Musical Platonism’s central thesis is that a musical work is a sound structure and nothing more. Given this, three consequences follow. First, musical works cannot be created. Second, if two musical works have the same sound structure, they are the same musical work. Third, a musical work’s instrumentation is not a necessary feature of its identity. Jerrold Levinson denies these three claims. He argues that musical works are created; that even if two musical works have the same sound structure, they are nevertheless two different musical works; and that a musical work’s instrumentation is a necessary feature of its identity. In this essay, I challenge Levinson’s views, and I make the case for a more feasible alternative.
Le, Thien-Tin M.
"Musical Platonism: A Challenge to Levinson,"
International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities: Vol. 4:
2, Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/ijurca/vol4/iss2/8