A self-narrative ensures continuity for a conscious subject, in that the subject empathizes with the protagonist of both their remembered past and anticipated future. The ethical narrativity thesis (ENT) posits that such a narrative (or life-story) is requisite for agency and an ordered experience. Opponents of the ENT argue that one can inhabit an episodic (non-narrative) temporal schema and qualify as a rational agent. In this paper, I argue that narrative selfhood encourages cognitive distortions and inhibits a thorough etiological understanding of one’s past. I maintain that episodicity is the optimal form of self-constitution for rational, ethical decision-making.
"Identifying Errors in the Ethical Narrativity Thesis,"
International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities: Vol. 11:
2, Article 9.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/ijurca/vol11/iss2/9