)

Thus the foregrounding helps establish and reaffirm the relationship between the individual and the standard linguistic pattern and the linguistic pattern and reality. It is one method that enables the speaker to constantly double-check and correct the relationships among himself, the standard language, his use of language, and reality. It maintains the functional forms of language by emphasizing the difference

between the standard and poetic language. In addition to this it also emphasizes uniqueness and non-repeatability in the use of language.

The system which determines the standard automatized language is called the "parole." We all use language in accordance with the general parole, which determines our use of language with the confines of the standard automatized language. However, there is also our individual parole, which is linked to our individual personality and as such is linked to poetic language.

Language can be said to have two basic functions, the communicative and the esthetic. Standard automatized language is linked predominantly with the communicative function. Foregrounding is linked predominantly with the esthetic function.

Our concern is primarily to establish the basis for poetry within the confines of a general language theory. Poetry is a functional dialect in which the esthetic function predominates. However, the esthetic function is less able to overshadow the communicative function of language than the communicative function is to overshadow the esthetic, so the esthetic function is the most difficult to achieve or to make predominant. This may be because the foregrounded elements are new by being placed in a new perspective and in new relationships; they are part of the standard language but are not used in the standard way. We mainly see only what we are used to seeing and foregrounding presents us with a new emphasis, something we are not used to seeing by deviation from current standard usage. The dominance of the esthetic function in poetry has nothing to do with the raw number of foregrounded components.

In fact only a certain number of components can be foregrounded at one time. Simultaneous foregrounding of all components of language is impossible. But whether a component is foregrounded or not, in poetry all components are esthetically relevant. "The predominance of the esthetic function in poetic language, by contrast with communicative speech, thus consists in the esthetic relevance of the utterance as a whole." (1:58)

> Being a structure, that is, an indivisible whole, the work
> of poetry constitutes an esthetic value, a complex phenom-
> enon which is at the same time unique and regular. Its
> uniqueness is given by the indivisibility of its composi-
> tion, its regularity by the mutual equilibration of the re-
> lations between the components; being unique the work of
> poetry is nonrepeatable and accidental; being regular, how-
> ever, it lays claim to general and permanent recognition.
> (60:35)

The uniqueness of poetry relates it to the deautomatized language and the permanence relates it to standard automatized language. It is in constant fluctuation between the unique and the permanent; accident and law and its freedom from forms to adherence to norms. If the esthetic creation which forms deautomatized language accepts order it becomes automatized language and reaches over from the area of the momentary utterance to that of the conventions superordinate to the individual utterances which is the general parole. Poetic language has then moved from the individual and private to the general and public expression.

Metaphor is one of the most basic and effective ways to achieve foregrounding. By presenting relationships both that we have not been presented with before and in a new way, the metaphor draws our attention

to itself and is foregrounded. We see that it is a different way of using language than we are ordinarily used to.

From the basic established by Havranek and Mukarovsky we can see that metaphor could not be translated into a series of prose statements but could and would be assimilated into the structured esthetic and standard language in the process of automatization. It also could not be translated into a series of prose statements because of its basically illogical construction. There is no system available into which we could reliably transfer its meaning. By being foregrounded, metaphor emphasizes uniqueness and non-repeatability. When metaphors become automatized, they form dead (hidden) metaphors and later become cliches and even later, part of the standard language. The process of auto-matization is a primary method by which we gain new words and ideas, and therefore expand our language and knowledge. And this process is dependent on foregrounding and the creation of new metaphors to have a word or phrase that can be automatized. Thus the general theory of language put forth would support a non-literal theory of metaphor.

A new metaphor, created by foregrounding certain aspects of real-ity within the language, whether actual physical occurrences or mental attitudes, may be gradually understood by a body of the users of that language and become automatized into dead metaphors, cliches and even-tually become part of the standard language. If it is automatized and transferred into the standard language, this also means that it has moved from individual parole to the general parole. Thus metaphor is unique expression but unique expression that may, if the expression is

simple enough, be able to become part of the standard automatized language. However, if the metaphor is complex either in structure of idea, it is likely to remain alive as a metaphor, an inherent part of an individual parole. The greatest poets are those who create metaphors that can be understood by a large number of people but due to the complexity either of the structure or idea of the completed metaphor they remain live poetic metaphors. Winifred Nowottny feels that certain words, "may serve as escape-hatches from conceptual terms, because of their power to refer us out of language to an object ... which in real life is a visible crisis-point or declaration-point in a complicated history of process, a natural symbol with all the advantages over language of being in itself a simultaneity of opposites." (99:86) When these words are combined in the form of a metaphor, we are at the point of creating our own reality. For, "metaphor shakes our bearings on the question of how we stand in relation to 'objective reality,' and a metaphor inside a metaphor unfixes those bearings altogether; it makes us lose our direction--fix on the position of what is 'out there' in 'reality' and the position of our own consciousness of that." (99:84-85)

If we have a metaphor metaphorized (with each term of the metaphor a metaphor itself) we create a double jump outside the convention. In this way a complete poem can form a single complex metaphor of which its terms would be other metaphors. This breaks the hold the convention has on all of us and enables us to become aware of the subjectivity of objects and objectivity of the subjective process. Nowottny feels that this is so because, "The paradoxical or irrational features of poetic

language are a means of shortcircuiting the detour of consciousness through the polarized concepts of normal language—or perhaps we should rather say that they are a means of revealing the alternations of that current which runs from subject to object and from object to subject." (99:86) Metaphor in Nowottny's terms is far more than just a decorative or even explanatory (in the simple sense) device. It is the means by which we orient ourselves to the world, create meaning, and derive a sense of identity.

Achieving insight through the understanding of a metaphor is not a process of losing one's subjectivity, ego, or selfhood, but is the uniting of that subjectivity, ego, or selfhood with what was thought to be, without insight, an external object. It is an imaginative advancement to the realization that what was thought to be external to ourselves is now part of ourselves. Thus it is a dissolving of the subject-object dichotomy and a unification and fulfilling of ourselves with our environment. It increases not only our understanding of the interrelationships of what we perceive as real but also enlarges our concept of reality.

*Books and articles        BIBLIOGRAPHY
read for thesis.

1.  *Aldrich, Virgil C., "Image-Mongering and Image-Management,"
        *Philosophy and Phenomenological research,* XXIII (September,
        1962), 51-61.

        _____, "Pictorial Meaning and Picture Thinking" *The
        Kenyon Review,* V (Summer, 1943), 403-412.

        _____, "Pictorial Meaning, Picture-Thinking, and Witt-
        genstein's Theory of Aspects," *Mind,* LXVII (January, 1958),
        70-79.

        _____, "Visual Metaphor," *Journal of Aesthetic Educa-
        tion,* 2 (January, 1968), 73-86.

2.  *Allemann, Beda, "Metaphor and Anti-Metaphor," *Interpretation:
        The Poetry of Meaning.* S. R. Hopper and D. L. Miller, eds.
        New York.  1967.  103-123.

3.  *Aristotle, *The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle,* Tr. Rhys
        Roberts and Ingram Bywater, Modern Library Books, New York,
        1954.

4.  Ballard, E. G., "Metaphysics and Metaphor," *Journal of Philosophy,*
        45 (April 8, 1948), 208-214.

5.  Barfield, O., "Metaphor," *New Statesman,* 26 (March 20, 1926)
        708-710.

6.  _____, *Poetic Diction:  A Study in Meaning.*  London, 1952.

7.  Baym, M. I., "Present State of the Study of Metaphor," *Bibliography
        of Books Abroad,* 35 (Summer, 1961), 215-219.

8.  *Beardsley, Monroe C., *Aesthetics.*  New York, 1958.

9.  Berggren, Douglas, "From Myth to Metaphor," *The Monist,* 50
        (October, 1966), 530-552.

10. _____, "The Use and Abuse of Metaphor, I," *Review of
        Metaphysics,* XVI (December, 1962), 237-258.

11. Berry, Francis, *Poetry and the Physical Voice.*  London, 1962.

12. Berry, Ralph, "The Frontier of Metaphor and Symbol," *British Journal
        of Aesthetics,* 7 (January, 1967), 76-83.

13. Bilsky, M., "I. A. Richards' Theory of Metaphor," *Bibliography of
        Modern Philology,* 50 (November, 1952), 130-137.

14. Birch, A. H., "Abuse of Metaphor," *Hibbert Journal,* 45 (April, 1947), 234-240.

15. Black, Max, "Metaphor," *Philosophy Looks at the Arts: Contemporary Readings in Aesthetics.* J. A. Margolis, ed. New York, 1962.

16. *_____, *Models and Metaphors: Studies in Language and Philosophy.* Ithaca, New York, 1962.

17. *_____, "Some Questions About Emotive Meaning," *The Philosophical Review,* LVII (March, 1948), 111-126.

18. Bloomfield, Leonard, *Language.* New York, 1933.

19. Bosanquet, Bernard, *Three Lectures on Aesthetics.* London, 1923.

20. Brooke-Rose, Christine, *A Grammar of Metaphor.* London, 1958.

21. Brooks, Cleanth, and Robert Penn Warren, *Understanding Poetry,* 3rd ed., New York, 1961.

22. Brown, Stephen J., *The World of Imagery: Metaphor and Kindred Imagery.* London, 1927.

23. Carmichael, Peter A., "Aesthetic Knowledge," *The Journal of Philosophy,* LVIII (July 6, 1961), 378-387.

24. Cassirer, Ernst, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,* Vol. I: *Language.* Vol. II: *Mythical Thought.* Vol. III: *The Phenomonology of Knowledge.* Translated by Ralph Manheim. New Haven, 1957-1961.

25. Child, H. H., *Essays and Reflections.* Cambridge, 1948.

26. Christiansen, R. T., "Myth, Metaphor, and Simile," *Bibliography of American Folklore,* 68 (October, 1955), 417-427.

27. Costello, Edward B., "Metaphors and Metaphysics," *Journal of Thought,* 3 (July, 1968), 141-151.

28. Croce, Benedetto, *Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic.* Translated by Douglas Ainslie. New York, 1962.

29. Daitz, Edna, "The Picture Theory of Meaning," *Mind,* LXII (April, 1953), 184-201.

30. *D'Avanzo, Mario L., *Keat's Metaphors for the Poetic Imagination.* Durham, N. C., 1967.

31. Decker, Henry W., *Pure Poetry, 1920-1930: Theory and Debate in France*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962.

32. Downey, J. E., "Psychology of Figures of Speech," *American Journal of Psychology*, 30 (January, 1919), 103-115.

33. Eastman, Max, *The Literary Mind: Its Place in an Age of Science*. New York, 1935.

34. Elton, William, ed. *Aesthetics and Language*. Oxford, 1959.

35. Empson, William, *Seven Types of Ambiguity*. London, 1956.

36. Farre, George L., "Remarks on Swanson's Theory of Models," *British Journal of Philosophy and Science*, 18 (August 1967), 140-144.

37. Fleming, Noel, "Recognizing and Seeing As," *The Philosophical Review*, LXVI (April, 1957), 161-179.

38. Fogle, Richard Herter, *The Idea of Coleridge's Criticism*. Berkeley, 1962.

39. _____, *The Imagery of Keats and Shelly: A Comparative Study*. Hamden, Connecticut, 1962.

40. Foss, Martin, *Symbol and Metaphor in Human Experience*. Princeton, 1949.

41. Friedman, Norman, "Imagery: From Sensation to Symbol," *The Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism*, XII (September, 1953), 25-37.

42. Friedmarck, V., "Joseph Trapp's Advance Conception of Metaphor," *Bibliography of Philology Quarterly*, 22 (October, 1950), 413-416.

43. Frye, Northrop, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*. Princeton, 1957.

44. Gill, Jerry H., "Professor Edwards Confusions," *Mind*, 76 (October, 1967), 587-591.

45. Hagopian, J. V., "Symbol and Metaphor in the Transformation of Reality into Art," *Comparative Literature*, 20 (Winter, 1968), 45-54.

46. Hamburg, Carl H., *Symbol and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*. The Hague, 1956.

47.  Harre, R., "Metaphor, Model and Mechanism," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series*, LX (January, 1960), 101-122.

48. *Havranck, Bohuslav, "The Functional Differentiation of the Standard Language," *A Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure and Style*. Tr. Paul L. Garvin. Washington, 1964. Pp. 3-16.

49.  Heffernan, James, "Wordsworth on Imagination: The Emblemizing Power," *PMLA*, LXXXI (October, 1966), 386-399.

50.  Henle, Paul, ed. *Language, Thought and Culture*. Ann Arbor, 1958.

51. *Herschberger, Ruth, "The Structure of Metaphor," *The Kenyon Review*, V (Summer, 1943), 433-443.

52.  Hervey, Helen, "The Private Language Problem," *The Philospphical Quarterly*, VII (January, 1957), 63-79.

53. *Hester, Marcus B., *The Meaning of Poetic Metaphor: An Analysis in the Light of Wittgenstein's Claim that Meaning is Use*. The Hague, 1967.

54.  Hospers, John, "The Concept of Artistic Expression," *The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. New Series*, LV (June 20, 1955), 313-344.

55.  _____, *Meaning and Truth in the Arts*. Chapel Hill, 1948.

56.  Hudson, H., "Why We Cannot Witness or Observe What Goes On 'In Our Heads'," *Mind*, LXV (April, 1956), 218-230.

57.  Hughes, H. S., *Teachers of History: Essays in Honor of Laurance Bradford Packard*. Ed. by H. S. Hughes with the collaboration of M. P. Gilmore and E. C. Rozwenc. Ithaca, 1954.

58.  Hungerland, Isabel C., *Poetic Discourse, University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. XXXIII. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958.

59. *Husserl, Edmund, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomonology*. Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. London, 1958.

60. *Husserl, Edmund, *The Paris Lectures*, Tr. Peter Koestenbaum, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964, p. 35.

61.  Isenberg, A., "On Defining Metaphor," *Journal of Philosophy*, 60 (October 10, 1963), 609-623.

62. Isenberg, A., "The Perception, Meaning and the Subject-Matter of Art," *Journal of Philosophy,* XLI (October 12, 1944), 561-575.

63. _____, "The Esthetic Function of Language," *Journal of Philosophy,* XLVI (January 6, 1949), 5-20.

64. Jarrett, James L., "Verification in the Reading of Poetry," *Journal of Philosophy,* XLVI (July 7, 1949), 435-444.

65. Jordan, E., "Imagination and Its Organon Metaphor," *Essays in Criticism,* E. Jordan, ed. Chicago, 1952, pp. 87-142.

66. Kaelin, Eugene F., *An Existentialist Aesthetic.* Madison, Wisc., 1962.

67. Kamar, S. K., *British Romantic Poets: Recent Revaluations.* New York, 1966.

68. Kaplan, Abraham, and Ernst Kris, "Esthetic Ambiguity," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* VIII (March, 1948), 415-435.

69. _____, "Referential Meaning in the Arts," *The Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism,* XII (June, 1954), 457-474.

70. Kendall, G., "Dogma as Metaphor," *Hibbert Journal,* 22 (July, 1924), 734-743.

71. Ker, W. P., "Historical Notes on the Similes of Dante," *Essays on Medieval Literature.* W. P. Ker. London, 1905. Pp. 32-51.

72. Khan, Sholom J., "What Does a Critic Analyze? (On a Phenomenological Approach to Literature)," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,* XIII (December, 1952), 237-245.

73. *Khatchadourian, Haig, "Metaphor," *The British Journal of Aesthetics,* 8 (July, 1968), 227-243.

74. _____, "Symbols and Metaphors," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy,* 6 (Fall, 1968), 181-190.

75. Lalo, Charles, "The Aesthetic Analysis of a Work of Art: An Essay on the Structure and Superstructure of Poetry," *The Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism,* VII (June, 1949), 275-293.

76. *Langer, Susanne K., *Feeling and Form: A Theory of Art.* New York, 1953.

77. _____, *Philosophy in a New Key: A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art.* Cambridge, 1942.

78. Leaky, F. W., "Intention in Metaphor," *Essays in Criticism,* IV (1954), 191-198.

79. Leckie, G. G., "Note on Symbolic Inversion," *Philosophy Review,* 5 (May, 1943), 289-298.

80. Lee, Irving J., ed. *The Language of Wiscom and Folly: Background Reading in Semantics.* New York, 1949.

81. Lerner, Laurence, *The Truest Poetry: An Essay on the Question What Is Literature.* London, 1960.

82. *Levy, Jiri, "The Meanings of Forms and The Forms of Meaning," *Poetics II,* Warszawa, 1966, pp. 45-59.

83. Lewis, C. Day, *The Poetic Image.* London, 1947.

84. Linsky, Leonard, *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language.* Urbana, Ill., 1952.

85. Lowie, R. H., "Empathy, or 'Seeing from Within'," *Culture in History,* S. Diamond, ed. New York, 1960, pp. 147-159.

86. Lucas, F. L., "Simile and Metaphor," *Modern Essays on Writing and Style,* Paul C. Wermuth, ed. New York, 1964, pp. 124-140.

87. Mackey, Louis, "On Philosophical Form, A Tear for Adonais," *Thought,* 42 (Summer, 1967), 238-260.

88. Margolis, J., "Notes on the Logic of Simile, Metaphor and Analogy," *American Speech,* 32 (October, 1957), 186-189.

89. Mayhead, Robin, *John Keats.* Cambridge, 1967.

90. Mazzeo, J. A., "Metaphysical Poetry and the Poetics of Correspondence," *Bibliography of the Journal of the History of Ideas,* 14 (April, 1953), 221-234.

91. Meadows, Paul, "The Human Image and the New Partnership of Change," *The Personalist,* 48 (Fall, 1967), 524-547.

92. Mellor, W. W., "Three Problems About Other Minds," *Mind,* LXV (April, 1956), 200-217.

93. Meszaros, Istvan, "Metaphor and Simile," *Proceedings of the Aristotle Society,* 67 (1966-1967), 127-144.

94. Mindel, J., "Uses of Metaphor: Henry Adams and the Symbols of Science," *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 26 (January, 1965), 89-102.

95.  Morris, Charles, *Sign, Language and Behavior*.  New York, 1946.

96.  *Mukarovsky, Jan, "The Esthetics of Language," *A Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure and Style*.  Tr. Paul L. Garvin.  Washington, 1964, pp. 31-70.

97.  *_____, "Standard Language and Poetic Language," *A Prague School Reader on Esthetics, Literary Structure and Style*, Tr. Paul L. Garvin.  Washington, 1964, pp. 17-30.

98.  Myers, C. Mason, "Metaphors and Mediately Informative Expressions," *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 6 (Fall, 1968), 159-166.

99.  *Nowottny, Winifred, *The Language Poets Use*.  London, 1965.

100.  Ogden, C. K., and I. A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, 10th ed.  London, 1960.

101.  Ong, W. J., "Metaphor and the Twinned Vision," in his *The Barbarian Within, and Other Fugitive Essays and Stories*.  New York, 1962, pp. 41-48.

102.  *Paget, V., "Empathy," excerpt from *The Beautiful, A Modern Book of Aesthetics*.  New York, 1960, pp. 370-374.

103.  Pepper, Stephen C., *World Hypotheses:  A Study in Evidence*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1948.

104.  Percy, W., "Metaphor as a Mistake," *Sewanee Review*, 66 (Winter, 1958), 79-99.

105.  Perkins, Moreland, "Intersubjectivity and Gestalt Psychology," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XIII (June, 1953), 437-450.

106.  Preminger, Alex, *Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*, Princeton, 1965.

107.  Ransom, John Crowe, *The New Criticism*.  Norfolk, Connecticut, 1941.

108.  Read, Herbert, "Metaphor and Other Figures of Speech," *Modern Essays on Writing and Style*.  Paul C. Wermuth, ed.  New York, 1964, pp. 115-123.

109.  Richards, I. A., *Principles of Literary Criticism*.  New York, 1925.

110.  *_____, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*.  New York, 1965.

111.  *Rieser, Max, *Journal of Philosophy*, XXXVII (1940),pp. 209-217.

112. Ross, W. D., ed. *The Works of Aristotle*, 12 Vols. Oxford, 1959.

113. Ryle, Gilbert, *The Concept of Mind*. London, 1949.

114. Sapir, Edward, *Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech*. New York, 1949.

115. *Sartre, Jean-Paul, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*. Tr. Hazel E. Barnes. New York, 1956.

116. _____, *The Psychology of Imagination*. Tr. not given. New York, 1948.

117. Schlauch, Margaret, *The Gift of Tongues*. New York, 1942.

118. Schoeck, Richard J., "Mathematics and the Languages of Literary Criticism," *The Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism*, 26 (Spring, 1968), 367-376.

119. *Shipley, Joseph T., ed., *Dictionary of World Literature*. New Jersey, 1966.

120. Sibley, Frank, "Aesthetic Concepts," *The Philosophical Review*, LXVIII (October, 1959), 421-450.

121. Smith, Norman Kemp, tr. *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. London, 1958.

122. Smythies, J. R., "On Some Properties and Relations of Images," *The Philosophical Review*, LXVII (July, 1958), 389-394.

123. *Spiegelberg, Herbert, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 2 Vols. The Hague, 1960.

124. Spitzer, Leo, "Language of Poetry," *Language: An Enquiry Into Its Meaning and Function*. Ruth Nanda, ed. New York, 1957.

125. Stanford, W. Bedell, *Greek Metaphor: Studies in Theory and Practice*. Oxford, 1936.

126. Stevenson, Charles L., *Ethics and Language*. New Haven, 1960.

127. _____, "On the 'Analysis' of a Work of Art," *The Philosophical Review*, LXVII (January, 1958), 33-51.

128. _____, "On 'What is a Poem?'," *The Philosophical Review*, LXVI (July, 1957), 329-362.

129. Tarbet, David W., "The Fabric of Metaphor in Kants Critique of Pure Reason," *The Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 6 (July, 1968), 257-270.

130. *Thrall, W. F., A. Hibbard, and C. H. Holman, eds., *A Handbook to Literature*. New York, 1960.

131. Tomas, Vincent, "Aesthetic Vision," *The Philosophical Review*, LXVIII (January, 1959), 52-67.

132. *Turbayne, Colin Murry, *The Myth of Metaphor*. New Haven, 1962.

133. *Urban, Wilber M., *Language and Reality: The Philosophy of Language and Principles of Symbolism*. New York, 1939.

134. Van Peursen, C. A., "Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XX (December, 1959), 181-197.

135. Valery, Paul, *The Art of Poetry*. Tr. Denise Folliot. New York, 1961.

136. Wajid, R. A., "Metaphor and Aesthetic Distance," *Darshana International*, 7 (January, 1967), 61-67.

137. Walsh, Dorothy, "The Poetic Use of Language," *The Journal of Philosophy*, XXXV (February, 1938), 73-81.

138. Warren, Robert Penn, "Pure and Impure Poetry," *The Kenyon Review*, V (Spring, 1943), 228-254.

139. Weitz, Morris, ed. *Problems in Aesthetics: An Introductory Book of Readings*. New York, 1959.

140. _____, "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics," *The Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism*, XV (September, 1956), 27-35.

141. Wellek, Rene, and Austin Warren, *Theory of Literature*. London, 1949.

142. *Wheelwright, Philip, *The Burning Fountain*. Bloomington, 1954.

143. *_____, *Metaphor and Reality*. Bloomington, 1962.

144. Wimsatt, W. K., Jr., "Poetic Tension: A Summary," *The New Scholasticism*, XXXII (January, 1958), 73-88.

145. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Preliminary Studies for the "Philosophical Investigations,"* generally known as: *The Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford, 1960.

146. Zink, Sidney, "Poetry and Truth," *The Philosophical Review*, LIV (March, 1945), 132-144.