A formal theory approach to lawsuits and corporate deviant behavior: building a more efficient system
Department or Administrative Unit
This paper discusses the problems in the efficient implementation of tort reform. Current, and many proposed reforms, fail to provide a Pareto optimal solution. The problems with current policies lie in the fact that they only alter the incentive structures of one actor in the tort system. A truly efficient system needs to alter incentive structures for both potential litigants and potential defendants. Using economic modeling, the paper argues that efficient tort reform can be achieved by utilizing decoupled tax incentives.
Manweller, M. (2004). A formal theory approach to lawsuits and corporate deviant behavior: building a more efficient system. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 33(1), 107–123. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2003.12.001
The Journal of Socio-Economics
Copyright © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.