United States-Russian Relations, March Through November 1917: A Study of Misunderstanding

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UNITED STATES-RUSSIAN RELATIONS,
MARCH THROUGH NOVEMBER 1917:
A STUDY OF MISUNDERSTANDING

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate Faculty
Central Washington State College

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Education

by
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APPROVED FOR THE GRADUATE FACULTY

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INTRODUCTION

Woodrow Wilson said on April 3, 1917,

Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? ... Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor" (1:512).

Wilson depicted in this statement the American reaction to the March Revolution in Tsarist Russia of 1917. The United States was about to enter the Great War where her main objectives would be to defeat Germany and save the world for democracy; the Russian Revolution represented to the United States a first movement toward the paramount goal of freeing the people of the world from the harsh rule of autocracy.

This paper will study the relationship between the newly established Russian Provisional Government and the United States, March through November of 1917. The purpose of this study is to describe the diplomatic relations between the two governments and to illuminate the shortcomings of the United States in these relations. United States foreign policy in 1917 was primarily concerned with continuation of the war effort, and she pressed a war-weary Russian populace to keep fighting to save the intangible political ideal of democracy. The Russian people were reluctant to go on fighting a war to obtain the wartime goals of their deposed
ruler and the Allies. These people did not look upon the defeat of German militarism as the sole means for saving the world for peace; they felt that the Allies themselves must repudiate all profits from a German defeat and dedicate themselves to the emancipation of all the enslaved peoples of the world. The defeat of Germany was not the ultimate goal of the Russian people. The Woodrow Wilson administration, on the other hand, felt that Germany's defeat was the first and most important step to a peaceful world. Herein lies the basis for a misunderstanding; the hope of one to build a free nation, and the goal of the other to defeat German militarism. The attitude of the United States toward the Provisional Government developed from a misunderstanding of the events at that time and misinterpretation of the aspirations of the Russian people. This study will attempt to illuminate the misunderstanding.

Few historians have taken the time to deal specifically with relations between the United States and the Russian Provisional Government. Edward H. Carr, in his four volume work, *A History of Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution*, devotes only one chapter to the diplomacy between the two governments in question. *Russian-American Relations, March, 1917-March, 1920: Documents and Papers*, compiled and edited by C. K. Cumming and Walter W. Pettit is questionable as to its thoroughness because it was published in 1921, so
few years after the Bolshevik Revolution. Materials available at that time were limited compared to that which is currently available. "The Review of Books" in the *American Historical Review*, January, 1921, was very critical of the Cummings work because of his selectiveness of documents; the over-emphasis on Raymond Robins' involvement reduced the objectivity of the work (48:371-72). Since then, a three volume work, *The Russian Provisional Government, 1917*, covering Russian affairs more thoroughly, was written by Alexander Kerensky and Robert Paul Browder.

Many monographs have been written about different aspects of this particular time in diplomatic history. A few were written by the actual participants, for example: David R. Francis' *Russia From the American Embassy*; *One Hundred Red Days* by Edgar Sisson; *The Catastrophe* by Alexander Kerensky; and Henry P. Davison's *The American Red Cross in the Great War*.

Since the Second World War additional material has appeared, but the period of the Provisional Government is written only as a small part of a larger study, or as in the case of Alexander Kerensky's memoirs, given as a subjective account of the actual events. Arno J. Mayer's *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking*, published in 1967, devotes just over three chapters to Russia of 1917 and handles related topics in a very objective fashion. The
most popular work of this period is George F. Kennan's *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920*, two volumes. Kennan felt that the weakness of the Russian Provisional Government and its inability to continue the war effort should have awakened the United States to the realization of Russia's inadequacy as a good war partner. He continued by saying:

Yet the fact is that neither of these realities was widely noted in the United States; it is, indeed, not an exaggeration to say that the policy of the United States government toward the Russian Provisional Government was founded largely on ignorance of both of them and on the hope that just the opposite would be the case: that Russia would evolve rapidly, that is, in the direction of democratic stability, and that she would continue to prosecute vigorously, as a loyal and enthusiastic member of the western coalition, the war against Germany. In these misunderstandings will be found the roots not only of much of the ineffectiveness of American policy toward the Provisional Government but also of the difficulty experienced by many Americans at a later date in adjusting to the realities of Soviet power (29:12).

This writer agrees with Mr. Kennan, but Mr. Kennan used this misunderstanding as a basis for the beginning of his two volume work on Soviet-American relations, excluding, except briefly in the first chapter, American relations with the Provisional Government. With the availability of State Department material in the National Archives, the Russian-United States war diplomacy of 1917 can be more clearly defined.

The division of this paper will consist of five
chapters followed by a brief summary. Chapter One is entitled "United States' Reaction to the March Revolution," and will include reactions from the State Department, public opinion, and Russian opinion of their own events. The Second Chapter, "Diplomacy: April, May and June," will follow the development of usual diplomatic relations in a chronological manner. Chapter Three, "Special Missions to Russia," will deal with the United States' efforts through the use of special committees sent to Russia, to convince her to continue in the war, the most important and well-known committee being the Root Mission, headed by Elihu Root. Chapter Four, "Diplomacy: July through October," will again explain development of the diplomatic relations during this time. The Fifth Chapter, "United States Reaction to the November Revolution," will describe the initial reaction to the revolution and the general attitude toward the very early days of the Bolshevik government.

Dates throughout this paper will be from the Gregorian calendar which was in use in the West in 1917. The old style Julian calendar which the Russians used was thirteen days behind the Gregorian. Spelling of Russian names will be the generally accepted American version.
CHAPTER I

UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE MARCH REVOLUTION

Diplomacy between countries is formulated by the leaders. Each leader is guided by his representatives in foreign countries who send reports back to their capitals for analysis. In the case of United States-Russian relations, the reports from the representatives of the United States in Russia, added to public opinion at home, helped President Woodrow Wilson formulate a basic attitude toward the Russian government founded in March, 1917. By March, he was drawing closer to committing the United States to join the Allies in the fight against Germany. The overthrow of Tsardom and the formation of the new Russian representative government were more compatible with President Wilson's pre-formed philosophy of eradicating imperialism from the capitalist system.

In order to understand the United States' relations with the Russian Provisional Government, it is necessary to analyze briefly the man most responsible for the development of these relations: David R. Francis, the United States Ambassador to Petrograd. David Francis had a long history as a public servant: Mayor of St. Louis (1885-1889), Governor of Missouri (1889-1893), Secretary of the Interior (1896-1897), and President of the Universal Exposition of
1904, as well as having had a long career as a businessman. George Kennan was dubious about why Mr. Francis was selected (29:35); his experience in foreign affairs had not been evident previously.

When Ambassador Francis arrived at Petrograd, Russia, in 1916, he was greeted by Tsarist Russia with her expensive and royal atmosphere, something to which a Missouri boy was not accustomed. Francis' British and French counterparts were much more at home in the refinement of the Russian Court. One can scarcely wonder at Francis' boyish excitement over being the first major Ambassador to recognize the newly created Provisional Government upon the fall of Tsardom. Francis' close relationship with this government formed the foundation of United States-Russian relations from March through November of 1917.

Continuing war brought internal disorder and economic crisis to Russia in March, 1917. The Tsar had proved to be an inadequate leader of Russia. Francis sent numerous telegrams to Secretary of State Robert Lansing describing the turmoil existing in Petrograd and throughout Russia. Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador to Russia, supported Francis' descriptions of the poor economic conditions and lack of government coordination in the war effort when he cabled the British Foreign Office (5:57).

In his communications to Lansing, Francis described
the progress of the revolution and the way the Duma was able to wrestle control of the government from the Romanovs, the Russian Imperial family. The first telegrams from Ambassador Francis displayed very little emotion; they were mostly businesslike descriptions of the events as he saw them. On March 15, Roland S. Morris, United States representative in Sweden, cabled a copy of an official statement by the Russian Telegram Bureau accounting for the disruption in the Russian government. It explained that the Duma replaced the Imperial family as head of the government. The cable went on to say that life had almost returned to normal in Petrograd (61:861.00/275). Morris, having the advantage of viewing from afar, was better able to interpret objectively the internal chaos than Francis, who was directly involved.

Prince Lvov was named to head the newly created Provisional Government as Minister of Interior and President of Ministers. Pavel Nikolayevich Milyukov, a well-known Russian historian and statesman, headed the Department of Foreign Affairs. On March 15, 1917, Tsar Nicholas abdicated the throne for himself and his young son in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. Michael, however, refused to rule Russia, which left the Duma in control of establishing Russia's first representative government. Francis reported these events without fanfare, although he did mention that the Duma and committees of
workingmen disagreed on the kind of government to be established.

United States recognition of the Russian Provisional Government proved to be the highlight of David Francis' career as Ambassador to Russia. He was elated over being the first Ambassador to recognize the new government. This early emotional involvement caused Francis to feel he had to retain his faith in the Provisional Government, even when that faith was not warranted. On March 13, 1917, Mr. Francis requested permission from the State Department to be the first to recognize the Provisional Government. He claimed that this first recognition was important to help stabilize the new government and ensure its participation in the war. He went on to say:

This revolution is the practical realization of that principle of Government which we have championed and advocated, I mean Government by consent of the governed. Our recognition will have a stupendous moral effect especially if given first (61:861.00/282).

In later years, Francis re-enacted his role in the recognition of the new government with great pride in the ovation he received at the recognition ceremony (18:110). Lansing wired back permission for Francis to extend United States formal recognition of the Russian Government and Francis acted immediately by meeting with Foreign Minister Milyukov at eleven a.m. on March 22. He emphasized to Lansing that
he extended the recognition hours before the British and French.

British Ambassador Sir George Buchanan, like Francis, was interested in immediate recognition of the Provisional Government, but he insisted that Milyukov give assurance of Russia's willingness to continue the war to a successful conclusion (5:90). Buchanan was much more cautious than Francis in his view of the new Russian Ministers; he felt that they would prove to be too weak and that the strong man needed for an efficient organization of the government was not to be found in the existing Ministry (5:108). As to the actual recognition of the government, Buchanan followed Francis by forty-eight hours. He mentioned that Francis was very proud of being the first to recognize the new government (5:91).

Secretary of State Lansing and Ambassador Francis had been less than enthusiastic about the Romanov government. Lansing wrote President Wilson of his impression that the Russian Imperial Court had divided loyalties between the Allies and the Germans, as they were of German descent, and now the new government would be an Ally (61:861.00/273). Francis' support of the Provisional Government continued to grow partly because of his desire that the government be successful and partly to insure Russia's continuance in the war. He believed that the government was occupied by just and honest representatives of all the people who would
govern with compassion for freedom and democracy. A triumphant ending to the war was the only way for the Russian experiment in democracy to survive.

Socialist parties were strong in Russia at this time. Francis described the socialist demands as "rot" and simultaneously lauded the outstanding qualifications of the government ministers (18:70-71). Francis recognized the potential strength of the socialist element, but failed to see its direct threat to the Provisional Government and its eventual support from the Russian people. A strong socialist element in Russia was recognized by Roland Morris in Sweden. As early as March 24, 1917, he observed that embarrassment would befall the Allies if a socialist government was established in Russia. He even said that the Stockholm press was aware of the stronger socialist party in competition with a weaker Duma (63:861.00/300). Socialist power was evident by the number of established socialist parties, but they were not prepared in March for the sudden fall of the Tsarist monarchy. Many of the non-socialist groups had participated in the old government and were thus in a better position to take command of the new one.

Conditions in Russia at the time of the March Revolution were very confusing. Food was scarce in the cities, not because it was not available, but because the transportation system in Russia was so poorly organized that food
could not be moved from the farms to the cities. Reports of rioting and land-grabbing were widespread. Even the troops were reported to be impatient to join in the free land grab. David R. Maggowan, the Vice-Consul in Moscow, reported that soldiers and workers were refusing in large numbers to return to the war front and to the factories, and instead were increasing the danger of a debacle. A class struggle over the land question was eminent, advised Maggowan (63:861.00/337). Maddin Summers, Consul in Moscow, collaborated with the report of poor conditions concerning food and transportation in Russia (63:861.00/337). The American Consul in Petrograd, North Winship, reported the deteriorating conditions in Petrograd and the surrounding area. He warned that if the food problem was not relieved at once, the government would become more socialist (63:861.00/330). On March 27, he elaborated on the strength of the Council of Soldiers' and Workmen's Deputies. Soldiers refused to take orders from former Imperial officers and many workers abstained from working. They were interested in a speedy conclusion to the war (63:861.00/370). Despite the reports of confusion, the Russian populace generally supported the revolution and were helpful in overthrowing the Tsar. As time neared November, the workers and soldiers became disillusioned with the slowness of the revolution and again turned to violence as they had in July.
Looking through the eyes of David Francis, one sees a different picture of these conditions. Francis continued to send cables to Lansing reporting the improved conditions in Petrograd and the growing strength of the Provisional Government. He was concerned with two things: keeping Russia in the war, and improving the United States relationship with Russia. William Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State, reported receiving a telegram from Francis saying that financial aid to Russia at this time would be a "master stroke" (69:861.51/129). Francis alluded to the potential danger of the socialist element, but concluded this message with a reassuring statement as to the improving conditions. Letters from Samuel Gompers and other labor leaders would be helpful in quieting the socialists, suggested Francis (63:861.00/299).

State Department reaction was generally based on communications from Francis. Although Morris and Winship, among others, frequently disagreed with Francis' descriptions of Russia's internal conditions, the State Department continued to believe Francis and disregard the others. An overwhelming desire on the part of Wilson and Lansing to see the war concluded with a German defeat and a victory for democracy closed their eyes to the true picture of Russia. They misunderstood the deep wishes of the Russian people to stop a war they felt was a conflict between
imperialistic countries; the people wanted to turn to
the century-late task of making secure their freedom and
projected equality. Francis was delighted to gain impor­
tance in a country that had previously had little to offer
American diplomats. This enchantment with the Provisional
Government blinded him to existing conditions and allowed
him to continue from March to November supporting the vari­
ous Provisional Governments despite the obviously growing
anti-government feeling. The desire of the official United
States government to secure Russia's perseverance in the
war against German autocracy contributed to the eventual
ascent of Bolshevism in Russia.

Public reaction to the overthrow of Russia's monar­
chy was for the most part like that of the State Department:
enthusiastic. The New York Times ran front page articles
on March 16, telling of the revolutionary events. Their
account runs parallel to Ambassador Francis' statement,
reporting that Tsar Nicholas was a "man of excellent inten­
tions, but vacillating resolutions," "the revolution was
well prepared," and, "the city is now quiet and perfect
order prevails" (41:16th/1,2). The Times emphasized that
the newly created Russian government would not give Germany
an advantage; the Russian people would want to maintain
their freedom through a successful prosecution of the war.
"It is only through victory that Russia's long sought prize
of access to unfrozen seas can be won" (41:16th/10). It was this statement of implied imperialistic gain through war that would later become a strong socialist argument for abandoning the war.

Reactions from other news media were very similar to that of the New York Times. The World said the revolution marked the passing of an old regime, whereas the New York Tribune related that Russia would have a full constitutional form of government with a military responsible to the citizenry (57:799-800). The unification of the Allied cause for democracy against Germany became evident, reported the Dallas News (15:885-86).

The view that the Russian March Revolution resulted in unity for the Allies and enlightened democratic government for Russia was further popularized in periodical articles. "The revolution in Russia has given absolute guarantee of the unity of the Allied cause to the end," wrote the Nation (40:330). Paul Wharton, giving an eye-witness account in the Atlantic Monthly, said, "I am happy, very happy, for I believe that one of the great spiritual victories of mankind has been won during this bewildering week." Mr. Wharton went on to say that Russia would be the center of culture of the future (75:30). After only one week of complete chaos and confusion, it seems rather optimistic to make the statement that Russia, a country
locked in archaic autocracy for hundreds of years, would suddenly emerge as an enlightened cultural center.

Few people saw doubt or evil in the March revolution; most were searching for a just reason to support the Allied cause. The fall of Russian autocracy, the only chink in the Allied political armor, gave the American people the needed impetus to join in the Allied cause for defeat of German militarism. There were some people, however, who doubted the success of the Russian revolution; one such person was Alexander Petrunkevitch, zoologist and President of the Executive Committee of the Federation of Russian Organizations in America, an anti-Bolshevik organization. Writing in the *Yale Review*, Petrunkevitch expressed doubt as to whether the revolution had actually accomplished what appeared on the surface to be democracy. Revolutions take a long time, they are not concluded in a week, nor can one predict the outcome in so short a time. Mr. Petrunkevitch went on to say the socialists looked upon the revolution as social rather than political; this was something most other observers failed to see or report. He pointed out that there was a need for all European countries to follow suit and change with the times lest they be left with "time-worn ideals" (46:838-855). America and the Allies were too busy rejoicing over the new-found justification for a complete victory over Germany to heed the
warning of doubt concerning the claimed success of the Russian revolution. People wanted the revolution to be successful, and therefore refused to look beyond a very transparent framework of Russian democracy. Had the Allies realized the eventual danger in tying their cause to the Russian revolution and insisting on Russian continuance in that cause, they might have taken an alternate path to Germany's ruin.

Optimism regarding the Russian revolution continued with confidence invested in Prince Lvov. He was claimed to be the most popular man in Russia; in fact he was the only man the Russians were willing to trust as leader of the new government. The New York Times reported that in the first week, the Tsar's name was deleted from church services (41:3). Gerald Morgan wrote in the North American Review that the war was a war for the people, not for nationalistic interests nor dynasties; thus he supplemented the New York Times' article in showing the growing rejection of Tsarist ways (36:502-10). G. J. Sosnowsky, an American citizen, was not to be outdone when he said that Russia was to become "the world's foremost democracy" (52:536). This short review of articles on Russia's revolution shows only a few opinions on the subject. Many other people had their say concerning the Russian events, including Jews, newspaper editors, the general public and Congress.
Reluctance to give wholehearted support was the character of those few people that uttered words of caution about Russia. The "wait and see" attitude was the most popular view among the so-called opposition. Very few people in America understood the meaning and desires of the socialist parties in Russia; consequently their view was limited to past history. However, H. W. Nevinson, writing in *Contemporary Review*, did warn that danger might arise from the non-compromising principles of political theory inherent in the radical socialist parties such as the Social Democrats (39:409-18). The *New Republic* was more candid in its belief that Russia was a giant, free to wander in Asia without restraint. It even suggested that a defeated Germany would be unable to deter Russia from advancing into Western Europe (33:214-15). Dr. A. Coralnik, American correspondent of the *Bourse Gazette* of Petrograd, disagreed with the *New Republic*’s view of an unrestrained Russia. He saw Russia as a peace-loving democracy with nothing to demand of her neighbors (41:25th/E-2). Fear that the revolution was far from over existed among some people, noted the *New York Times* (41:17th/3). Again these views were not typical; rather, they displayed the lack of unquestioned confidence exhibited by the general public.

Of all the interest groups in the United States, the Jews probably had more direct interest in the revolution
than anyone. For years the Jews had been discriminated against under Tsarist rule, and as a result, many fled to the United States. Naturally they felt a keen interest and delight at the fall of the Romanovs. The Jews viewed the revolution as a liberal movement and thought their position in Russia and throughout the world would be advanced. The New York Times reported a mass meeting of Jewish refugees to cheer the new government, for which 8,000 tickets had been sold (41:20th/2). Herman Berstein, editor of The American Hebrew, conveyed that the revolution could possibly result in the "eventual building up of a great empire of the people," meaning Jews (41:16th/4). Many Jewish refugees would turn to Russia upon hearing the news of the revolution, said Dr. Israel Friedlander, professor of Biblical Literature at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America (41:25th/E-3). Abraham Cahan, editor of the Jewish Daily Forward, wrote, "We no longer distinguish between the Russian government and the Russian people; both are one in soul and spirit: we now love both" (17:15-16). Jewish enthusiasm was great indeed; it is understandable to rejoice and see only the good when viewing the fall of an enemy. Nevertheless, this did not excuse the failure of the Jewish community to realize that pogroms in Russia needed the active support from many people outside of the government. The collapse of a government does not cleanse away basic feelings and
Editorial comments in the highly respected New York Times gave evidence of wishful thinking rather than scholarly analysis. On March 24, eight days after Tsar Nicholas abdicated, the Times said in an editorial that the Russian Church called for the people to be loyal to the government. The Times claimed this was a good sign, and went further by saying that the socialists in Russia were "an insignificant fraction of the population" (41:23rd/8). Both statements, in light of future events, proved to be naive at best. An editorial in The Independent was more cautious, but concluded that the results of the revolution would be permanent, meaning Tsardom was to be no more (56:525).

By no means were the New York Times editors guilty of perpetrating a false view to the public, because the public had already drawn the same enthusiastic opinion of the revolution. Individual travelers in Russia brought back the view that the Russian army was in complete support of the new government. To add to the already glazed public conception of the revolution, a United States government economic advisor and member of the Institute of Government Research, N. I. Stone, Ph. D., claimed that the Russian people were basically a democratic people. He said that Russia was "ripe for a republican form of government" in
comparison to past revolutionary countries (41:25th/2). Simon Bass represented public reaction by writing to the New York Times that America should be happy for Russia's new opportunity for freedom and to thank the Times for bringing the public the good news (41:22nd/10).

The State Department was not without a share of public opinion of the March Revolution. Many cables and letters were received indicating individual and group excitement over the revolution. Some went so far as to send congratulatory letters to the new government in Russia. Typical among the reactions received by the State Department was Oscar S. Straus' thanks to Secretary Lansing for seeing that the United States was the first to recognize the newly created Russian government (63:861.00/314). The State Department forwarded some of the reactions to Ambassador Francis for further distribution in appropriate Russian circles.

Congress was not to be outdone by the public nor the State Department in their joyous acceptance of the new democracy. Action taken by Congress was very limited, which is understandable since the State Department handles most foreign relations matters. A few resolutions passed both Houses congratulating the Russian people and promising brotherly help when needed. Isaac Siegel, in answer to the pacifists' opposition in the United States, read George
Kennan's (relative of George F. Kennan) statement that America should now join the Allies and fight for freedom in Europe. Kennan said liberty in Russia was not won by pacifists, nor would be European liberty (7:1035).

Bankers sensed a new market in Russia for money dealings. Most bankers were excited over the new, basically untouched money market. Loans to the new Russian government would be made more readily available. Some bankers were hesitant to float loans at first, or at least until the government took on a more stable character (41: 17th/16). Nevertheless, bankers seemed to be in general agreement that Russia provided a largely untapped economic source. Even though this first reaction was optimistic for Russia, it did not materialize in large loans for her in the remaining time before the Bolshevik takeover.

For the most part, the American reaction to the Russian revolution was enthusiastic and supporting. On the contrary, the Russians were less enthusiastic, and in many cases, gave only qualified support. Naturally there were those who considered the Provisional Government a godsend, but many took the "wait and see" attitude. The socialist parties in general were not opposed to the new government, but they recommended that their followers only support those governmental programs that were consistent with party policy.

Lenin led the anti-government forces with his April
thesis: no support to the Provisional Government. At this time, however, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were not influential compared to the much larger and more popular groups of Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. Lenin said the government still had imperialistic aspirations of territorial gain (4:1203). Izvestiia, organ of the Workers' and Soldier's Deputies, represented the most powerful organized group in Petrograd, and their support, badly needed by the government, was qualified. At first they refused to sanction fellow socialists joining the Provisional Government; later they relented and let them join but only after creating a committee "to watch over the acts of the Provisional Government" (4:125-26). Four days later, on March 20, they called for the Russian people to continue to agitate and keep the revolution going (4:195). The underlying idea to this was that the people, not the Provisional Government, must continue the re-organization of Russia and control their own futures. An editorial in Den, a socialist newspaper, said they would oppose any "Chauvinistic, nationalistic, and imperialistic words, thoughts, or deeds" from any source. They did give support to the Provisional Government; however, they retained the right to criticize any wrong acts of the government (4:144). Other newspapers, such as the Rabochaia Gazeta, of the Social Democratic Party (Menshevik), and the Delo Naroda, of the Socialist Revolutionary Party,
said they would support the Provisional Government as long as it agreed with their actions.

There were those, such as the conservative paper Novoe Vremia, who gave unqualified support to the Provisional Government. It said as early as March 18 that the newly created government was "the legitimate expression of the entire people's will" (4:141). "Izvestiia" Revoliutsionnoi Nedeli, not to be confused with Izvestiia, called for governmental support by the people to aid the success of the revolution (4:136). Rech, organ of the Constitutional Party Democrats, gave its support to the government and called the revolution the eighth wonder of the world (4:143).

The Provisional Government had an enormous task ahead of itself uniting all of Russia's people, and the war with Germany was just an added problem with which to contend. Rather than withdraw from the war, its biggest problem, the Provisional Government chose to dedicate itself to a more vigorous prosecution of the war and to bring it to a prompt and just conclusion. The government made its aims public on March 20 in the V. V. P., the government newspaper, declaring, "the Government will make every effort to provide our army with everything necessary to bring the war to a victorious conclusion" (4:157). Reaction of the various interest groups in Russia was along
party lines. The strongly socialist groups tended to oppose the continuation of the war; some said that if the war must be continued, then eliminate the imperialistic goals. Conservative parties were in favor of supporting the Allied cause; the Cadets called for government support to repel the external enemy (4:1199).

Support of the Provisional Government was not always contingent on the composition of the government, but rather on its stand on certain key problems existing within Russia. One such problem was money. The government needed the cooperation of the manufacturers, whereas the socialist elements were demanding more control of factories by the workers. Another issue was the association of the Church with the State; Izvestiia was quite emphatic in insisting that there be a complete separation of Church and State (4:812). Some Americans were pleased when the Russian Churches supported the Provisional Government, thinking the churches represented popular opinion.

 Probably the most applause the Provisional Government received in its short life was for the abolishment of the death penalty for military crimes. The newspapers rang with praise for the government for eliminating an old Tsarist tool. This act proved to be dangerous and the penalty was eventually restored with the agreement of Ambassador Francis.
Alexander Kerensky re-wrote his memoirs in 1965, *Russia and History's Turning Point*, in which he expressed strong feelings concerning the first moments of the Provisional Government. He described the immediate confusion and physical reaction of the public upon receiving the news of the fall of the Tsar. At first the people reacted violently against old Tsarist officials and landlords, but Kerensky said they ceased this disruptive behavior when all Russia realized that the fall of the Tsar meant the realization of a life-long dream—freedom (30:218).

With the forming of the Provisional Government, Kerensky was the only socialist appointed to the Ministry. His first-hand experience in the early days of the revolution gave him an insight to the government that no other person could claim. Prince Lvov, the President of the first Ministry, had been criticized for being weak; however, Kerensky defended him as having complete faith in Russia's capacity to develop a democracy (30:220).

Kerensky wrote that the Russian people turned to the task of building a new life with great enthusiasm (30:230). He was confident in the people's capacity to withstand all the pressures brought to bear as a result of the years of political inactivity. This was evidenced by the government's inclusion of a variety of political parties in the Ministry. Kerensky was concerned because the
Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies had reservations about endorsing any Cabinet members but Kerensky as Minister of Justice. This showed the potential danger to the Provisional Government which proved to be an unfortunate reality (30:234).

Kerensky felt the Provisional Government had four major tasks to accomplish. In order of importance, they were:

1. To continue the defense of the country;
2. To reestablish a working administrative apparatus throughout the country;
3. To carry out a number of basic political and social reforms;
4. To prepare the way for the transformation of Russia from a highly centralized state into a federal state (30:219).

Making the war the government's top priority was a mistake. Kerensky still believes, however, as he related in his memoirs, that the government was generally popular and had the interests of the people at heart. He also believed that the people, for the most part, supported the government.

The socialist parties gave their support to the government as long as it followed their ideas; the Workmen's and Soldiers' Soviet announced at the beginning that they were not going to follow the government blindly and that drastic changes must be made before Russia could hope to attain a democratic state. If the war must be continued, then all imperialistic war aims must be renounced, insisted
many socialist newspapers. This needed change was never fully recognized by United States authorities. By November, the cry for Russian withdrawal from the war grew louder, while the American effort to keep Russia fighting became more intense. The rest of this paper will deal with United States attempts to keep Russia in the war despite the logic against such a course of action.
CHAPTER II

DIPLOMACY: APRIL, MAY AND JUNE

During a three month period, April, May and June, the Russian Provisional Government had great difficulties maintaining stability and seeking cooperation among the political parties in Russia. The government was lacking a leader. Alexander Kerensky was slow in moving up the ladder of governmental importance, and at this time he was not able to exercise the degree of guiding leadership that was needed in that time of turmoil.

Using the Russian Revolution as a final justification for United States entrance to the World War, Woodrow Wilson committed himself and the country to encouraging Russian efforts against Germany. He wanted the Allies to win a victory for democracy and everlasting peace. As a result, most United States government officials were so busy trying to keep Russia fighting that they were blind to the internal disorder and public dissatisfaction with the entire war. The socialists were able to capitalize on this unrest among the people; when the Provisional Government insisted on continuing the war, they presented the side of the people. This period, April through June, was the beginning of the United States misunderstanding of the
Russian people's desire to conclude the war, or else to repudiate the imperialistic goals of the Allies.

The first move the Provisional Government had to make to continue the war effort and maintain general stability was to secure a large loan from the United States. Ambassador Francis was very anxious to assist the government in its efforts. He wired Secretary of State Lansing that since the United States had loaned five hundred million dollars to both France and Great Britain, the Russians would be insulted if they were not given the same amount. Francis assured Lansing that Russia was abundantly rich in natural resources so the loan would be "absolutely safe" (69:861.51/133). Within seven days, on April 13, Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo, via Lansing, assured Francis that Congress would approve loans for those countries willing to continue the fight against the common enemy (69:861.51/133). He was saying that if Russia did not fight, she would not receive financial aid from the United States.

Russia's need for money or credit was painfully obvious. Her railroad system was confused for the most part, but more important, she was lacking locomotives and boxcars. The government had also been trying desperately to buy guns from the Remington Company, but did not have adequate credit. Francis talked to the Russian Minister of Finance on April 20 and told him no loans would be
forthcoming unless the Russians continued to fight. The Minister agreed that there would be no separate peace (69:861.51/134).

Discussions concerning American loans to Russia continued for the remaining seven months with Francis promising the State Department that Russia was quite capable of paying back a loan. The Treasury Department finally secured the loan and authorized Russian credit in the United States up to one hundred million dollars. Francis reported that the Minister of Finance feared the United States would loan money to Russia through Great Britain, and he said the Russians would be insulted if this were the case (69:861.51/140). Finally, the United States continued to push Francis to inform the Provisional Government that the loan was contingent on their continued war effort.

It is interesting to note that North Winship, United States Consul in Petrograd, said the Russian people had no faith in their economy; the people were trying desperately to sell all possessions. Winship felt that a loan was needed to prevent economic chaos rather than preserve the fighting force (63:861.00/439,435).

The Petrograd Soviet debated long and hard whether to back the government's bid for the American Liberty Loan; with reluctance, they finally agreed to support the government. Once again, the Soviet hesitated to uphold the Allies
because of their imperialistic war aims. Their consent to the loan was to aid the government to throw off the bonds of imperialism and seek only revolutionary objectives.

Money was borrowed, stated the Provisional Government, to aid in defeating Germany; the responsibility of every citizen was to help in this effort (4:486). Den, a socialist newspaper, said the loan was only good as long as the government realized that annexations were out of the question (4:486). Again, the Russian attention focused on the Allied war objectives; dissatisfaction with these objectives was strong in the socialist parties, but little was done by the United States to calm this unrest.

The American view of the Provisional Government and its degree of popular support was developed by Ambassador Francis. He continued to send back reports telling of the improved conditions and of the many people who spoke of supporting the Provisional Government. He described the enthusiastic crowds that gathered at the American Embassy and his patriotic speeches to them. Although Francis rarely studied the socialist mind and never tried to understand the desires of those seeking a separate peace, he did find time to discuss opposition to the Bolsheviks. Winship reported on April 30 that the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies strongly denounced Lenin, the Bolshevik leader; they believed he was dangerous to their membership (63:861.00/386). This
certainly satisfied Francis and indicated that the most powerful Soviet in Russia supported the government.

It appears that the State Department's view of the popularity of the Provisional Government was fairly accurate because most Petrograd papers pleaded at the beginning for government support from the people. Even Izvestiia, tool of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Soviet, called for the people to uphold the government for fear that opposition would cause riots and disorder that might lead to the end of the Revolution (4:1241). Izvestiia asked the soldiers not to carry their weapons during the June demonstration (4:1323). There was criticism, much of the time, concerning the Bolsheviks and their aspirations of complete government control. The government continued to receive backing from the non-socialist parties as long as they carried on an aggressive military campaign against Germany.

Support of the Provisional Government diminished as the months passed. Each party had its own "ax to grind," and the government appeared to be the grinding wheel. North Winship, Consul in Petrograd, reported that the people were in strong opposition to the way the government was handling the war. Many protested the offensive against Germany; others rebelled against the war and cried for an end to the fighting. Winship described newspaper articles telling the people the only way that land reform and other revolutionary
ideas could be accomplished was for the war to end (63:861.00/435). Some papers even accused Alexander Kerensky, Acting Minister of War, of fighting on the offensive, in essence, causing the war to spread and postponing the day of peace (63:861.00/435).

Maddin Summers, Consul in Moscow, sent to Washington a copy of an open letter to Frank L. Polk, Assistant Secretary of State, from a Petrograd official criticizing the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies for accusing non-governmental backing by the people (63:861.00/403½). Another Consulate, John A. Ray in Odessa, reported that the peasants were not supporting the government. He said the peasants had deserted the Zemstvo organizations—formerly the main representative body in the rural areas—because the land owners controlled them. Many peasants were forming their own organizations in opposition to the Zemstvos (63:861.00/401). Ray pointed out later that many of the regions were calling for local autonomy and independence (63:861.00/410).

Reports continued to come into the State Department from Russia describing the deteriorating conditions. They explained how the socialist elements were becoming more aggressive toward the government. The workers were making excessive demands of their employers and refusing to work unless their demands were met. The government was almost
powerless to meet this resistance with concentrated authority; one reason for this weakness was the lack of socialist ministers. Only Alexander Kerensky served in the government from the powerful Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; the Council was opposed to any other members joining the government (63:861.00/404), thus perpetrating the division of power within Russia. Even Kerensky admitted in 1927 that the open hatred of Minister Milyukov by the Petrograd Soviet was detrimental to the government's existence and showed the "lack of confidence" in the government. This confidence had to be restored if the government could hope to survive (31:132-33).

To make matters worse, the Bolsheviks were planning a mass demonstration against the government in June. Lenin had arrived in Russia two months earlier, in April, and had been preaching to the workers to agitate against the existing government whenever possible; he appealed to the workers to elect their own kind to office and help end the war. The cry for a mass demonstration was made on June 10 by a Bolshevik bulletin calling for soldiers and workers to join hands and support their local Soviets. They used the slogan "Bread! Peace! Liberty!" to good advantage (4:1312). The Petrograd Soviet was in opposition to the Bolsheviks, and they pleaded for the workers to avoid demonstrations, especially armed demonstrations (4:1313).
Antagonism toward the government mounted steadily month after month as the war grew and Allied pressure to continue fighting grew more intense. The war played a major role, if not the major role, in the eventual collapse of the Provisional Government.

President Woodrow Wilson developed his international political philosophy prior to the first Russian Revolution in 1917. He was concerned with the existing world unrest, and, as he indicated in his famous Fourteen Point speech on January 8, 1918, he wished to see order result from the European conflict. N. Gordon Levin devoted the first two chapters in *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics* to the idea that President Wilson was basically anti-imperialist and hoped to change existing European imperialist goals by reform rather than revolution. According to Levin, Wilson justified the war against Germany as a war of liberal reform. In other words, if Germany was defeated, imperialism would be weakened and a progressive attitude toward international relations would emerge, led by the omnipotent United States economic power. Therefore, when the Russian Revolution created a liberal form of government in Petrograd, it gave Wilson the final reason to implement his international philosophy, to assist a liberal Russia in her fight against imperialism (32:Ch. I,II).
Robert Lansing also saw the connection between the Revolution and the American crusade to save the world for democracy. Woodrow Wilson included Russia in his war address when he said:

Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? . . . Here is a fit partner for a League of Honor (1:512).

Subsequently, the United States embarked on one of history's most famous crusades. One hardly has to wonder why Russia's continuance in the war was so important to the United States: Russia represented the new democracy, the embryo of a new world of peace and freedom led by the greatest democracy of them all--the United States. David R. Francis and many other Americans were so caught up in the fast pace of saving the world that they did not have time to analyze situations and determine whether each country wanted to be "saved" by the United States.

The Provisional Government policy was made public on April 9, declaring that Russia would work closely with the Allies and seek a just peace with no annexations and with "self-determination of peoples" (4:1046). Milyukov's successor, Minister Terestchenko, reiterated these governmental objectives on several occasions. He emphasized that Russia would not seek a separate peace; this was most
gratifying to Ambassador Francis, who was in daily contact with Terestchenko. As expected, the right-wing newspapers supported the government's announcement.

The army was not as zealous as the government. Maddin Summers reported newspaper articles in Moscow described the poor conditions and morale in the army, and said that reinforcement troops for the front lines were deserting en masse (63:861.00/406). A. F. Kerensky, the new Minister of War and Navy, made an emotional appeal on May 25 to the soldiers to continue fighting and save the revolution (4:936). Many newspapers in Petrograd supported Kerensky's call for a new June offensive. There was disagreement as to who should control the offensive; the military interest pressured the government for control, and this resulted in a certain amount of confusion. Roland Morris in Sweden related Prince Lvov's request that the Provisional Government be given full control of the army if they were expected to be responsible for the well being of the country (63:861.00/355). This disruption and confusion about the control of the army continued until the Bolsheviks took over in November. Discipline was almost non-existent in the army; the men in the ranks demanded new powers over their officers as guaranteed by the revolution. This helped feed the disruptive confusion and led to inadequate execution of duties.
President Wilson sent messages to Russia on different occasions explaining that this was not a war for territorial or monetary gain, but for saving democracy. Russia was very important to the war, said Colonel Edward House, friend and confidant of Wilson's; and the United States could not spend enough to help her (50:25). Wilson's interest in Russia was evidenced by his actions toward the socialists. He refused to stop the socialists in the United States from attending a gathering in Stockholm, and in addition, he used his position to try to influence a court case in California involving a socialist, Thomas J. Mooney, who had allegedly thrown a bomb during a Preparedness Day parade on July 22, 1916. Wilson told California Governor William D. Stephens that a sentence commuted to life would aid the United States internationally (1:65-66). Wilson never really displayed much understanding of the Russian socialist movement, nor did many Americans.

Propaganda played a positive role in United States-Russian relations; the United States sent missions, films, and other forms of informational propaganda to Russia. Secretary Lansing and Ambassador Francis were in agreement to encourage President Wilson to continue distributing information to Russia. Francis frequently asked for clarification of United States war aims and for statements from the President to encourage the Russian government to fight
on. The aforementioned individual missions will be discussed in the next chapter.

Propaganda, intentional or otherwise, did not stop with the State Department; many private citizens sent letters to Russia and called for films depicting the United States efforts to help mankind. Most of these offers, however, were channelled through the State Department. Labor leader Samuel Gompers wrote to Francis, saying that the American workers were rejoicing because their Russian counterparts had finally attained freedom. But he warned that it was impossible to achieve all goals immediately (63:861.00/389). Another example of private citizen initiative was H. M. Edmunds, who requested permission from President Wilson to show movies in Russia depicting German mistreatment of Russian soldiers (67:861.4061/3). Many other examples may be cited, but let it suffice to say that many Americans were involved in encouraging Russia to remain in the war—whether she wanted to or not.

The socialists viewed the war with far less enthusiasm than the Provisional Government or the United States. In fact, the socialists read into President Wilson's messages the approval of annexations and other imperialistic attitudes. North Winship reported that the Social Democrats (Maximalist) claimed Allied war aims in "absolute opposition" to the Russian war aims (63:861.00/438). From Odessa, John
A. Ray pointed out that when the United States entered the war, the Russians lost faith in Wilson's objectivity (63:861.00/446). More importantly, the strongest opposition to the Provisional Government, the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, was emphatic in refuting Wilson and the Russian government. They said the socialist movement was growing throughout the world and the only way for victory was a united struggle of working men against imperialism (63:861.00/438). The desire for a separate peace or a change in the Allied war aims was presented to the State Department, but it refused to act in the face of the contradicting reports from Francis and others to come.

David Francis, for the most part, reported the internal conditions of Russia to be improving. He held daily conferences with Provisional Government officials and seemed to be convinced by their reports, as he always concluded that conditions were improving. At one time, in a letter to Foreign Minister Milyukov on April 15, he went so far as to claim that Russia had always been democratic at heart (18:96-97).

Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador to Russia, took a much more pessimistic view of the Provisional Government. He did not see the basic Russian desire for democracy as did Francis, nor did he see any substantial reason for a Russian offensive in the spring (5:113-14).
In writing to the British Foreign Office, Buchanan said he could not share the same confidence in the Russian Ministry that Francis indicated in his letters to Lansing (5:115). According to Buchanan, the Germans proved to be a nearly insurmountable foe for the weak and disorganized Russian army. At this point in time, April, 1917, Buchanan and Francis represented opposite Allied views of the Provisional Government. North Winship, Roland Morris and Maddin Summers agreed with Buchanan, seeing the government as less than adequate.

One of the most pressing problems of the Provisional Government was that of land reform. The peasant had the bonds of serfdom lifted fifty-six years earlier, but what good was their freedom without land? The immediate reaction of the peasants to the downfall of the Tsarist monarchy was to grab and divide the land of the large estate owners. The Provisional Government delayed this action by promising that the proposed Constitutional Assembly would deal equitably with the land question; but patience had been worn thin by years of waiting. Izvestia was critical of the government's nebulous statements concerning land; it called for an affirmative stand on the problem (4:527). Winship reported in these early days, on April 17, that the peasants were very restless concerning the slowness of the government to act on the land question (63:861.00/404). The situation
grew more tense as the days passed. By April 21, the government finally had to act, not to help the peasants, but to inform the troops that they would have to use force against the peasants who were taking land illegally (4:584). This land problem continued to plague the infant democracy until its death. The procrastination of the government in convening the Constitutional Assembly to deal with Russia's multitude of unique problems stands out as one of the major errors of the Provisional Government. The people were hungry for a new life—too have to wait again proved to be too heavy a load for the people to bear.

May saw a new governmental crisis: public pressure forced some of the Cabinet Ministers to resign. Francis recognized that the government was experiencing grave difficulties as he reported to Lansing different accounts of disorder from American diplomats in Russia (63:861.00/363). Unless the government could guarantee that the Russian army was willing and able to fight, Francis told the Foreign Minister, then he would recommend that all material support from America be withdrawn (63:861.00/343).

The internal conditions of Russia in May were bad at best, and American representatives other than Francis wired Lansing of the confusion within the country. Maddin Summers was especially candid in his lengthy discussion about the inadequate education of the Russian masses to
prepare them for a democratic government. He went on
to explain some of the dangers to which these peasant
Russians were exposed, but concluded they were generally
too ignorant to understand or fear them (63:861.00/406).
North Winship continued his portrait of a society riddled
with anarchy when he related that burglaries and thefts
had increased considerably during May (63:861.00/402).
Reports from Roland Morris in Stockholm and John Ray in
Odessa, said almost the same thing about poor conditions.
Even The Outlook wrote on May 23 that because of her poor
internal conditions, there was the real threat of Russia
making a separate peace with Germany (54:131-32).

Deteriorating and harsh conditions within Russia
did not go unnoticed in the Russian newspapers. Delo
Naroda claimed the Russian economy was almost a complete
wreck; the paper called for cooperation from all peoples to
stabilize the situation (4:630).

Land reform was an even greater problem in May
than it was in April. Prince Lvov declared that land
reform would be carried out by the Constitutional Assem-
bley, and told the soldiers at the front not to worry
because land would not be distributed until they were
present. He explained further that the study was being
conducted to determine the best way to divide the land
(4:527-28). This governmental directive was met by a
retort from the peasant paper, *Delo Naroda*, saying that the peasants, workers and soldiers were in reality the governing bodies of Russia (4:534).

As viewed by the United States, the condition of the Russian army in this general period, April, May and June, was far below acceptable standards. Reports were received by the State Department declaring the Russian army unfit to carry on the war. Reporting from Odessa, John Ray observed that the troops were highly susceptible to German propaganda, and war weariness made fraternizing with the enemy much easier (63:861.00/401). In another report, he described the lack of discipline in the army; the troops refused to obey their officers (63:861.00/436). Winship declared it was obvious to him that the government had no control over the Petrograd troops (63:861.00/393). Other American diplomats had comments to make on the worsening conditions within the army. Even Francis, who received much of this same information and was aware of the problem, insisted that stronger discipline within the army would improve conditions.

Status and condition of the army continued to be a problem until the end of the Provisional Government. The Minister of War told Winship that the situation in the army was very serious (63:861.00/393); the officers were failing to keep control of the military machine.
The Russian newspapers tended to agree on the deplorable conditions within the army. Sir George Buchanan explained that the common soldiers could no longer identify with the war; fighting for the capitalists was no different from fighting for the Tsar (5:128). The Russians could see little to gain from this war between imperialists. They would prefer to go home and settle on their share of land.

Socialist parties in Russia were rapidly gaining strength in the early months of the Provisional Government. The main organizational body of the socialists was the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; but included in that group was the most radical of all socialists—according to Francis—the Bolsheviks and their leader, Vladimir I. Lenin. Francis wrote to his son Perry, telling him of an "ultra-Socialist" that was inciting people to violence (18:106). He admitted in later years that he predicted Bolshevism would create "worldwide danger" (18:vi). This is not to say, though, that Francis had pre-judged Lenin or turned a deaf ear to his cries for reform. Sir George Buchanan contacted his foreign office about this same time in May, and said that something had to be done to prevent Lenin from inciting anarchy and encouraging the troops to leave the front and come home to forcefully seize the land if necessary (5:119).
Fear of a Bolshevik coup was not the only concern of Americans for internal stability in Russia. The Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies was thought by many to be the greatest threat to the continuance of the Provisional Government. Winship wrote on several occasions to Lansing expressing his concern about the increasing power and influence of the Deputies. The extreme socialists within the Deputies now had a larger sounding board than they would have had if they had been united with other socialists. "Workmen make exorbitant demands," cabled Francis to the State Department, expressing his concern about the growing strength and independence of the socialist Deputies (63:861.00/378). This division of Russian power did not go unnoticed by the American public. George Kennan wrote several articles in The Outlook describing his disturbance over the dangers resulting from lack of central control of the Government. He was perturbed at the Provisional Government for playing chess with the Deputies over social reforms and peace when they should have been concentrating on winning the war; then peace would follow (28:217-19).

The governmental crisis in early May aptly displayed the weakness of the Provisional Government. Foreign Minister Milyukov sent a declaration of Russian war aims to the Allied powers with a note of explanation. The note
included promises to proceed with the war as originally intended, and inaccurately reported that the will to fight had grown stronger among the Russian people. This infuriated the people; large crowds gathered immediately to call for Milyukov's resignation. The Petrograd Soviet hastily went into conference with the Cabinet and determined that a new note would be sent to clarify certain phrases in the note. The Soviet then ordered all military units to abandon the streets unless otherwise ordered by the Soviet Executive Committee (6:143-45).

The results of the May Crisis were multiple: first, the Petrograd Soviet displayed its authority over the soldiers by ordering them off the streets; second, the Soviet allowed their membership to join the newly formed and more socialist Cabinet; and lastly, the May Crisis made it clear to the Allies that the Russians were dissatisfied with the existing war aims as mentioned in the secret treaties.

To support the statement that the socialist parties were rapidly gaining strength in Russia are the results of the Duma elections. Winship sent the results to Lansing: bourgeois parties received a total of 167,309 votes; socialists, 389,941; Bolsheviks, 107,760 (63: 861.00/439). The socialists had dominant control of the Dumas. Izvestiia pointed to the fact that the election
was a large socialist victory, but they cautiously said that it was also a defeat for extremism on both sides of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies platform (4:1299-1300). This last comment referred to the bourgeois on one hand, the Bolsheviks on the other. The decision of the voters has to be impressive. Adding all socialist votes together, they received 497,702 versus the bourgeois' 167,309; or in terms of Duma seats, 477 to 171. The election resulted in an open expression of choice for the socialist program. The bourgeois parties, generally supported by Francis, were losing ground rapidly to the reform-minded socialists.

There can be no question that the socialists were strong in May and June of 1917. Socialists represented a large portion of the people and thus it was significant when they avoided making any comment regarding the United States entrance to the war, Winship explained. He said that the only statements about the war effort were from the middle classes, and that even Samuel Gomper's message of congratulations on their new government was received without comment (63:861.00/395). The American government officials were not attuned to the socialist mind. The socialist language, goals, and means of achieving these goals were different from those of the Americans. Germany posed the only real threat to peace from the American
point of view, but the Bolsheviks looked upon all capi-
talist countries as potential threats to peace, including
England and the United States.

Conditions in the month of June deteriorated some-
what, and resulted in the creation of a new government
in July. Roland Morris in Sweden described the Russian
scene as poor and disorganized. He felt the condition
of the economy and labor was such that Russia was headed
for serious problems (63:861.00/389). John A. Ray was
not as blunt in his pessimism as was Morris, but he did
point out that the people were concerned about the war
and wanted a peace without annexations, contrary to known
Allied wishes. According to Ray, the laborers were too
busy playing politics to do their regular jobs. The people
were becoming restless because of the war and the crop
failures, he asserted (63:861.00/436). Winship also
described conditions in Russia as generally poor.

Despair and gloom over the Russian scene was not
the only picture painted for the State Department; Francis
and Congress helped build confidence in Russia's strength.
Messages sent to Lansing by Francis were filled with
optimistic phrases such as "Government gaining confidence
and courage," or just simply, "conditions are improving"
(63:861.00/388). Congress managed to contribute to Russia's
continued good standing with the American public. Meyer
London, United States Representative from New York, managed a round of applause from fellow House of Representatives members when he said, "Russia has brought a stream of new life and liberty, not only for the people of Russia, but for all mankind" (9:4540). Other speeches of praise followed Representative London's, and although not all agreed, a number of resolutions were presented describing the confidence that the United States had in the Russian ability to pull through this trying time.

Through the Provisional Government's own reports, one could easily see their desperate condition at this time. The Minister of Trade and Industry admitted that the economic conditions were very bad; he stated that the constant struggles of classes within Russia were causing turmoil. Labor was demanding higher wages, he said, thus endangering the stability of the ruble (4:672-73). Another report to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies by the Minister of Food, made it clear that the government must cooperate with the Deputies. The Minister asked them to help make the population aware of the need to sacrifice for the country as a whole (4:636). Other reports continued to be filed showing the internal conditions as far less than desirable. At this point, it seems strange that with so many people describing poor conditions in Russia and so few reports in favor of the
stability of the government, that the State Department, for the most part, chose to embrace the latter view. The wish to accomplish the revered war aims apparently was more important than seeking an understanding of Russia in reality.

The month of June brought out more determined cries for a stronger leader in the Provisional Government. Prince Lvov proved to be unable to take charge and direct the government more authoritatively than the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Winship noted the general lack of authority exhibited by the Provisional Government (63:861.00/450). This obvious lack was even discussed by the American news media. The Spectator said the confused times called for a great leader and they mentioned Army General Brusilov as a potential leader; a man who could carry Russia on to victory over the Germans and lead the Russian people to a new world of democracy—American style (55:631).

When the Provisional Government was first established in March, it was to be a temporary government, holding power only until a Constitutional Assembly could be elected and convinced to create a Constitution and a truly representative government of the Russian people. The Provisional Government had intended to hold elections September 30, and the Assembly to start on October 13.
(4:445), but conditions forced another postponement. The failure to convene the Constitutional Assembly gave the Bolsheviks the badly-needed time—and reason—to overthrow the Provisional Government in November.
CHAPTER III

SPECIAL MISSIONS TO RUSSIA

President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State Robert Lansing viewed Russia as a struggling democracy, and thought that a special mission to Russia would express the sincere interest of the United States. The success of the actual mission is highly questionable. Secretary Lansing was concerned about the increasing socialist propaganda within Russia, and suggested to President Wilson that a committee be organized to help combat it. Wilson agreed (1:16-17).

President Wilson then named Elihu Root to head a mission to Russia to express the genuine American interest in and sympathy with the Russian Revolution, and to cooperate with the Russians in conducting the war. Unfortunately, the purpose of the Root Mission was to try to keep Russia in the war, not to find out if she wanted to continue fighting. There was some question about the authority of the Root Mission over committees such as the Railroad Commission in Russia, but Lansing informed Root that the Missions were separate (22:359). At the meeting of the Bourse of Moscow on June 23, 1917, Ambassador Root stated the purpose of the Mission: "We intentionally limited the functions of this Mission
especially to alliance and co-operation in the conduct of the war against Germany" (72:763.72/6430½). The Russian people did not want to hear this; they were interested in land reform and peace.

The composition of the Root Mission lacked American understanding of the Russian political mood; Wilson's choice of Elihu Root to head the Mission was a prime example. Root, a conservative Republican, a former Secretary of War, Secretary of State, and United States Senator from New York, never displayed a thorough knowledge of Russia or the socialist movement. He was committed to the idea of defeating Germany, with or without Russia. Root's activities while in Russia and his "no fight, no loan" attitude were unfortunate, for it gave the State Department a false image of the Russian capacity and will to continue fighting. The Commission needed a liberal leader with compassion for a new government and with sympathy for the Russian people--Root was no such person. Soon after his arrival in Russia, Mr. Root wired to Lansing his impression of the Russian people:

Please say to the President that we have found one hundred and seventy million people and they need to be supplied with kindergarten material; they are sincere, kindly, good people but confused and dazed (44:122).

President Wilson had difficulty finding a man of liberal background to head the Russian Mission; one who
would also be a good representative of America. Wilson's selection of Root was an effort to display bipartisanship. Nevertheless, even a liberal Republican who tried to understand the European movement would have been a better selection. The neglect to include a Russian expert in the Mission compounded Wilson's unsatisfactory selection of Root.

President Wilson selected the other members of the Mission from business, finance, military and humanitarian organizations. He had difficulty choosing a socialist for the Mission, because socialism was not a popular American political philosophy. His choice of James H. Duncan, Vice-President of the American Federation of Labor, demonstrated Wilson's misunderstanding of the radical Russian socialist mind. American labor was a bourgeois philosophy by the radical European socialist standards; the American labor movement, according to the European socialists, had joined forces with business to exploit the world's masses, and Duncan personified this idea. Another member of the Commission chosen to please the socialists was Charles E. Russell, one-time socialist candidate for President. Russell was an elderly man, and was in favor of continuing the war; this kept him from acceptance by the Russian socialists. The two military members of the Mission were General Hugh Scott and
Admiral Glennon, who understandably embraced the idea of continuing the war. American business was represented by S. R. Bertron and Cyrus McCormick. John R. Mott, Executive Secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association, was the final member of importance; he was to represent the American feelings of human kindness and religious thinking. The Mission failed to include any important Russian-speaking member, only an interpreter. A more compassionate commission of people might have been able to determine Russia's weakness and declining will to continue fighting.

Public reaction to the selection of the Root Mission members was mostly favorable in the United States. The North American Review considered Root a true representative of self-government and self-determination. They said his Mission was to extend American friendship and lend a helping hand in the face of the common enemy (38:829-34). Senator Miles Poindexter of Washington declared on the Senate floor that the Mission was charged to bring about cooperation and coordination of the Allied cause (7:745). The New York Times claimed Root to be the best diplomatic brain to combat German diplomacy, and said that his Mission was "one of the most difficult diplomatic missions which the United States has ever undertaken in foreign lands" (22:354). On May 15, the Times stated bluntly that the purpose of the Mission was "to save Russia to the Entente cause" (22:354).
Mr. Ivan Narvodny, Vice-President of the Russian-American Asiatic Corporation, stated that the socialist element in Russia would not lead the government because the intellectual middle class would unite with the peasants and establish a federal republic (37:1401). By this comment, he approved the absence of a radical socialist in the Mission.

There was some criticism of Root and his Mission members, but it was not made public until after the completion of the Mission. A socialist magazine in New York, Call, did criticize Root as being the personage of what the Russians had rejected in Tsarism, and wrote that Root was an insult to all of Russia's hopes and desires (37:1401); this was a minority view, however. On May 20, 1917, the Mission left for Vladivostok, Russia, on the U.S.S. Buffalo.

Once the Mission reached Russia, each member spoke to groups related to his special interest. Mr. Root spent a great deal of his time talking to government officials and government-related agencies. He made a strong plea for the Russian Government to continue the war. On June 22, 1917, Root addressed the Moscow Duma:

Our faith in your working out a system of free self-government, adapted to the conditions and the character and the genius of the Russian people, is marred by but one doubt; and that is the doubt whether you will be able to protect the right to develop your own free government against the malign and sinister control of German autocracy (72:763.72/6430½,6).

He also said that the war was a test to see if Russia was
willing to fight for her freedom. The speech was met by loud applause, which was only natural, coming from the Moscow Duma, an organ established by the Tsar and manned by representatives of the middle class. Other speeches made by Root carried basically the same message; that Russia could not hope to survive without the defeat of German militarism. He rarely referred to Russia's bright future without first prefacing it with the need to defeat Germany.

Ambassador Root tried to convince the Russian people of their strong basis for democracy, and he expressed unlimited confidence in the ability of the Russians to solve their own problems in the wake of German aggression. In order to solidify United States-Russian friendship, Root said the labor movement in the United States had matured to the point where labor could look after its own interests and simultaneously cooperate with the government (72:763.72/6430½,5). Organization and enthusiasm were needed by the Russian workers to make up for the interruption of Allied supplies, Root explained (72:763.72/6430½,4). The differences between the labor forces of the two countries were glaring, and to tell a war-weary people that they must depend on enthusiasm in place of supplies to defeat a highly mechanized German army bordered on the ludicrous.

Discipline in the army almost disappeared immediately following the Revolution. Root observed this and
was appalled; but later, July 13, he said that the army was under the direction of a great leader, Alexander Kerensky, then Minister of War (72:763.72/6430½,9). Root had faith that new direction and purpose had been achieved in the army; he made several speeches to soldiers encouraging them to continue the fight for democracy. There was cause for concern, though, in Germany's propaganda barrage against the Provisional Government. Root asked the State Department for immediate funds to combat the German propaganda offensive (22:365); and the Mission itself put up thirty thousand dollars to start the United States propaganda machinery. Lansing agreed to the Mission's advancement, but not without careful consideration (22:366). Thirty thousand dollars to start a propaganda campaign for the Allies was a "drop in the bucket," however, considering what was needed.

Despite the shaky foundation of the Provisional Government and the obvious unrest and discontent of the people, Root believed that the Mission had been successful. He wrote to his wife just before their return trip that the Mission left the Government and the army much stronger than before (22:367).

General Hugh Scott inspected the Russian army to see if they were willing and capable of an offensive against the Germans. The report he filed left the final
conclusion somewhat up in the air; he went to great length describing the low morale in the Russian army, then concluded they could mount a successful offensive. He reported the soldiers had gained control of their local units and were issuing orders or only obeying those orders with which they agreed. Discipline was absent from the army in the early months of the revolution. Scott saw this lack of discipline spreading to the general populace. Workers refused to obey "unjust" orders from factory bosses and production for the war effort was in serious jeopardy (72:763.72/6430½,1-8).

By the time the revolution was a few months old, reported Scott, the conditions improved in the army as well as in society as a whole. He declared that since fewer desertions were evident and since many soldiers were returning to the front lines, confidence in the Russian will to fight was renewed (72:763.72/6430½,10-12). Scott felt the reason for this improvement was due to requests from the Provisional Government and the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Apparently the fact of a dual government in Russia went unnoticed again in the State Department.

General Scott included in his report a memorandum by a Colonel Mott describing the Russian military officials as evasive when asked for statistical information concerning the Russian army's equipment status (72:763.72/6430½).
Later in his report, General Scott was willing to accept the word of the Russians that their army had improved enough to be able to implement an offensive (72:763.72/6430,19-20). Scott did not indicate that he had gone to the front lines to investigate this himself.

Railroad cars headed the list of military requests given to General Scott by Russian officers. The Russian military was very emphatic that munitions sent by the United States were of little value unless railroad cars accompanied the supplies, to ease the overburdened transportation system in Russia. General Michelson told General Scott that they were disappointed when the shipment of the requested five hundred locomotives and ten thousand freight cars would be postponed until December—they had hoped to receive them in July. He went on to say that any military move would be greatly impaired without improved transportation (72:763.72/6430,3-4). The fact remains that every Russian military department listed railroad cars at the top of their lists of needed supplies, but the Stevens Railroad Commission, set up to assist in operating the Russian railroad system, did not operate functionally until after the Bolshevik takeover in November.

General Scott made it quite clear that it was in the best interests of the United States to loan Russia the needed money to continue the war. He maintained that
if present conditions continued to exist, Russia would be forced to drop out of the war; this would be disastrous to the Allied cause. A loan of a billion dollars in addition to the railroad cars requested was Scott's recommendation to save Russia from a separate peace with Germany (72:763.72/6430½,26-34).

By General Scott's own admission, he did not spend any appreciable time on the front lines or talking to the rank and file soldiers; his time was spent with former Tsarist officers (72:763.72/6430½,24-25). However biased his view of Russia, Scott's attempt to seek a true picture of revolutionary Russia was consistent with most members of the Mission.

Admiral Glennon reported on the conditions within the Russian navy. Like Scott, Glennon reported that the men refused to obey officers' orders, and in some instances killed a number of unpopular officers. Workers and soldiers were working together in controlling all decisions, and the Provisional Government complied with their demands (72:763.72/6430½,1-6). Again it is evident that the Russian Government was not monolithic.

Glennon used the workers in a naval repair station as an example of workers' attitudes. Workmen did not put forth a maximum effort, but insisted on having more food although their wages were already high. He said that none
of the workers put in more than four hours of work time a day, despite the fact they were at work eight hours (72:763.72/6430\(1\frac{1}{2}\),4-6). Glennon seemed concerned with the general lack of discipline; this was only natural from a military man.

There was no financial stability within Russia, according to the report filed by S. R. Bertron and Cyrus McCormick. They were explicitly candid in their view of the near-disastrous financial crisis in Russia. The Provisional Government was losing support from the people as paper money continued to inflate to the point of worthlessness. Gold deposits did not cover the government's outstanding debts, and an effort to float a "Liberty Loan" was less that successful because only a few people participated. Bertron and McCormick were concerned that the people had lost confidence in the Provisional Government. They said the only true way to rebuild the economy was for the public to restore its faith in the government (72:763.72/6430\(1\frac{1}{2}\),1-4).

The financial report concluded that the United States must look carefully at Russia's needs and assist her in the most crucial areas; Russia's continuance in the war was dependent on United States' financial aid. It was agreed that the loan would be safe, because Russia's assets were more than sufficient to secure repayment after
the war. In the meantime, Russia needed a loan immediately, or Germany might step in with a loan offer (72: 763.72/6430½,5-6). This idea of German monetary support of Russian political groups was common among American officials; from an Allied point of view, any financial aid to Russia from Germany would be disastrous.

John R. Mott, Executive Secretary of the Young Men's Christian Association, talked to a variety of Russians, but most of his time was taken up by non-socialists; this was typical of the entire Root Mission. His activities included visiting Russian churches, lecturing for the need of a Y.M.C.A. in Russia, a speech at the Cossack Congress and various contacts with the intelligentsia and educated classes. He concluded that there was no opposition in any walk of Russian life to the creation of a Russian Y.M.C.A.; in fact, most Russians advocated it. To make this plan become reality, however, the United States would have to generously finance it, according to Mott (72:763.72/6430¾,3). Soldiers in the army had too many hours of leisure in which they sat around thinking of their plight. A Y.M.C.A. would give these idle men an opportunity to become active and improve their morale and raise their spirits, Mott assured in his report (72: 763.72/6430½,2). He lectured on several occasions to popularize his belief in the need of a Russian Y.M.C.A.
By his own admission, Mott spent considerable time conferring with church officials. His feeling was that if anyone wished to talk to the Russian people, contact must be made through the Orthodox Church, because it was the "Heart of Russia" (72:763.72/6430½,1). Evidently Mott did not anticipate reaching the radical socialists, as they, with good reason, did not support the former Tsarist tool, the Orthodox Church.

Charles E. Russell, one-time socialist candidate for President, spoke to the various socialist parties in Russia. He claimed to be a fellow socialist, when in fact Russian radical socialists looked upon the American socialists as members of the bourgeois. In an address to a socialist group, Russell tried to convince them that their success and future were solely dependent upon the survival of democracy (72:763.72/6430½,2). Nothing could have been further from the truth as far as the radicals were concerned. Russell did not stop there; he continued trying to convince the Russian people that it was their duty to fight the Germans; only cowards refuse to fight, he argued (72:763.72/6430½,2). Men should not be afraid to die for liberty, liberty they all loved so much—he spoke as if the Russians had known liberty all their lives. Russell tied German victory to Russian defeat; if Germany was able to defeat the Allies, then surely Russia could
not hope to survive. Russian liberty could not be tolerated in a world dominated by militarism (72:763.72/6430½,1).

Russell made a last appeal to the socialists by saying the United States, a peace-loving nation, was driven to war to save democracy (72:763.72/6430½,4), and Russia's new democracy should join with America in the march for a democratic victory. Russians should not fear death, for a loss of this war would result in another kind of defeat—autocratic rule (72:763.72/6430½,1). From Russell's own agenda, he failed to talk enough with all groups of socialists, nor did he mention ever talking with the Bolsheviks. It is difficult to believe that the Russians could have accepted Russell's suggestion that only cowards refuse to fight or die for a cause, especially in light of the millions of Russians that had already died in defense of their country.

The last member of the Root Mission to file a separate report was James Duncan, Vice-President of the American Federation of Labor. He spent the majority of his time speaking to workers and their unions. As previously explained, the Russian workers were making excessive demands on the factories and the Provisional Government. These workers were not accustomed to demanding benefits without the Tsar to refuse or even punish them. James Duncan began telling them to work extra shifts
without compensation, putting forth additional effort to defeat Germany, because the soldiers were already doing their extra share (72:763.72/6430⅓,7-9). This was not what the Russian workers wanted to hear.

In his report to Root, James Duncan made it clear that he believed the general conditions within Russia had greatly improved. He also mentioned that his attempt to convince workers to put in extra shifts had brought Cossack criticism of the Maximalists (Bolsheviks) and agreement with his policy (72:763.72/6430⅓,9,12). Duncan represented American unions as cooperative with the United States government's war struggle and hoped to convince Russian unions to have the same cooperation with their government.

The Root Mission submitted its final report as a composite of their activities as individuals of the Mission and their collective views of the general situation in Russia. Conditions were confusing at first with near-anarchy, the Mission reported; but later the government gained more trust of the people and was better able to govern (72:763.72/6430⅓,2-3). The Mission displayed satisfaction in the Russian character to survive this most trying test of their drive for freedom. Transportation was considered the main problem of the Russian government in relation to the war burden, reported the
Committee, and railroad cars were desperately needed (72:763.72/6430½,10-11).

Root's final report continued by listing their objectives: the first two were general platitudes of faith in Russian democracy; the third described the essence of the Mission:

To promote a realization of the fact that the effective continuance of the war was the only course by which the opportunity for Russia to work out the conditions of her own freedom could be preserved from destruction by German domination (72:763.72/6430½,24).

Francis held this same belief; in fact the report gave credit to Francis for supporting the Mission's activities in Russia, and supporting their conclusions (72:763.72/6430½,26). Finally, the Mission summarized that United States aid was necessary to keep Russia in the war. Their last comment in reference to the suggestion for aid was:

That the benefit of keeping Russia in the war and its army in the field will be so enormous that the risk involved in rendering the aid required should not be seriously considered (72:763.72/6430½,26-27).

Public reaction to the Root Mission's report was understandably enthusiastic. The report described the Russians as hard-fighting people longing for peace and the same style of democracy America cherished. Although it had a limited circulation, The Nation did sum up general public opinion of Root and his Mission when it wrote
about Root's opening speech in Petrograd:

that speech will remain one of the masterly documents of the war. It showed perfect understanding blended with such sympathy as many more "democratic" personages and organs of public opinion than Mr. Root have shown themselves incapable of . . . (47:166-67).

Unfortunately, Mr. Root did have the sympathy for the Russian cause, but not the understanding of their peculiar situation.

President Wilson seemed to disregard completely any suggestions by the Mission and also neglected to talk to Root after his return. The matter of implementing the Mission's recommendation was passed on to the Creel Committee of Public Information. Wilson never talked to Root after that to discuss Russian problems or possible solutions. It seems strange that during the later Allied invasion of Russian Siberia that Root was not consulted for his thoughts on the subject.

Hindsight offers the view that the Root Mission was far from successful. The members of the Mission were not logical choices to send to a struggling revolutionary country; most of them saw in Russia only what they wanted to see, and conditions were either ignored or misread. This is easily understood, as few of them bothered to associate with the radical socialists; only those people and groups that agreed with them were consulted. Root's recommendations fell far short of a comprehensive plan to
save Russia; films and Y.M.C.A. games were not going to win the desperately needed time for the Russians to collect their thoughts and create a cohesive political philosophy. The war was a thorn in her side; it had to be removed for her to survive. David Francis summed up the sad American misunderstanding in his usual naive and candid way when he asserted: "... the Commission represented all the interests in our own country, and had come for the purpose of welcoming Russia to the sisterhood of republics" (18:128). How unfortunate; the Russians did not want to hear loudly sung platitudes of democracy from the warring Allies, they wanted to be left to build their own dreams.

Successful prosecution of the war by Russia was of paramount interest to the Allies. The lack of equipment and coordination of the transportation system have been mentioned in connection with the Root report, and as the first few months after the Revolution unfolded, it became increasingly evident to the Allies that there was need for their assistance in coordinating Russian railroads. The United States made inquiries of the Russian government as to whether such assistance would be welcome. What could they say? Even David Francis recognized the true problem when he said the Russian railroad personnel were competent, but the lack of government
cooperation and equipment reduced their efforts to confusion; he went on to say that the Russians resented outside advice (71:861.77/48). Nevertheless, the United States organized a Railroad Commission, headed by engineer John Stevens, to advise the Russians on railroad organizational matters. Due to illness and equipment delays, the Commission did not begin to operate fully in Russia until the Provisional Government had fallen under Bolshevik pressure. Not surprisingly, the Railroad Commission had little effect on the Provisional Government. The United States would have been in a better position by sending the needed railroad equipment requested than to send advisors to Russia. Advice they had; equipment they lacked.

President Wilson felt that it was necessary to make the thoughts and feelings of the United States known to the Russian infant democracy. He assigned George Creel's Committee on Public Information to this task; in turn, Creel selected Edgar Sisson to head the actual delegation to Russia. Sisson explained his purpose as helping to implement the "practicable portion" of the Root report, explain the American purpose and struggle in the war and to weaken German morale whenever possible (51:3). Sisson's group sailed October 27 and arrived in Russia November 25—eighteen days after the demise of the Provisional Government.
Although the Information Committee arrived after the Bolshevik takeover, Sisson still provided another view of the problems discussed earlier. His opinion of David Francis was mixed. Francis' hatred of the Bolsheviks was obvious, according to Sisson (51:29), and his general lack of confidence in Francis' ability and objectiveness was supported by others. He suggested that Ambassadors should be removed and replaced by better qualified coordinators of war-time policy in time of war (51:30).

Sisson considered the Root report recommendations to be vague and somewhat "unpractical." The implementation of a mass propaganda campaign in Russia could not be started immediately, nor could it have guaranteed success. The dollar cost of such a program would be high; Sisson favored a close watch on money expenditures (51:5). Sisson's Committee arrived in Russia too late to be of any help, but he does bring to light a few crucial issues that concern this paper.

There was one last Mission to Russia: the Red Cross. The Red Cross was controversial not because of its intended purpose, but because of the individuals involved as the leaders of this supposedly charitable organization. Two men in the Red Cross were noteworthy; one for his complete disregard for presidential and political channels, and the other for his direct involvement
in Russian Government activities after the Bolshevik take-over. William Boyce Thompson, a Chicago millionaire, was appointed to lead the Red Cross group in Russia, although his qualifications for such a job were questionable. The other controversial member was Raymond Robins, a full time social reformer who was known to have been in contact with Russian revolutionaries prior to his Red Cross appointment.

The purpose of the Red Cross in Russia was to help the people regardless of their political affiliations and to impress upon them that the United States wanted to help (14:272). By the time Thompson re-interpreted the purpose of the Red Cross, it was indistinguishable from the original. Thompson admitted he would do all in his power to keep the Russian forces intact (19:184), and he put it bluntly in memorandum form:

The problems which it was apparent to me must be met in Russia were three in number:
1. How to assist Russia and keep her actively fighting in the Entente Alliance.
2. Failing in No. 1, how to prevent Russia from making a separate peace.
3. Failing in Nos. 1 and 2, how to prevent Russia from being used by Germany against the Allies (19:201).

These objectives do not sound like objectives of a charitable organization. Thompson worked hard to help the Allied cause; he was a frustrated man who used charity work to vindicate his long life of merciless money making. Even while living in Russia, Thompson surrounded himself
with luxuries and associated mainly with top government officials, something he was accustomed to in the United States.

Raymond Robins was more astute in revolutionary ideas and methods than Thompson, and he used his ability to push hard the American message to the Russian people. He, more than anyone, talked to all sides of the Russian society; Robins would exchange ideas with any man, no matter how radical. He traveled throughout Russia lecturing to soldiers and to anyone who would listen about America's purpose in entering the war. Reality finally dawned on Robins, as he admitted in late October, "The war is dead in the heart of the Russian soldier" (20:46). After the Bolshevik counter-revolution in November, to the dismay of many Americans, Robins continued on in Russia talking frequently with Bolshevik leaders.

Education of the Russian mind to combat the German propaganda offensive was Thompson's major objective. He was excited by Catherine Breshkovsky's committee to inform the public of their duties to a people's government. His devotion to his new found role was so zealous that he contributed one million dollars of his own money toward the propaganda fund in Russia. With this money he started newspapers, lectures and various organizations to pass the word that the success of the revolution was contingent
on Germany's defeat. Thompson realized, however, that one million dollars was not enough, so he cabled Washington explaining his program and requesting one million dollars immediately and three million a month thereafter. Three weeks elapsed before a weak message arrived from Washington saying that the matter was under consideration. The message also advised that a member of the Committee on Public Information, Edgar Sisson, would soon arrive in Petrograd to administer American propaganda (20:38-39). Thompson continued to press for the urgently needed funds as he wrote to Henry P. Davison, Chairman of the American Red Cross, to pressure Wilson into some form of action on Washington's part until the matter received further study. Davison urged Thompson not to commit himself to further involvement without government approval (19:219). Thompson persisted, however, but Wilson ably avoided his prodding.

Sisson's Propaganda Committee left for Russia with approximately one-eightieth of Thompson's request and a message from Wilson lauding him for good work and hinting that he avoid any further involvement (19:231). Wilson's neglect of Thompson's ideas seems consistent with his avoidance of most other matters concerning Russian internal affairs. Germany's defeat and the enactment of Wilson's Fourteen Point program were first priority.

Henry P. Davison wrote in later years that the Red
Cross had done a good job in light of the difficult circumstances. He listed the supplies sent to Russia, such as ambulances and medical supplies, milk and a limited amount of funds for relief work (14:269). Davison was naive in his assumption of Red Cross accomplishments; the small dent they made in the Russian problem was almost unnoticed by the Russians, and, for that matter, not necessarily welcomed. Thompson and Robins were busy involving themselves in Russian politics and did not perform customary Red Cross work. Thompson's concern was with Russian mobilization against the advancing Germans in order to save the revolution, not in the commonplace distribution of medical supplies. This is not to say they were unsuccessful, but they surely did not accomplish for the Red Cross what Mr. Davison would have had the public believe.

American attempts through the various special missions to influence Russia to resist German aggression were doomed to failure. All of these missions had preconceived ideas of the Russian situation and how to cope with it; none had any understanding of the people's desire for their own chance to govern themselves in peace.

The Red Cross Commission did not perform its intended duties and the only reason it is mentioned is because of its participants, Thompson and Robins. Edgar Sisson's Propaganda Committee was doomed to failure from the outset.
because the Bolsheviks had attained control by the time Sisson arrived. The Stevens Railroad Commission suffered the same fate: inactivity until the Bolsheviks took over. Even though the Mission was set up in time, the first months were spent in talking—time the Bolsheviks used for positive activity. Lastly, the Root Mission failed because its members, for the most part, were not attuned to the needs of the people. Russell and Duncan were the only members who talked with all parties in Russia, and then only on a limited scale. The Mission had sailed from Seattle with pre-conceived notions as to Russia's problems and their own views of remedies for these problems; they returned without adequate solutions. One should keep in mind, though, that all of these Missions, the men involved and conclusions reached, were representative of general American thought. Only a small minority of viewers could see the true picture of Russia—and they were generally ignored.

George F. Kennan, writing in Soviet-American Relations, agreed that the Missions had little "appreciable favorable effect on the course of events in Russia." In fact, he suggested that some of the Missions were not wanted by the Russians, but only tolerated in order to receive materials from the United States (29:21).
July to November of 1917 was a time of utter confusion; crisis after crisis arose, yet the Provisional Government managed to weather each one, losing some control each time. By November the situation was such that the much discredited and weakened government could not bear the pressure and had to succumb to the Bolsheviks. Hindsight shows an America committed to the war encouraged a weakening Provisional Government to go on fighting. Even after the fall of the government, the American public failed to understand what had happened and why. This chapter will deal with the major events of this five month period, with special emphasis on the Bolsheviks.

Alexander Kerensky was without question the most important man in the Provisional Government. To discuss him and all the controversy involved with him would be voluminous, to say the least; however, it is not the intent of this paper to present a biographical sketch of Alexander Kerensky.

David Francis had great difficulty establishing an attitude toward Kerensky. He wanted a dictatorial leader of the government, but also one who could see the problem of Russia from Francis' viewpoint. Kerensky was indeed the
strongest member of the government, but not nearly strong enough to cope with decisions that required firmness or farsightedness. Francis put his trust in Kerensky, but was critical of his weakness in dealing with the Bolsheviks and the General Kornilov Affair, which was an apparent attempt to overthrow the Provisional Government. In later years, Francis was critical of Kerensky's failure to deal firmly with Lenin and Trotsky (18:193-94).

July was a disruptive month in Russia. The government was shaky and eventually fell, only to be replaced by another coalition government. Francis began to report the general disruption and unrest of the people on the first day of July. He observed that parades were being organized with banners flying calling for "Bread, Peace, Freedom," well-known Bolshevik demands. The only government supporters Francis mentioned were the Cossacks (63:861.00/419). The next week the local Dumas held elections with results that could have meant a gradual change in the attitude of the people toward their own government and the war. Maddin Summers, Consul in Moscow, reported that the local election witnessed victory for the various socialist parties. He was careful to point out that the election showed no direct opposition to the war, although more than ten per cent of the votes were cast for the Social Maximalists (Bolsheviks). The Socialist Revolutionaries won the majority of the votes;
they were a peasant party with less radical demands than some fellow socialist parties (63:861.00/466). North Winship reported basically the same results in the Petrograd election for Duma representatives. The socialists completely dominated the election with the Socialist Revolutionaries gaining the majority of seats, but only by a slim margin. The Bolsheviks received 37 seats out of 200 (the Socialist Revolutionaries received 54), but combined with the less radical half of their party, the Social Democrat Mensheviks, they held 77 seats, by far the largest voting block (63:861.00/463). If nothing else, the elections indicated a turn toward the socialist view and closer, if only slightly, to the position of questioning the war. Francis failed to see this trend.

On July 17, 1917, demonstrations against the government intensified. Francis reported that a large gathering at the Duma called for Kerensky's arrest. Many Ministers resigned because of the disturbance, and Prince Lvov, President of the government, drew up plans to implement demands of the peasants. It was even suggested that the Workmen and Soldiers take command of the government (63:861.00/427). Roland Morris cabled Lansing concerning the disruptive conditions in Petrograd, declaring that some soldiers had shot their officers and uncontrolled rioting was present (63:861.00/422).
Francis reported on July 20, 1917, that Prince Lvov resigned as President of the Russian government, and suggested that Kerensky be his successor because he was the only man who could execute the government plans. Lvov was very pleased with his governmental term, mainly because it had prevented the advance of the Bolsheviks, Lenin had been arrested, and the army was taking its orders from the Ministry, which suggested stability (63:861.00/430). Lvov also announced, through Francis, that the Bolshevik faction had been eliminated—apparently he neglected to look closely at the recent Duma elections.

Kerensky returned from the front as Prince Lvov resigned, and immediately offered his resignation, but, as Francis concluded, was wisely refused. Francis was concerned that Kerensky's resignation amidst the new active militancy of the workers would be fatal to the government's survival (63:861.00/424). It is interesting to compare at this same time Winship's impressions of Russia's needs with this conclusion of Francis'. Winship felt that a new and strong coalition government was not enough; there had to be a more cohesive attitude among the classes of Russian society. He said:

As long as war lasts this disintegration will continue to progress geometrically. But a real burst of genuine patriotism, which means unity and cooperation between classes, could slow down the process and perhaps keep Russia on her feet until the end of the war (63:861.00/478).
Winship continued to be critical and somewhat sarcastic of the Provisional Government's ability to control the people, and asserted that only the Workmen's and Soldier's Deputies were able to exercise any degree of authority over the troops (63:861.00/450).

The appointment of a new Ministry by Kerensky was a good sign, according to Francis, but he admitted that food riots had to be curbed if the Ministry hoped to be effective. He went on to explain that criticism of the Workmen and Soldiers by competent men indicated "improved public sentiment" (63:861.00/461).

The contrast between Winship's and Francis' analysis of the situation was glaring. Winship refused to believe that one man could change the complexion of a people's attitude and psychological makeup, whereas Francis wanted to see stability in the new government and weakness in the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Winship witnessed the increasing power of the Deputies, but Francis only reported the hopeful demise of their influence in Russia. Failure to recognize changing public sentiment and increasing influence of the Deputies continued to be Francis' greatest fault.

Kerensky's new government was met with mixed emotions by his fellow Russians. The moderate socialists were enthusiastic about his chances for successful use of the country's resources; the claim that the government was
non-partisan was not uncommon. The Rabochaia Gazeta wrote that the government would "save the country from military devastation" (4:1432). Delo Naroda claimed Kerensky was just the political genius needed to stabilize the government (4:1434). Support of the government was guaranteed by Izvestiia; it felt the government represented the essential parts of Russian politics (4:1435).

Opposition to Kerensky's government was not absent. The conservative parties were opposed to the predominately socialist government. Novoe Vremia criticized the inclusion of radical socialists in the Ministry; those whose loyalty was questionable (4:1430). The more radical socialists opposed the government because it failed to disassociate from inadequate programs and did not pass social legislation rapidly. Novaia Zhizn supported this view (4:1436). A few papers took a more cautious "wait and see" attitude toward the new Ministry. It is apparent that Kerensky did not have unquestioned support from the inception of his government. He did have the backing of the major parties currently in public favor; he eventually lost this support.

American diplomats disagreed on the meaning of Russian internal conditions in July. The biggest news of the month was the unsuccessful uprising of the Bolsheviks. As far as the general conditions go, most American observers were concerned about Russia's stability and desire to
continue the war. Railroad conditions were reported by D. B. Maggowan, Vice Consul at Moscow, to be very bad. Relations between railroad workers and management had deteriorated to a point where the workers refused to obey management orders and demanded control for themselves (71:861.77/145).

Messages arrived at the State Department describing apathy in the people and a lack of enthusiasm for continuation of the war. This feeling of apathy was coupled with a growing push by some socialists for a separate peace with Germany. Winship reported on several occasions that the socialists viewed the war and victory differently from the Allies or the Russian Government. "Peace without annexations" was the socialist demand; they believed the improved Russian army now could command consideration for acceptance of this proposal (63:861.00/455).

As before, David Francis refused to state that conditions were taking a turn for the worse. On those few occasions that Mr. Francis did relay declining conditions, he generally concluded his message with words of encouragement about the newest improved conditions. In July, as in past months, he supported the Russian government's stand. Conditions were improving, he said on July 23; workers fully recognized the government and a stricter discipline had been restored in the army (63:861.00/432).
Again the pattern was the same: Francis conveying hope, promise and false conditions, and other observers seeing doubt and reason to believe in eventual Russian defeat unless something was done to change the situation. Francis' version of the story was accepted by the Wilson Administration because it encouraged Wilson in his hope for an Allied peace.

Bolshevik activity was the main topic of discussion in dispatches to Washington during the month of July. The Bolsheviks attempted a coup on July 16, 17 and 18, when their activity was forced by the restless workers and soldiers. This aggressive unrest was evident in factory demands and soldier unwillingness to fight. The socialists were becoming more influential, but even the Bolsheviks were finding it difficult to restrain the over-zealous people.

Alexander Kerensky was aware of this unrest among the people and as Minister of War he decided a major offensive on the Russian-German front would divert the attention of the people and give Russia the international prestige needed to continue the war (6:164-65). The offensive started well because the Russians faced only the weak Austrian soldiers, but when German re-enforcement arrived, the Russians panicked; soldiers threw down their rifles and fled.

The offensive was a failure from the military view, and it compounded unrest among the masses. Discontent with
the revolution grew to a point of becoming uncontrollable in the cities. The Bolsheviks did not want to attempt a coup in July; they were forced into it from fear that the Bolsheviks would lose control of the radical element (6:166).

The July Crisis was poorly organized and eventually failed, but not without causing the exposure of the weakness of the Provisional Government. Publications of German documents by Gregory Alexinsky and Vasily Pankrativ, men of questionable character and intent, helped control the crisis. They alleged that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were German agents. William Chamberlin suggested in *The Russian Revolution 1917-21*, that Kerensky encouraged the publication of the documents in order to destroy Bolshevik power (6:181). The allegations in the documents were damaging to the Bolsheviks; many were forced into hiding while others were being arrested.

The results of the Kerensky offensive and the July Crisis were of a conservative nature. Top Bolshevik leaders were in jail or in hiding; unruly army regiments were broken up; some arms searches were conducted; the death penalty was restored on July 25; additional restrictions were imposed on the press; and a new Cabinet was formed on August 6, made up of right-wing socialists and non-socialists, with Alexander Kerensky named Prime Minister on July 21 (6:184-89).

Francis reported that the Bolshevik uprising caught
the government by surprise. Hundreds were reportedly killed as the Cossacks resisted the Bolsheviks (63:861.00/428). A strong government would have been prepared to stop such a limited attempt at a coup, but Kerensky assured Francis that many Bolsheviks had been captured and would be severely punished. Francis observed that some people hoped Kerensky would assume dictatorial powers, but Francis doubted this would happen (63:861.00/440).

Defeat of the Bolsheviks was not just a fancy of Mr. Francis; others, including Russian government officials, hoped for the same thing. Bolshevism was at an end, according to a government official, echoed Roland Morris from Sweden; the government had failed to capture Lenin, but they did believe they had put a stop to the Bolshevik movement (63:861.00/431).

A detailed explanation of the July Bolshevik riots was sent to Lansing from Winship in Petrograd. He did not give glowing platitudes about government stability and strength in the face of an internal enemy, instead he described a weakened government feebly resisting a threat to its very existence. The riots not only caused death, they also caused havoc in the army and with the economy. Confidence in the government's strength was challenged and slackened to a point where the Liberty Loan was in jeopardy. Government support from the troops and police
was questionable during the disorders and would continue to be. It is interesting to note, as Winship indicated, that even though many moderate socialists refused to support and even opposed the Bolshevik riots, they defended them against accusations of being pro-German. Winship also concluded that each attempt at Bolshevik pressure on the government had grown more intense and the Bolsheviks were far from dead after this last setback (63:861.00/477).

A less objective, though more positive stand on the July disorder was put forth by Sir George Buchanan. He was aware, and stated frequently, that the Provisional Government was too weak and indecisive when trying to stop radical groups from disrupting government activities. On July 23, Buchanan wired the British Foreign Office that the Russians had missed an unparalleled opportunity to stop the Bolsheviks permanently. He said the occupation of the Pravda offices and imprisonment of key Bolshevik personnel was good, but then they returned the captured Pravda documents and released the prisoners. "The Prime Minister was not strong enough to take advantage of this unique opportunity of suppressing anarchy once and for all" (5:165).

Official Russian government reaction to the Bolshevik uprising was to stop the publication of Pravda and any other publication that advocated disobedience in the military (4:979). Any type of censorship is dangerous and
censorship of government opposition is especially hazardous. When people are refused legal public means by which to express their views, then illegal and usually more radical methods are used to inflame the public mind toward a particular cause. Government restoration of the death penalty for desertion from the army testified to the infiltration of the Bolshevik propaganda calling for soldiers to refuse to fight.

Socialist parties expressed concern that the Bolsheviks had weakened the government's ability to maintain relative calm. Rabochaia Gazeta expressed this view by observing that the July riots opened up the opportunity for counterrevolutions. Once the Bolsheviks gained power, near anarchy would reign because no one would be able to stop further revolutions (4:1362-63).

Aid from the United States to the Provisional Government was extremely important in the relations between the two governments, because it displayed the American attitude toward the entire Russian situation. In the early part of July, when Russia requested an additional loan from the United States, Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo was hesitant to approve such a loan without knowledge of the internal conditions of Russia. He asked Lansing to have Mr. Root or Ambassador Francis inform him of the conditions (69:861.51/159). The situation
was such that a loan was urgently needed to secure Russia's continuance in the war, cabled Root. It was recommended that a loan of seventy-five million dollars be made available to the Russian government with no restriction as to how or where the money was to be spent (69:861.51/154). McAdoo responded immediately with an additional seventy-five million dollar credit loan to Russia (69:861.51/156).

A much tougher stand was taken by Ambassador Francis, as he was opposed to loans to a weak Russian Government unwilling or unable to continue prosecution of the war. Francis was of the opinion that American loans should be used to push for a stronger Provisional Government and force an increased war effort. On July 18, Francis bluntly stated that no loans should be extended unless the present Russian government, or a stronger replacement, could maintain order and prosecute the war (69:861.51/167).

This hesitation to assist the Russian government by the Treasury Department and the suggested conditional support from Ambassador Francis depicts official American attitude toward Russia. If Russia could have maintained order and exercised a more vigorous war effort, then the United States would have extended all necessary money and materials. There appeared to be no real desire to help the Russian people themselves. Even Francis' request for propaganda films to instruct the newly created yet ignorant
Russian voter how to vote intelligently (meaning against the socialist parties) is evidence of American feelings toward their "fellow democracy" (67:861.4061/12a).

Doubt about Russia's stability continued to be the major question when dealing with loans. Francis went on questioning the Russian government's ability to continue the war before approving loans to them. Finally, on August 28, Francis told Lansing that the physical wealth of Russia was enough to secure any loan the United States might make available (70:861.51/199). By the time a loan of any significant size could be approved and implemented, however, the arrival of any purchased materials would be November at the earliest. This would be too late.

During this exchange of notes between various American officials concerning a loan to Russia, a question about the Russian Ambassador to Washington, Boris Bakhmeteff, arose. The Treasury Department was worried that he might not have full authority to negotiate for the loan. The State Department requested that Francis clear up this matter. Francis complied in the affirmative, because by now he was convinced that any loan to Russia was worth the risk, as the loss of Russia would be too costly to the Allies (66:861.24/16).

Ironically, Francis was now in favor of loans to Russia, but the Treasury Department became increasingly
more suspicious of Russia's ability to wage war. Acting Secretary of the Treasury Oscar T. Crosby insisted that no further credits from the original seventy-five million dollar loan would be allowed unless Francis could convincingly show that the money would not be lost (70:861.51/223). Francis continued to press for the loans.

Securing the loan was difficult enough, but receiving the supplies ordered was even harder. Russia had ordered a large number of rifles and ammunition from the United States to be manufactured primarily by the Colt Company. The shipment of these supplies was delayed because of the poor transportation in Russia, and doubt as to their arrival was expressed by Lansing (66:861.24/15). The final blow came when Secretary of War Newton D. Baker told Boris Bakhmeteff, Russia's Ambassador, that their order of Vickers guns had been cancelled and this word had been passed on to the Colt Company. Baker explained that the Vickers gun was badly needed on the Western front by the French army, and in addition was needed by the United States aircraft because it was the only gun that was synchronized with the aircraft propellers (66:861.24/16). Despite the disappointment Bakhmeteff must have felt upon hearing this news, the lateness of the hour, October 29, 1917, meant time was running short, anyway, for this chapter of Russian democracy.

Russian reaction to the economic scene was, for the
most part, restricted to the issuance of the Liberty Loan within Russia. A very emphatic call for purchase of the loans was made by Izvestiia. It claimed the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies called on the people to buy Liberty Loans (4:490). The people did not react well to the plea for participation in the program. Den was concerned, saying that neither the peasants nor the workers were buying loans. They called for a propaganda program to stir up support for the loans (4:491).

The United States extended a total of 375 million dollars in credits to the Russian Provisional Government. Due to the internal conditions, this amount of money was not adequate to meet Russian needs, but from the Treasury's point of view, it was probably too much.

United States confidence in the Provisional Government varied with each interest group. The Missions each expressed hope and confidence in the Russians, Francis wavered on his support depending on the crisis, and the State Department seemed to have less trust in the Russians as the months passed. The United States was willing to express reassurance in the Russian government, but less and less material support accompanied this feeling about their ability to survive.

This apparent lack of American belief in the real ability of Russia to continue the war in the remaining few
months was not one-sided. The Petrograd press printed several articles criticizing the war and blaming it on all capitalists, not just Germany (63:861.00/510). More to the point was the accusation by the Russian press that the United States had aided her Western Allies more than Russia (63:861.00/476). This added to the already existing agitation in Russia.

By August, rumblings of real unrest were heard. The war was not going well and the people were tired; tired of war, tired of government promises for land reforms and tired of their new responsibilities. Interest of the general public in the politics of their government was declining and interest in strictly the economics of life was rapidly increasing, according to John Ray, Consul at Odessa (63:861.00/539). Maddin Summers reported that the Transportation Minister predicted terrible things for Russia unless she quickly improved internal conditions (71:861.77/196).

President Wilson was also concerned about the mental state of the Russian Ministry and masses. He conveyed once again a message to the Russians reiterating Allied war aims (10:5722-23). Wilson did not take into account that the Bolsheviks did not differentiate between the Allies and the Germans; the war was one between capitalists. The fight must be for liberty and dignity of freedom, Wilson expounded, without imposing indemnities, and ultimately form a common
bond to guarantee peace in the future. He continued:

For these are the things we have always professed to desire, and unless we pour out blood and treasure now and succeed we may never be able to unite or show conquering force again in the great cause of human liberty (10:5722-23).

The Bolsheviks did not agree with this view—the war was only for gain of one side over the other.

Reports continued to describe the internal conditions of Russia as crumbling. In the month of September, Roland Morris was especially active in painting a gloomy picture of Russia. Conditions were bad; food was scarce, radical propaganda was more intense and the army had more rumblings of disloyalty. Army personnel were becoming more political, Morris commented, as they refused to obey any order unless it was first approved by the Executive Committee of the Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Council (63:861.00/502).

A good indication of the erosion of confidence in Russian stability was when both Britain and Japan recalled most of their citizens from Petrograd. The British wanted all women and children to evacuate Petrograd (63:861.00/528).

As September came to a close, Morris’ dispatches grew less promising. He continued to write of disrespect in the army and that a form of anarchy hung over Russia because no central authority currently existed that could command enough respect to gain obedience.

Rumors continued to circulate that the Allies were
withdrawing from Petrograd, abandoning the Russians to their own chaotic conditions. The Germans and anti-Allied socialists in Russia were more than willing to spread such rumors in their travels. At this same time in September there was a change in the State Department's attitude toward Russia. Less confidence was felt in the Russian capability to conduct the war to an end, and even less faith remained in Kerensky as a leader. Unfortunately, this changing attitude did not result in an increased desire to help Russia, only in a feeling that Russia would not remain in the war; therefore, the attitude developed—"why bet on a losing team?" Francis alone continued to search for order among the chaos despite his occasional criticism of the Russians.

In September, despite Francis' doubts about government stability, he mingled his reports of despair with ones of faith in Kerensky and the government. Confusion was the rule in Russia during this time, and David Francis adapted quite well to this state of affairs. His main concern the entire time was with Russia's weakness, and the knowledge that her loss to the Allied side would cost the United States millions of dollars and lives because of an intensified war on the Western front. In light of this view, one could understand why Francis was interested in Russian government stability. The lack of food grew more critical, reported Francis, and the greatest menace to Russia was the Bolshevik
party (18:164-65). He was in doubt about who the army would follow in time of crisis; with army loyalty split between the government, the Deputies, Conservatives and Bolsheviks, some officials felt civil war was possible (63:861.00/523).

One September communiqué from Francis stated that he had talked separately to the Japanese Ambassador to Russia and various government officials about a contest between the government and the Soviet. Each one believed the Soviet would be victorious, although Francis felt the government would command the loyalty of the army. His confidence was rewarded by agreement from the Russian Foreign Minister (63:861.00/527). Another Ministry was formed in September by Kerensky, reported Francis, and it was growing stronger because it did not include any Soviets (63:861.00/519). Here again is evidence that Francis was not cognizant of the reality of Russian politics. Socialists were increasingly present in the Ministry after July, even though they were not the most liberal socialists. The Soviets were the most powerful organization in Russia and hoping to exclude them from the Ministry and then claim to have a stronger government displayed Francis' complete lack of comprehension of politics in general, and especially Russian politics.

The United States never ceased to try to persuade
Russia to continue to fight. Messages were sent to political and social organizations; Samuel Gompers, for example, continued to write to the Russians calling for the workers to limit their demands in favor of a united war effort. Colonel House emphasized that money must be spent on some form of educational propaganda to combat the German propaganda; he drew his conclusion from listening to eyewitnesses from Russia (50:140). House expressed a real understanding of the events when he concluded that Russia was about to go under and wrote, "It is more important, I think, that Russia should weld herself into a virile republic than it is that Germany should be beaten to her knees (50:153). Few others felt the same as Colonel House did in 1917.

One additional problem had to do with propaganda and presenting a good American image: United States treatment of socialists within their own country. There were a few trials in which socialists were involved and they drew much attention in Russia. Francis attended one gathering in September to hear protests against the United States. About eight thousand were at the meeting, and were to hear, according to a handbill, "how this (free) country deals with its revolutionists" (18:165-66). Radical socialists continued to question America's support of the Russian people versus the American desire to keep Russia in the war.
During August the Provisional Government called the various parties to meet in Moscow to confer on a number of problems and discuss the proposed Constitutional Assembly. Opinion varied as to the success of the Moscow Conference. One group expressed the belief that the government had emerged from the Conference with more strength and solid support than ever before. Izvestiia agreed that the Conference served the government's interests; in their view it had to, because Russia could be saved only if all the parties consolidated their goals and worked together for survival of the revolution (4:1520). Contrary to this view was the theory that the Conference caused Russia to split into two political groups. No one emerged a victor, everyone suffered a small defeat, wrote Den (4:1518). Again, the newspapers split their opinions along political lines; the radicals on either end could see no favorable outcome in Moscow, whereas moderate socialists wanted to see hope, and they did.

Elections to the Constituent Assembly, already postponed from its original dates, was set for November 12, and the Assembly itself would convene on November 28, 1917. The failure to hold the Assembly earlier, as originally planned, probably sent the Provisional Government to an earlier death than would otherwise have been the case. Land reform was needed before the Tsar fell, and postponing
it for a long time after his downfall was more than most ignorant peasants could understand. The Assembly was to alleviate the inequities and distribute the land among the peasants; delaying land reform was a major error of the Provisional Government.

The last major crisis Kerensky faced before the Bolsheviks took over was the Kornilov Affair. Named for General Kornilov, it was particularly important because it not only displayed Kerensky's weakness and the weakness of the government, but it also allowed the Bolsheviks to gain their final foothold before stepping into power.

General Kornilov was named Commander-in-Chief of all the Russian forces. Francis described him as a man of small stature, but an iron constitution coupled with a will of steel. He could speak seventeen languages, which made him popular among the multitudinous nationalities in the Russian army. Strict adherence to military rules was enforced by Kornilov. Francis used the example of one hundred deserters that had been shot and placed on the roadway with placards reading, "I was shot because I ran away from the enemy and was a traitor to Russia" (18:145). If Francis had the power, he could not have molded a man more suited to his ideal.

Morale improved and discipline was restored to the army with the appointment of Kornilov as Commander
of the Army. Kornilov believed in a strong government as well as a disciplined army. Kerensky's vacillating actions concerning the radical socialists, his failure to restore order in the army and with the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies all were an anathema to Kornilov. Rumors that forces were at work in Russia to restore the monarchy added tension to the differences between the two men. A major German victory at the front generated Bolshevik activity in Petrograd, and caused Kornilov to move his forces to the outskirts of the city. Much confusion followed.

Kornilov sent Vladimir Lvov to Kerensky to demand the latter's resignation and place himself as a temporary military dictator. Of course, Kerensky refused and tried to find a replacement for Kornilov as Commander of the Army. Kerensky could find no one willing to take command immediately, and meantime the threat of Kornilov and his forces marching on the city was greatly increased. At this point, Kerensky made his fatal error; he armed the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, including the Bolsheviks, to resist Kornilov, which they did successfully (63:361.00/501). Kerensky was caught in the middle of two forces with opposing political views, and he willingly armed one to defeat the other.

Following Kornilov's defeat on September 12, Francis cabled Lansing that the government was stronger
as a result, but if discipline in the army was not restored immediately, Russia would be out of the war (63:861.00/515). Kerensky formed a new Ministry and invited the Cadets to join; however, the Soviets refused to allow their members to join if the Cadets did (63:861.00/516).

Reports came into the State Department that the Kornilov Affair had badly shaken the government. The radicals on both ends had gained a larger voice because the moderates were busy destroying themselves. Maddin Summers claimed that Kerensky was having difficulty forming a new cabinet, and criticism was increasing because many people thought that Kornilov had been tricked by Kerensky (64:861.00/600). Odessa was the scene of a shift in power, reported John Ray; the workers and soldiers had taken command of their local government and declared their stand in favor of peace and no confidence in the Provisional Government (63:861.00/525).

Disappointment has to be an understatement in describing Francis' feeling about the Kornilov Affair. Kornilov was a man "whose mistake was making demands before public sentiment was sufficiently strong in their favor to face their acceptance," Francis wrote to Judge Henry B. Priest of St. Louis (18:160-61). Francis was bitter as he wrote in later years:

Had Lvov been a wise and strong man instead of the
meddlesome rattle-brain that he was, and had Kerensky been big enough to place his country's welfare above his own pride and seek some middle ground upon which he and Kornilov might have worked against the Bolshevists--their common enemy--they might between them have rescued Russia and the world from the curse of Bolshevism. . . (18:156-57).

Kerensky was viewed as a vacillating idealist by Sir George Buchanan. He told the British Foreign Office that Kerensky feared a strong Russian army because it might someday be used against the revolution (5:186). The weakness of the Kerensky government was now apparent to all. Buchanan was no exception; in fact, he had seen a general weakness in the Provisional Government long before others did.

Again political beliefs split Russian attitude toward the Kornilov Affair. The radicals on the left wing were opposed to Kornilov and the radicals on the right wing were opposed to the government; the moderates favored the government. Support of the government was Izvestiia's stand, because it controlled many of the governmental operations through the Soviets (4:1597). Those who were in sympathy with Kornilov longed for a stronger government and strict discipline in the army. Kornilov offered this. Former supporters of the Tsar, such as the Church, wanted a stronger government (4:824).

Condemnation of Kornilov came from the Bolshevik opposition. They were upset because Kornilov had exposed
the already weak Provisional Government to one more traumatic test which surely weakened it further. Russkiia Vedomoski opposed Kornilov's attempted coup on the grounds that force was not the way to change the government (4:1592).

The Kornilov Affair did not expose tacit weakness in the Provisional Government, but showed its complete impotence. Kornilov's efforts to save Russia from the grip of the Bolsheviks sped up the Bolshevik takeover by seriously weakening the government and causing Kerensky to arm the Bolsheviks. It took a little more than a month from Kornilov's defeat to the time of the Bolshevik victory.

In October, Francis, torn between his hope of Russian continuance in the war and his view of the rapid deterioration of government support, persisted in sending confusing cables to Washington. He would describe insoluble conditions, then conclude by saying he had faith in Russia's ability to emerge from the chaos in good order.

Moderate socialists had lost their grip on the people, claimed Roland Morris, and this left an open avenue for the Bolsheviks and other radicals (64:861.00/581). Maddin Summers extended the bad news by reporting the economic situation was steadily growing worse; food distribution was as bad as distribution under the Tsarist system (64:861.00/594).
An ironic note came at this inopportune time from Lansing to Francis. It was a message from the United States Chamber of Commerce telling the Russian people that they supported the Russian fight against Germany. The message continued by pointing out the Chamber's honesty in not taking advantage of war time to make excessive profits. The Russian Revolution was for democracy and they wanted the Russians to know that the democratic Chamber was behind them (64:861.00/574a). Here was a message from capitalism's own organization telling a country that would become communist in one month that they should continue to fight for democracy.

Even though Lansing's position toward Russia seemed to harden somewhat, he still stated a need to aid Russia as late as October 23. In a memorandum he expressed the view that a fighting Russia meant the saving of at least one million American lives and any aid was worth at least that much. Too much caution, such as Francis used, was not correct, Lansing said, but consideration for loans should be made on the basis of economy and efficiency, not on Russia's stability (70:861.51/241).

The United States did not give up on Russia. Lansing's attitude was an example of America's steadfast faith in the young republic. Even after the Bolshevik takeover,
the United States refused to abandon all hope of Russia remaining with the Allies.

One topic remains for discussion in this chapter, that of the increase in Bolshevik strength just prior to the second revolution in November. Following their attempt at control in early July, the Bolsheviks remained semi-dormant until the Kornilov Affair equipped them with arms and public reaction against the right wing of Russian politics. The Bolsheviks won a major victory on September 22 when they gained a majority of votes in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets, reported Izvestiia. The reason for the victory was the split among the Social Revolutionaries following the Kornilov Affair. Leon Trotsky, a Bolshevik, was named President of the Petrograd Soviet (4:1704); this gave the Bolsheviks more prestige than power, but that was what counted among an ignorant populace.

Bolshevik strength continued to increase, according to reports by Ambassador Francis. His messages contained accounts of unrest and government weakness in the face of frequent and oft-threatened demonstrations by the Bolsheviks. In the concluding days of September, Francis reported agitation by the Bolsheviks to the point where the government decided to issue a warrant for Lenin's arrest. Francis feared Lenin's arrest might spark an armed clash, but the arrest never materialized (63:861.00/558). The selection of
the frequently changed Ministry was cause for further conflict. Kerensky chose a number of Cadets to fill Cabinet posts, much to the consternation of the Bolsheviks. Francis speculated that Kerensky had confidence that he could handle the threat of the Bolsheviks (64:861.00/579), but Francis was well aware of the dangerous atmosphere existing in Petrograd. He wrote to his son telling him the British Ambassador headed a list of persons the Bolsheviks planned to kill, and he, Francis, was not far down the list of names; however, he did not seem to be afraid (18:169-70).

In the few remaining days of October, the Bolshevik pressure mounted. There were many threats of demonstrations against the government, but nothing developed on a mass scale. Francis did say that there was a large demonstration planned for November 2 and the Bolsheviks were to arrest the members of the Provisional Government. The government said they would resist any Bolshevik attempt, peaceful or otherwise (64:861.00/615). October dispatches from Petrograd ended with an altogether typical view from Francis when he cabled Lansing:

Beginning to think Bolsheviks will make no demonstration; if so shall regret as believe sentiment turning against them and time opportune moment for giving them wholesome lesson (64:861.00/619).

Sir George Buchanan was emphatic in his dislike of the Bolsheviks and frequently stated so. He was worried
that the socialists would refuse to stop the Bolsheviks because of their vague socialist brotherhood, and said that if the government could not muster the strength to stop the Bolsheviks soon, the only alternative would be an eventual Bolshevik government (5:188-89).

Russian newspapers were bulging with articles describing the obvious weakness of the Provisional Government. The use of the word "anarchy" was frequent in these articles when discussing the general political atmosphere. Even the government wrote of the uncontrollable waves of anarchy rising across the country bent on destroying Russian society; they said this unruliness was fed by foreigners hoping to take advantage of a weakened foe (4:1714). There was no uniform solution to this disorder, although most papers agreed that the government must take a firmer stand in controlling it. Izvestiia reported that Kerensky was receiving letters from all over Russia requesting government action to stop the destruction (4:1644).

As if general chaos was not enough, reports began circulating that the Bolsheviks were agitating for Jewish pogroms. Headlines told of the increasing Bolshevik activity; a new mood existed among the people with the Bolsheviks ready to harvest the benefits, claimed Delo Naroda (4:1764). The Russians could see and sense the coming attempt at dominance by the Bolsheviks. Lenin gave a hint of the Bolshevik
opportunity to gain public confidence when he severely criticized the Socialist Revolutionary Party for betraying the peasants on the issue of land reform (4:581). This criticism of the peasants' most influential party revealed a degree of Bolshevik assurance that Russian society was disrupted enough to let them take control.

Bolshevism was able to gain control of the Government a few short days into November. The results of Russian activity from March to November, 1917, have been extremely controversial. The immediate public reaction was not disbelief at the Provisional Government's death, but intense hatred of the Bolsheviks and hope that the Provisional Government would return to power.
The November Bolshevik Revolution was not anticipated by the American public, but the public reaction was not one of bewilderment and shock; rather, of intense dislike of the Bolsheviks. Little time and space was devoted to analyzing what went wrong in Russia; most was spent criticizing Bolshevism and hoping for a return to power of the Provisional Government, or its equivalent.

As late as November 2, Francis did not appear to be worried about the government's stability. He did mention that most of the soldiers had pledged to follow the Soviet, controlled by the Bolsheviks. Guards were posted outside the various diplomatic embassies for protection; Francis did not think the action was significant, "merely precaution" (64:861.00/620). On the same day, Lansing cabled Francis that the Washington Post had announced that Russia was ready to quit the war. He was very concerned about this misleading article and feared unpleasant reaction in Russia, so he gave Francis a statement that claimed the State Department had received no information from its embassies or other sources that indicated Russia's intention of quitting the war (64:861.00/621a). Certainly Lansing was worried that the Russian government would believe that
Francis and other diplomats had given the State Department this news; this would be most damaging to the Provisional Government's relationship with Francis.

Internal conditions in Russia grew more confused during the first week of November; the Bolsheviks, after gaining control of the Petrograd Soviet, were increasing their stranglehold on Petrograd itself. Francis was aware of this expansion of Bolshevik influence. On November 7 he revealed that the Bolsheviks had control of everything; the Ministry had disappeared and the soldiers were sympathizing with the Bolsheviks. Even the majority of newspapers had been suppressed (64:861.00/634). The end of the Provisional Government had finally arrived; Francis did not mourn like a godfather; instead he stood his ground and announced his refusal to recognize any government instigated by Lenin and Trotsky (18:188). This attitude continued to be Francis' stand until his departure from Russia in 1918.

Action by the Wilson Administration was hampered by conflicting reports and the lateness of Francis' cables because of poor telegraph connections. Wilson wrote to Charles E. Russell agreeing with Russell's letter asking for United States propaganda to show that Russia's revolutionary success depended on continuance of the war (1:349). Although the United States had little in common with
communist Russia, Wilson would let Russia determine her own destiny in the hope that she would re-enter the war.

Much of the information received by the State Department concerning the latest Russian revolution came from Morris in Sweden; Francis wrote to Morris because of the difficulty sending information directly from Petrograd to Washington. Consequently, Morris was in a good position to relay the new events, and he described in various cables to Lansing that the Bolsheviks had taken control of Petrograd and appeared to have the support of the Soviet.

Immediately following the Bolshevik takeover, several actions were taken by the Petrograd Soviet. Trotsky proclaimed the Provisional Government dissolved, arrested some of its Ministers, and took a vote which indicated lack of confidence in Kerensky as a leader (64:861.00/630). Later reports confirmed that the Bolsheviks had more control and there were more arrests of government personnel. The Mayor of Petrograd had formed a committee of public safety to oppose the Bolsheviks, which was supported by the American and British Embassies. Morris notified Lansing that Kerensky was willing to fight the Bolsheviks (64:861.00/645). Finally, on November 19, Morris related the feeling of Russian visitors to Sweden that the Bolsheviks would not last long because of their lack of support from many socialist parties (44:237).
Bolshevism was able to gain more popular support in November than earlier in 1917, because their plea for a separate peace was more appealing than in March. The sudden illusion of democracy in March added spirit to the war effort and the people seemed willing to fight for their newly won freedom. This spirit soon dwindled because war was just as devastating and cruel under democracy as it had been under Tsardom. Consequently the Bolshevik cry for "Bread, Land, Peace" became increasingly appealing to the Russian people.

The move for a separate peace was strong in the earlier hours of the Bolshevik government. Francis was aware of this move and reported it to Lansing, when he wrote that a peace proposal was not a move for Russia alone, but for all Allies (44:236). The declining fighting spirit of the army and their deplorable fighting conditions made any proposal for peace very popular with the soldiers. Francis was not concerned with this, but he was disturbed at the Russians for negotiating an armistice without consulting the Allies; he reminded Russia she had promised to continue fighting, using all her ability (44:252). It is not difficult to understand Francis' displeasure with the Bolshevik peace move. He had worked hard to encourage the Provisional Government to stay in the war; to have a group of people, whom Francis never
understood, dislodge that government and immediately call for an armistice was more than Francis could bear.

Francis continued to display his intense dislike of the Bolsheviks in his reports. Protection of the American Embassy was offered by the Bolshevik government, but Francis declined lest it indicate a form of recognition of the Lenin-Trotsky government (18:183). The popular rumor that Germany supported Lenin and his followers was accepted by Francis as well as by many State Department officials. Francis' beliefs were confirmed by German Secretary of State Kuhlmann on December 3, 1917. He stated that the Germans had in fact funded Bolshevik activity in Russia (4:1381).

By the end of November, any hope of Kerensky's government returning to office had diminished considerably. The only hope left for Francis was that the remaining socialist parties would overcome the Bolsheviks and form a more moderate government. As a result, Francis watched the elections for the Constitutional Assembly with keen interest and told Lansing that it did not look like the Bolsheviks would win a majority. This was encouraging to Francis (44:272), and his speculation proved to be correct; nevertheless, the Bolsheviks powered their way to complete dominance of Russia in a short period of time.

One final note remains to be explained concerning
David Francis' reaction to the Bolshevik takeover. When the Tsar fell in March and Prince Lvov formed a government, Francis eagerly requested State Department permission to recognize the new government. However, upon seeing the Bolsheviks gain office, Francis was less willing to extend a friendly hand; he was reluctant to ask Lansing what he was to do concerning recognition of the Bolshevik government. Lansing hurriedly cabled Francis that he was not to extend recognition to the Bolsheviks; he explained that the United States was waiting for further developments (44:254). When the wrong party acquires control of a government, it is understandable that the United States would hesitate to aid it with the prestige of her recognition.

To conclude State Department reaction to the November Revolution, a note from Maddin Summers in Moscow must be considered. Summers candidly described the deplorable conditions in the army, and said peace or no peace, the Russian army was not able to fight effectively. He concluded, however, that the most important American job was to combat German propaganda and hope the "better elements" in Russia would regain power. Thus, he felt it essential that all American agencies stay in Russia to aid the propaganda campaign (44:235). Summers, as well as most Americans, refused to give up hope that in the
near future the Bolshevik fantasy would disappear and sanity would once again rule Russia.

Alexander Kerensky was critical of the Bolsheviks, not so much of the individuals, but of their unethical tactics. Much of the Bolshevik agitation was directed at Kerensky personally; he thought this was damaging to the Provisional Government in the long run. The dual role played by the Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government for support of the people was unbalanced by the Bolsheviks' insistence on including the soldiers in the Soviet membership. This gave the Bolsheviks unwarranted influence in that body (30:233). The basically ignorant people of Russia were unable to distinguish between the Soviet and the government at times, thus severely damaging the government's authority and stability (30:233).

Kerensky admitted that land reform was too slow in coming to realize support from the people, but he countered that none of the opposition offered a workable alternative to the government's program (30:225). Despite this and similar shortcomings, Kerensky insisted the Provisional Government could have succeeded if it had not been for the unethical and unfair lies spread by the Bolsheviks against the government. Personal defamation toward himself concerning the Kornilov Affair, Kerensky explained, proved to
be "one of the major factors in the destruction of democracy in Russia" (30:423-24).

Generally, the public reaction to the Bolshevik takeover was similar to the State Department's; the people expressed disappointment at the Provisional Government's fall and opposed the Bolshevik government. Before November 7, the public seemed to be aware of trouble because many articles were written in the newspapers concerning Russia's ability to continue fighting in the war. The *New York Times* ran a front page story on November 3 reproducing Lansing's letter to Francis describing the *Washington Post*'s article about Russia quitting the war. The article made it quite emphatic that Russia was not out of the war. But in the same paper, an editorial criticized Kerensky's tacit statement about Russia withdrawing from the war before it actually happened (42:3rd/1).

Some Americans realized the overwhelming odds against the actual success of the Russian Revolution in developing Russia into a democracy. The blame, in part, was placed with the general backwardness of the Russian peasants. Simon Litman wrote that contrary to a few earlier claims, the Russians lacked a basic understanding of free choice on a national level, and the Russian masses followed the party that offered the most benefits in the shortest time. He claimed the Bolsheviks took advantage
of the poor internal conditions and the people were not to
be blamed for following their lead; the freedom Russians
sought was not to be criticized (34:181-91). Writing in
The Russian Review, Leo Pasvolsky described the Provisional
Government as lacking real authority to guide the Russian
people, and said the Kornilov Affair was the final blow
before its downfall (45:7-38).

Criticism of the Provisional Government was not
widespread; Kerensky himself received the brunt of the cri-
tics' blows. One comment from The Nation on November 8
should be noted. It censured the Allies for not reducing
their war aims, and commented that because the Allies
refused to cooperate with Kerensky's government in his
pledge to change the war aims, it greatly weakened his
government (73:501-2). By the time The Nation hit the
newsstands, their fears were reality—Kerensky's govern-
ment had fallen because the people lost faith in its
ability to carry out its promises.

Russian Ambassador Boris Bakhmeteff was not sympa-
thetic to the Bolshevik government. Understandably, he
would not represent them because of divergent viewpoints.
Bakhmeteff said that the American State Department would
not recognize Lenin's government and would instead continue
to recognize himself (42:25th/2), as he perpetrated the
Russian attitude of continued fighting against Germany.
When news of the Bolshevik Revolution reached the United States, there was immediate response on Wall Street; the market dipped eleven points in some areas. It was one of the year's worst declines (42:9th/1). Because Allied war contracts were a great factor in the stability of the Stock Market, it was highly susceptible to any unrest among the Allies; the Bolshevik Revolution caused the market to drop.

United States newspaper reaction at first was limited to descriptions of the Bolshevik takeover and Kerensky's attempt to wrestle control of the government. Many of the articles criticized the Bolsheviks but they did not laud Kerensky's former government. Disruptive activity in Petrograd filled most of the early articles with comments about the Bolsheviks' irresponsibility in using power.

Much of the public reaction to the second Russian Revolution was anti-Bolshevik. The people disliked the Bolsheviks mainly because they caused Russia to drop out of the war and forced America to accept a larger share of the fighting. Two years later, in 1919, the American people developed an equal hatred of the Bolshevik philosophy. The label of pro-Germanism was pasted on the Bolsheviks; it was popular to lump all enemies of the Allies as pro-German. One can easily understand this
feeling that the Bolsheviks were aiding the Germans when the Americans could see more of their sons dying on the Western front because the Germans no longer had war on two fronts.

Hope was expressed by many that a new government would emerge in Russia and topple the Bolsheviks. Leo Pasvolsky, editor of Russkoye Slovo, a New York daily, said that the Bolshevik rebellion was treasonous; it would shortly be crushed and replaced by a government pledged to convening the Constitutional Assembly (42:9th/2). Little doubt was left that the United States would recognize any government established in opposition to the Bolsheviks.

Jews expressed open dislike of the Bolsheviks; the Bolsheviks had overthrown the only Russian government to even mouth equality for the Russian Jew, and it was only natural that the Jews would not favor the Bolsheviks. Herman Bernstein was emphatic that the Jews were not in sympathy with the Bolsheviks in a speech before the Institutional Synagogue (42:19th/2).

Not all Americans viewed the Bolsheviks in the same light; most were opposed to them, but there were a few that did not view their new government as such a grave threat to American democracy. The American people were slow to realize the actual threat that Bolshevism presented to Germany, related William B. Thompson. He insisted the Bolsheviks represented the antithesis of Germanism and therefore were
an overpowering threat to the Germans (13:1408-10). Others felt that the Bolsheviks did not maintain enough control of the government to impose an immediate peace as they had threatened. The communists did not speak for the Russian people, said the New York World (2:10). Charles Johnston backed this last argument when he wrote in the North American Review that the Duma represented all Russians, whereas the Bolsheviks did not (24:378-87). Anti-socialism and pro-right wing political philosophy were consistent thinking by Johnston.

Optimism ran high in the early days following the November Revolution that the Bolsheviks would soon fall and be replaced by some form of democratic government. A New York Times editorial left no doubt that the Bolsheviks would not be able to retain power in Russia (42:11th/E-2). American officials expressed the same view; among these were S. R. Bertron, former member of the Root Mission, and Senator Meyer London. President Wilson saw the new Russian situation as a temporary setback in the war effort, but continued to believe that Russia would soon return to assisting the Allies (42:12th/3). The newspapers and periodicals were literally weighed down with optimistic articles concerning the return of a democratic government to Russia.

In all fairness, it must be said that not all shared this hope. One example is George Kennan, who did not
sympathize with the Bolsheviks at all, but took the more realistic view that European Russia was lost to the Allies and it was now necessary to save Siberia from the same fate. He contended that when fighting for Siberia, the Allies must support the majority of the Russians and not the Bolsheviks (27:141).

Alexander Kerensky was the last leader of the Provisional Government and consequently received the majority of the blame for its failure. The Atlantic Monthly called him a "virtual dictator" just before the Bolshevik takeover, but concluded that the people were willing to follow his lead (78:693-703). Kerensky's image deteriorated the more time elapsed after the November Revolution. Many people heaped total blame on Kerensky's shoulders for Russia's failure in their only experiment with democracy. The most common charge against him was his temporizing with the Bolshevik problem. The New York Times accused Kerensky of trying to please everyone and allowing the Bolsheviks to gain strength (42:10th/12). Correspondents Julius West and Harold Williams, traveling in Russia during November, related that they did not hear a kind word about Kerensky from the people (42:18th/2;74:250-51). By November 18, a New York Times editorial stated that Kerensky's attempt to raise an army was unsuccessful because the people had lost all faith in him (42:18th/E-2). The disenchantment with Kerensky
continued to grow, people became bitter toward him; his failure meant that more Americans would die in Europe and he received the indirect blame. His name was finally linked with Bolshevism when the Times referred to his political philosophy as Kerenskyism in the same sentence as Bolshevism (42:20th/12).

Kerensky never did, in the first few months after November, 1917, gain back the confidence of the Russians or Americans he once commanded. It was not uncommon to see articles written six months after his fall blaming him for not demonstrating a stronger will when confronted by the Bolshevik threat, although as time progressed this criticism became less harsh and more understanding. There was no difference between Kerensky and the Bolsheviks, commented the New Republic, except that Kerensky was loyal to the Allies whereas the Bolsheviks were not. The article went on to chastise the western Allies for not understanding the differences between the Russian moderates and extremists, concluding that a change had been necessary if they had wanted Russia to stay in the war (3:335-38). The New Republic displayed this more understanding analysis of Kerensky, but the search for a stronger conservative leader continued.

The primary concern of the United States upon hearing of the Provisional Government's fall was whether
or not Russia would remain in the war. Separate peace was a very unpopular idea among Americans because they thought it would increase fighting on the Western front. President Wilson was against a separate peace and admonished the pacifists. "I want peace," he explained, "but I know how to get it, and they do not" (42:13th/1). Many Americans were critical of the Bolshevik bid for a separate peace, claiming they did not represent the true feelings of the Russian people. Lincoln J. Steffens, after touring Russia, concluded that a separate peace could not be realized because the Russian people did not want it, and they were the real leaders of Russia (42:10th/2). Nothing could have been farther from the truth. Henry P. Davison of the Red Cross agreed with Mr. Steffens that the masses were not desirous of a separate peace (42:9th/2).

Testimonials continued to ring in the air with hope and trust in Russia; few news media carried articles that stated otherwise. The United States wanted Russia to continue to oppose Germany; it was an easy thing to believe they would, despite the indications they would not. Wilsonian ideals were so paramount for saving the world for democracy that the American public was temporarily unable to tolerate any opposition, especially by the little known and arrogant Bolsheviks.
EPILOGUE

Since 1900, the United States has developed into an omnipotent international force; when she makes a foreign policy decision, the entire world is affected. Sometimes the United States uses this power in a careless and even selfish manner. United States relations with the Russian Provisional Government of 1917 was such a case. President Woodrow Wilson decided to fight Germany, hoping to change European imperialism to a more liberal form of international order, but instead unintentionally aided the Bolsheviks in taking over control of the Russian government.

After the collapse of the Romanov dynasty, Russia was thrown into war and faced with having to establish a new form of government. The Russian people were not accustomed to representative government, and frequently reduced themselves to mob rule. Politics and political parties were able, for the first time, to operate without fear of government reprisal; thus confusion resulted as hundreds of years of political censorship were erased.

The Russian political picture did not tell the whole story. Russia was involved in a war against Germany, Europe's strongest military machine; the ill-equipped Russian army was no match for the German army. The Allied powers encouraged Russia to remain in the war, and at times
even threatened to curtail economic aid if Russia did not fight. The Allies were more interested in keeping Germany at war on two fronts than they were in helping Russia develop her first representative government. In all fairness to the Allies, diplomacy of war takes precedent over everything during wartime.

Russia's task of developing her first representative government and waging war at the same time were in direct contrast. In order to successfully conduct a war, a country must be internally stable; the Provisional Government was not. Failure of Kerensky's offensive in early July, coupled with procrastination in convening the Constitutional Assembly and implementing land reform pushed the people to the point of rebellion. Following the attempted coup in July by the Bolsheviks, the Provisional Government eroded with each crisis. The Kornilov Affair left the government standing almost alone while the Bolsheviks were preparing for the November Revolution.

United States-Russian day-to-day diplomatic relations were generally formulated by David R. Francis, Ambassador to Petrograd. There were numerous other American representatives to Russia during 1917, but only Francis wrote what the Wilson Administration wanted to hear. Being the first Allied representative to recognize the new Provisional Government, Francis felt an obligation to support this
government. His dislike of socialists and his hatred of the Bolsheviks prevented Francis from being an effective reporter to the United States Department of State. His dispatches to Robert Lansing were filled with confidence in the Provisional Government and distrust of the Bolsheviks.

A variety of United States special missions were sent to Russia in 1917. The accomplishments of the missions were negligible during the time of the Provisional Government; however, the Stevens Railroad Commission was of some assistance after the Bolsheviks gained power. The Root Mission, the most well known of the missions, came back to the United States with their opinions of Russia basically unchanged, and with weak suggestions for correcting Russia's ills. The two leaders of the Red Cross Mission, William Boyce Thompson and Raymond Robins, interfered in Russian political matters, and kept that Mission from performing its intended duties.

International political philosophy played a major role in United States-Russian relations during 1917. President Wilson developed a world philosophy that eventually proved to be in direct opposition to Vladimir Lenin's world revolutionary philosophy. Wilson had faith in the basic capitalist system, and was willing to fight Germany to save it. Germany was not an enemy of the United States; rather, she was imperialistic, and Wilson wanted to eliminate this
imperialistic element from Germany. On the other hand, Lenin opposed waging war to save capitalism, but favored immediate socialist revolution to destroy capitalism. Lenin was concerned that the Allies, if successful in the war, would replace the socialists in world reform.

Philosophical differences between Wilson and Lenin markedly affected Russia. Wilson's insistence that the defeat of Germany be the first priority left Russia in a precarious position. Following the March Revolution, Russia's feelings toward the war were mixed, but as the months passed, the hardships grew more intense and the mood quickly changed. Opposition to the war and impatience with the slow progress of the revolution became the general attitude of the Russian people. Lenin's alternative philosophy of abandoning the war for more expanded and rapid revolutions was appealing to the Russian people by late 1917. The insistence by Kerensky and Wilson that the war be concluded before political reform be accomplished was in direct opposition to the progress of the March Revolution. By November, the Russian people developed the feeling that the revolution was more important than the war; this mood was synonymous with Bolshevik propaganda and consequently helped instigate the Bolshevik Revolution.

Following the November Revolution, Bolshevism became an anathema in the United States, as was evidenced
by the Red Scare of 1919. Nevertheless, the United States was less hostile to Bolshevik Russia during the Versailles Peace Conference than was Britain or France. President Wilson believed the Russian people should determine their own fate; therefore, he was hesitant to assist the Russian nationalists in opposition to the Bolsheviks. Wilson's political philosophy, and in turn, United States-Russian relations, unintentionally assisted the Bolsheviks in overthrowing the Kerensky government.
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