The flow of time is vital for perception. While philosophers disagree as to the nature of how time is represented, i.e. that the passage of time is that of mere tense or belonging to the nature of the experience, it is generally accepted that the represented somehow tells us about the future, present and past. My contention is that this temporal character is indubitable for perception. I will begin by providing a temporal model of how percepts are represented. After giving a detailed presentation of the model, some problems will be considered, namely that the temporal model is doomed by the reversal of causal relata or no different than an unsuccessful perceptual experience. My contention will be that what is being represented in perception possesses fundamental temporal qualities that are indubitable for the experience, regardless of metaphysical worries or perceptual worries. If such temporal qualities belonging to the represented go without say, then a question remains as to the status of the temporal character of perception. After contrasting Kant’s position with Husserl’s position on the status of temporality in perception, I will argue that Kant’s position on perceptual temporality as manifesting from a cognitive faculty is more plausible.
Camacho, M. Polo
"The Indubitable Nature of Temporality in Perception,"
International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities: Vol. 4:
2, Article 17.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/ijurca/vol4/iss2/17