Title
A formal theory approach to lawsuits and corporate deviant behavior: building a more efficient system
Document Type
Article
Department or Administrative Unit
Political Science
Publication Date
3-2004
Abstract
This paper discusses the problems in the efficient implementation of tort reform. Current, and many proposed reforms, fail to provide a Pareto optimal solution. The problems with current policies lie in the fact that they only alter the incentive structures of one actor in the tort system. A truly efficient system needs to alter incentive structures for both potential litigants and potential defendants. Using economic modeling, the paper argues that efficient tort reform can be achieved by utilizing decoupled tax incentives.
Recommended Citation
Manweller, M. (2004). A formal theory approach to lawsuits and corporate deviant behavior: building a more efficient system. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 33(1), 107–123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2003.12.001
Journal
The Journal of Socio-Economics
Rights
Copyright © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Comments
This article was originally published in The Journal of Socio-Economics. The full-text article from the publisher can be found here.
Due to copyright restrictions, this article is not available for free download from ScholarWorks @ CWU.