This paper explores how a Humean may respond to issues of vagueness in philosophy of language—and in extension—ontology. It begins with an examination of the sorites paradox and two common responses: epistemicism, and eliminativism. I then turn to David Hume’s conception of abstract ideas as a way to determine how vague terms refer and then compare this view to both epistemicism and eliminativism. The paper ends with a defense of the Humean view as a synthesis of the two, which ultimately questions the formulation of the sorites paradox as a proper use of language.
"Towards a Humean Solution of Vagueness in Language and Ontology,"
International Journal of Undergraduate Research and Creative Activities: Vol. 6:
2, Article 7.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.cwu.edu/ijurca/vol6/iss2/7