Occurrent states
Document Type
Article
Department or Administrative Unit
Philosophy and Religious Studies
Publication Date
5-4-2017
Abstract
The distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent mental states is frequently appealed to by contemporary philosophers, but it has never been explicated in any significant detail. In the literature, two accounts of the distinction are commonly presupposed (and occasionally stated explicitly). One is that occurrent states are conscious states. The other is that non-occurrent states are dispositional states, and thus that occurrent states are manifestations of dispositions. I argue that neither of these accounts is adequate, and therefore that another account is needed. I propose that occurrent states are active states.
Recommended Citation
Bartlett, G. (2018). Occurrent states. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531
Journal
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Rights
Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017
Comments
This article was originally published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. The full-text article from the publisher can be found here.
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