Philosophers have relied heavily on the distinction between analytic truths and synthetic ones for various philosophical pursuits. In this paper I explore Immanuel Kant’s explanation of the distinction, W.V.O. Quine’s qualms with it, and the attempt of H.P. Grice and Strawson at saving synonymy in order to salvage analyticity from doubts. I conclude that although valiant, the efforts put forth by Grice and Strawson fall short. I argue that this is so because they attack a weak interpretation of Quine’s contention.
"Analytic vs. Synthetic, Distinction or Myth?: Kant’s Kantribution, Quine’s Inquisition, Grice and Strawson’s Salvation,"
International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities: Vol. 10:
2, Article 3.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/ijurca/vol10/iss2/3