Abstract
This paper argues that emergentism is not committed to downward causation but of direct causation. Events that are believed to be caused by a mental state, whether physical or mental, are actually caused by a physical state with a mental property. These mental properties are caused by the complexity of a collection of several physical components. Emergentism, as a view, is often faced by the fallacy of composition given its nomological nature which leads one to resort to dualism. Mental properties cannot exist in and of itself, but it only supports the physical through entailment. Lastly, it gives a brief discussion regarding some of the conditions of the possibility of emergent properties in conjunction with the characteristics of biological organisms.
Recommended Citation
Lota, Kenji
(2023)
"Emergentism Reconsidered,"
International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities: Vol. 9:
Iss.
2, Article 4.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7710/2155-4838.1164
Available at:
https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/ijurca/vol9/iss2/4
Article download data priot to October 2023
8