Issues of persistence through time have been controversial in recent scholarship. A popular new view is four-dimensionalism: the view that time is a dimension much like space. Although it has been motivated in part by advancements in special relativity, four-dimensionalism has primarily emerged as a solution to recent metaphysical dilemmas. In this paper, I will examine three solutions to David Lewis’ problem of temporary intrinsics. I then find that the four-dimensionalist view of perdurantism solves the problem of temporary intrinsics while managing to avoid the serious problems that the other two views encounter. I agree with Lewis that it is the best view of the three. I will then show that this view in light of problems related to composition, nominalist perdurantism best explains our experience of objects.
"The Perdurantist’s Commitments,"
International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities: Vol. 2:
2, Article 4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/ijurca/vol2/iss2/4