Using the combination of two views of blame (T. M. Scanlon and J. J. C Smart), I will argue in favor of a thesis I refer to as perspectivalism; that blame from the perspective of a third party is fundamentally a different sort of thing than blame from the perspective of an injured party. Using both examples that focus on hypocrites and moral luck cases, I will attempt to give reasons to why perspectivalism has strong explanatory value. Focusing on cases that involve hypocrites, I will attempt to show that two statements about hypocrites are true if we accept perspectivalism. First, that as many philosophers have noted, hypocrites lose their standing to blame from a third party perspective. Second, utilizing my new understanding of blaming as the injured party, I will conclude that hypocrites retain their standing to blame in virtue of their relationship to the wrong doing. In the case of the moral luck examples, I will give an example that shows the complexity that the two types of blame described. Ultimately, I will be arguing that a correct general theory of blame must take into consideration the blamer’s placement relative to an instance of wrongdoing using the explanatory value of the hypocrite cases.
"Perspectivalism and Blaming,"
International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities: Vol. 8:
2, Article 13.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/ijurca/vol8/iss2/13