Value, violence, and the ethics of gaming
Document Type
Article
Department or Administrative Unit
Philosophy and Religious Studies
Publication Date
2-6-2017
Abstract
I argue for two theses. First, many arguments against violent gaming rely on what I call the contamination thesis, drawing their conclusions by claiming that violent gaming contaminates real world interactions. I argue that this thesis is empirically and philosophically problematic. Second, I argue that rejecting the contamination thesis does not entail that all video games are morally unobjectionable. The violence within a game can be evaluated in terms of the values the game cultivates, reinforces, denigrates, or disrespects. Games which present violence in ways that disrespect objects of values are more objectionable than violent games that reinforce or cultivate those values. The resulting analysis evaluates games on a case-by-case basis and pays particular attention to the representational context of the violence.
Recommended Citation
Goerger, M. (2017). Value, violence, and the ethics of gaming. Ethics and Information Technology, 19(2), 95–105. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-017-9417-5
Journal
Ethics and Information Technology
Rights
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017
Comments
This article was originally published in Ethics and Information Technology. The full-text article from the publisher can be found here.
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