In this paper, I posit that our minds inevitably internalize the external in the process of metaphysical enquiry because they naturally rely on abstraction, categorization, simplification and association. I first focus on the idea of substratum by claiming that it cannot exist independently of our minds. Second, I opine that both primary and secondary qualities are significantly dependent on our minds. Last but not least, I extend the shadow of relativity over the notion of motion. Finally, I postulate that even though there is certain external reality upon which our enquiry can converge, the external world is neither perfectly nor particularly closely knowable.
"On the Inevitable Internalization of the External in the Process of Metaphysical Enquiry,"
International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities: Vol. 5:
2, Article 6.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/ijurca/vol5/iss2/6