Title

Occurrent states

Authors

Gary Bartlett, Central Washington UniversityFollow

Document Type

Article

Department or Administrative Unit

Philosophy and Religious Studies

Publication Date

5-4-2017

Abstract

The distinction between occurrent and non-occurrent mental states is frequently appealed to by contemporary philosophers, but it has never been explicated in any significant detail. In the literature, two accounts of the distinction are commonly presupposed (and occasionally stated explicitly). One is that occurrent states are conscious states. The other is that non-occurrent states are dispositional states, and thus that occurrent states are manifestations of dispositions. I argue that neither of these accounts is adequate, and therefore that another account is needed. I propose that occurrent states are active states.

Comments

This article was originally published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. The full-text article from the publisher can be found here.

Due to copyright restrictions, this article is not available for free download from ScholarWorks @ CWU.

Recommended Citation

Bartlett, G. (2018). Occurrent states. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 48(1), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2017.1323531

Journal

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Rights

Copyright © Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2017