PTOM: Profit Concerning and Truthful Online Spectrum Double Auction Mechanism

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Conference Proceeding

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In recent years, the auction has been widely applied in wireless communications for spectrum allocation. In this paper, we investigate the online spectrum double auction problem and propose a Profit concerning and Truthful Online spectrum double auction Mechanism (PTOM). Different from most previous works, we consider the dynamic arrival of primary users (PUs) and secondary users (SUs) and allow SUs to request distinct time slots for using the spectrum. By introducing the priority bid, we capture the online and location associated feature to improve the spectrum utility. Based on the priority bid, we design an efficient admission and pricing rule to improve the auctioneer’s profit. Theoretical analyses are provided to prove that our mechanism has nice economic properties including individual rationality, budget-balance and resistance of time-based and value-based cheating.


This article was originally published in ICCCS 2016: Cloud Computing and Security. The full-text article from the publisher can be found here.

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ICCCS 2016: Cloud Computing and Security


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